



AFRICA: POTENTIAL AND PROMISE

Y 4. F 76/1: AF 8/38

Africa: Potential and Promise, 103-...

HEARING

BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 27, 1994

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs



APR 5 1995

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

85-049 CC

WASHINGTON : 1995

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402

ISBN 0-16-046617-2

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AFRICA: POTENTIAL AND PROMISE

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 1994

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3 p.m. in room 2255 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Harry L. Johnston (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. JOHNSTON. To our witnesses, I start off with an apology. We have a hearing downstairs on Haiti right now. We have members of the State Department and the Defense Department, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, so members of this committee will be drifting in and out because there are three separate resolutions that have to be addressed down there.

Today's hearing is covering a subject that has enormous meaning to the African continent. It is ironic that this is not an area I have had much opportunity to discuss since I have become chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa.

This afternoon, I would like to talk about the good news that emanates from Africa. I firmly believe that Africa's potential and promise is often ignored by the world, the media, and for that matter, U.S. foreign policy.

So it is with great enthusiasm that I convene this afternoon's hearing to discuss Africa's success stories. I have had the privilege of presiding over about 25 congressional hearings since I became chairman last year. Most of these hearings have focused on problems facing the African continent.

We have heard testimonies about the civil wars in Liberia and Angola, the political debacles in Nigeria and Zaire, and we have been shocked by the devastation and genocide in Somalia and Rwanda.

This afternoon, I do not want to talk about the hyperbolic "Coming Anarchy", from the *Atlantic Monthly* article, or the disparaging "continental drift" written about in recent major magazines and newspapers, and other discussions of Africa's plight.

I would like to hear from witnesses who will dispel the myth that Africa is only a continent of chaos and despair. But more importantly, I would like to highlight ways that we can encourage the positive trends by implementing long-term initiatives that are not adversely affected by the all consuming needs to put out the fires.

Scores of countries have had successful free and fair elections in sub-Saharan Africa. The Carter Center reports that 18 countries are now categorized as democratic with 15 more demonstrating a

commitment to democratic reform. A significant number of other African countries have implemented promising economic reforms.

Moreover, USAID under the auspices of the DFA has successfully fostered the implementation of a variety of important programs which are yielding promising results.

In the final analysis, however, Africa's future will be determined by something beyond an increasing number of fair and free elections. Terms like democracy and political pluralism have multifaceted meanings in Africa.

I hope that our witnesses today will outline the major determinants to Africa's potential political and economic successes. In presentations today, we will take stock of the ways that cultural, economic, and political variables must work together to create an environment for sub-Saharan Africa's promising future.

I hope our witnesses will feel free to offer bold prescriptions for action that should be taken on by Africans themselves as well as by U.S. policymakers. One word of caution. We cannot and should not deny the startling realities that face Africa today.

This hearing is merely an attempt to balance the overwhelmingly negative coverage that Africa receives, in an attempt to highlight the good stories that can be told by countries like Benin, Mali, Nigeria, South Africa, Malawi and Botswana.

Witnesses appearing before the subcommittee this afternoon are Ed Brynn, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs and John Hicks, Assistant Administrator for Africa at the USAID.

I also had the privilege of hearing from the distinguished private panel of witnesses including Dr. Ali Mazrui, Albert Schweitzer of professor of the humanities at the Institute of Global Cultural Studies, State University of New York, Dr. Michael Chege at the Harvard University, Kennedy School of Business, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the United Nations Development Program, and Professor George Ayittey of American University.

We will start with you, Ambassador.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR EDWARD BRYNN, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. BRYNN. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, Assistant Secretary Moose regrets that he is unable to testify before you today. He is accompanying Secretary Christopher on meetings with African delegates to the United Nations General Assembly in New York. I am pleased to represent the Assistant Secretary at this hearing on positive developments in Africa.

This is a very good thing to do.

The world often views Africa only through the lens of crisis or, as portrayed in Robert Kaplan's magazine article on worldwide anarchy as proof of the planet's worsening economic, demographic, environmental, and political problems.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Ambassador, could you move that mike just a little closer to you?

Mr. BRYNN. But this view is myopic. It belies the fact that this is a diverse continent of 500 million people, people in 48 sub-Saha-

ran countries who speak more than 800 languages and hold Christian, Islamic, Animist, and other religious beliefs.

Africa is also a continent of stark contrasts. Its nations range from the very large, such as Zaire, Sudan, and Nigeria, to small island states such as the Seychelles and Cape Verde. Africa has great deserts, yet it also has the world's largest arable land mass. There are also great contrasts in the political situations of the countries in Africa. This year, we witnessed the long-awaited transition to majority rule in South Africa through inspired leadership, free and fair elections, and a people dedicated to reconciliation. At the other extreme, we saw the speedy unraveling of Rwanda and shocking internecine brutality.

Africa's contrasting scenes, whether of bodies floating down the Kagera River or the peaceful, poignant exchange of an apartheid regime for majority-ruled democracy, may make good news copy, but these events in and of themselves do not define Africa.

Mr. Chairman, you asked me to focus on the positive events and trends in Africa. While I caution against generalization, I do believe there are a number of commendable changes occurring on the continent.

Let me turn first to a theme central to our concern for Africa, democracy, governance, and the rule of law. Although armed conflict and humanitarian disaster invariably seized the world's attention, there is a dramatic trend toward open democratic societies in sub-Saharan Africa.

The election of a democratic government in South Africa is but one example of how African demands for political participation are slowly being realized across the continent. There were only four African democracies in 1989. Now, nearly two-thirds of African countries are at some stage of democratic transition, providing a tremendous opportunity to advance U.S. interests in the areas of peace, sustainable development, and trade and investment, as well as in democracy and human rights.

Each country moves at its own pace, often with setbacks along the way, and each must fashion a democratic culture suitable to its own people. Change is sometimes incremental and the systems that emerge may not be completely familiar to us, demanding a more than superficial understanding before we come to judgment.

We have learned, for example, that an election which observers consider less than, "fair and transparent," may nonetheless constitute a positive step in a country's transition to democracy. This does not mean, however, that we will tolerate a double standard for newly emerging democracies. Instead, we will continue to hold governments accountable to the will of their own citizens and international human rights standards.

Our commitment to building democracy in Africa is carried out through policy dialogue and a strategic approach to resource allocation. Multilateral, regional, and bilateral approaches are being combined to maximize the effectiveness of U.S. efforts. The United States and other donors increasingly coordinate their bilateral assistance and are effectively pressing heads of state toward political and economic reform through international financial institutions and joint policy dialogue. For example, the former authoritarian stronghold of Malawi recently joined the ranks of Africa's democ-

racies as a result of such coordinated pressure combined with internal demands for change.

Civil society is beginning to blossom in those countries which have initiated political reform. Human rights and other watchdog groups, an independent press, professional associations, women's groups, and nongovernmental organizations providing civic education and legal assistance are proliferating and taking root. Although civic groups thrive best where democratic elections were free and fair, they have gained new foot holds, even in countries where democratic progress has been mixed. That is why U.S. democracy assistance, while concentrated among the most successful reformers, continues to be provided on a smaller scale where forces for positive change are active.

On the governmental side, officials, judges, and parliamentarians are striving to enact legal reform, public jurisprudence, obtain basic tools and references, develop skills and improve the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the judicial and legislative branches. Again, such efforts enjoy the most success where the government is fully committed to change. But even in countries where change has been halting, such efforts continue on the part of reform-minded individuals or groups, often with U.S. and other donor support.

New African democracies and countries in transition face difficult challenges, including struggling economies, high levels of poverty, disease and environmental degradation, and high population growth rates. In some countries, entrenched authoritarian leaders, recalcitrant militaries or civil conflicts threaten the welfare of millions. However, we have seen that once the political opening has occurred and civil society has begun to flower, the ability of an authoritarian regime to maintain power indefinitely rapidly diminishes.

Let me turn to a second central theme, conflict resolution and demobilization.

Conflict in Africa continues to pose perhaps the most difficult challenge to democratization. Conflict resolution is a first priority where there is civil strife. The Clinton administration has dedicated diplomatic and financial support both to resolve African conflicts and to prevent new ones. Sometimes these efforts are successful, sometimes they are not. The devastation in Rwanda, for example, came despite a 12-year diplomatic effort by Rwanda's neighbors and active U.S. support to establish a framework for national reconciliation.

Among other efforts to encourage reconciliation, the President sent the Reverend Jesse Jackson as a high-level emissary to Nigeria to encourage the Abacha government to take credible steps toward civilian democratic rule. The President's special envoys are deeply engaged in the peace talks on Angola and Sudan, making every effort to promote reconciliation in these countries.

Countries all over the world continue to look to the United Nations as a principal institution for resolving conflicts and keeping peace. The United Nations currently participates in four major peacekeeping operations in Africa: Somalia, Mozambique, Rwanda and Liberia. Mozambique is a budding success, well on its way to its first multiparty elections October 27, 28. The United States is working closely with the international community to foster com-

promise and reconciliation to bring an end to all these painful struggles.

One of the most positive trends we have noted in Africa is the increasing willingness of Africans to partnership in U.N. peacekeeping operations worldwide. In 19 countries, Zimbabwe, Botswana, the Congo, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Gambia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Mali, Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Chad, Zambia and Malawi, all of these countries have contributed troops for U.N. led peacekeeping operations in Africa. Ghana, Senegal, Nigeria, Kenya, Cameroon, and Niger have also provided troops for U.N. operations in Lebanon, Yugoslavia, Iran, and Cambodia.

Africans are also taking more responsibility for solving African conflicts. The Organization of African Unity, once best known for advocating a statist political agenda, organizing anti-Western block votes at the United Nations, and avoiding involvement in the conflicts of its neighbors, 2 years ago took on an historic initiative to create its own conflict resolution mechanism. Also unprecedented was OAU condemnation of one of its own member states for the 1993 attempted coup in Burundi.

The United States strongly supports the OAU's conflict resolution effort. This year, fiscal year 1994 we made a total of \$3.5 million available either directly to the OAU to help it establish its new conflict prevention center, or to the conflict media and mitigation efforts in which the OAU was engaged, including those in Rwanda and Burundi. In this context, the OAU has sent 47 military observers to Burundi.

As increasing democratization reduces regional strife, we are also noting increased cooperation between states. The Economic Community of West African States', ECOWAS, effort in Liberia involving peacekeeping from other African states has provided a new example of how subregional, regional, and international bodies can collaborate to pursue conflict resolution and peacekeeping.

The Intergovernmental Association on Drought and Development originally was established to help its six members, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia to address the Sahelian drought. Now it has been mediating the civil conflict in Sudan under the direction of the member Governments of Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea.

The Southern Africa Development Council, created by the neighboring states of then apartheid South Africa to forge economic cooperation and to lessen their dependence on South Africa faces new opportunities. Building on existing natural alliances, lines of communication and potential ties of commerce, SADC could be the foundation of regional cooperation and collaboration for conflict resolution.

Naturally, the new leadership of South Africa is concerned with tackling tough domestic issues. Nonetheless, President Mandela wants peace in his neighborhood, and, working in concert with President Mugabe of Zimbabwe and President Masire of Botswana decisively moved to resolve the crisis in Lesotho. He also lent his prestige to help in mediating the impasse between UNITA and the Government of Angola. South Africa with its exemplary history of

transition through reconciliation offers a model of conflict resolution to the rest of the continent.

Military downsizing has become a key issue in African conflict resolution. Several African states are in the process of demobilizing forces following the resolution of armed conflicts. They are doing so in part to reduce the economic burden of oversized military establishments.

This military downsizing directly supports efforts to promote democratization. Politicized militaries often pose the greatest threat to fragile African democracies. Downsizing and professional orientation can reduce the temptation for the military to intervene in politics or combatants to revert to the military option once democratization is under way. When combined with a well-designed program to reintegrate demobilized soldiers, it can also contribute importantly to overall economic development.

Mr. Chairman, I congratulate you and the committee for the September 19th House passage of the African Conflict Resolution Act. We commend the proposal's emphases on an enhanced capacity of African organizations to help resolve conflicts and on the relevance of the demobilization of African militaries to the long-term peace and economic well-being of Africa.

Finally, I would like to turn to economic reform and sustainable development.

There are some improvements in the economic health of Africa. Africa has all but abandoned failed socialistic economic policies of the past. Many countries have begun reforming their economies. A World Bank study, published earlier this year, examined 29 African countries that had undertaken structural adjustment programs in the second half of the 1980's. The study concluded that 15 of the 29 countries studied showed at least some improvement in their economic policies. Many countries substantially reduced nontariff barriers and began to rationalize tariff structures.

These better policies are beginning to pay benefits in higher growth rates in income, exports, industry, and agriculture that are leading to the reduction of poverty. Tanzania, Ghana, and Uganda exemplify those countries which are reaping the benefits of their adherence to economic reform programs. The World Bank study predates the January 1994 devaluation of the CFA franc on the African economies. This realignment of the exchange rate, coupled with other reforms, will help restore competitiveness of the 13 Francophone countries whose currencies are tied to the French franc. In some countries, we are already beginning to see the benefits of the devaluation both in renewed commitments to reform and indirect economic benefit to farmers.

The World Bank study, although positive on the effects of economic reform, warns of the need for sustained economic reform in Africa, especially in the public enterprises and financial sectors.

Through our own bilateral and regional assistance programs and through multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, we are helping African countries to get on the path to economic growth. We have also joined the Paris Club in offering debt reduction to the poorest nations in Africa and elsewhere.

Sustained economic development reinforces the trends toward political and economic reform in Africa. While Africans must shoulder the bulk of responsibility for economic development, the United States and the international community stand ready to assist. Congress appropriated \$802 million in fiscal year 1995 for the Development Fund for Africa to help Africa achieve broad-based economic growth. My colleague, John Hicks, will further address the successes of development assistance in Africa.

Let me conclude by saying that African peoples of all backgrounds, religions, and cultures have grown weary of autocratic rule, corruption, economic stagnation, civil strife and human misery. After the past few years, they have pressured for and become participants in the movement toward more open responsive governments. They recognize the cost of conflict to their continent, namely, the loss of life, the lack of development, and the loss of trade and investment.

Africans increasingly are drawing on internal resources to solve their conflicts. Unfortunately, setbacks and failures are inevitable, but these disappointments and these struggles do not invalidate real progress or the promise of African efforts. These efforts remain worthy of our full support.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Thank you, Ambassador.

[The prepared statement of Edward Brynn appears in the appendix.]

Mr. JOHNSTON. If I can impose on about eight or nine of you walking over to this side, I would appreciate it. I apologize for the crampness. Walk around right in front and when you want to leave, leave right in front. Before I call on you, Mr. Hicks, I ask Congressman Payne if he has an opening statement.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for being late but, as you probably know, since you were there, Congressman Hastings and I just left a meeting on Haiti and—but we feel that it is certainly important for us to be here on this very important issue of potentials and promises of Africa.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Especially since we are talking about the positive aspects of Africa, and we always hear of the downside, and I think it is in the right direction to talk about some of the successes.

I always try to bring the potential impact of the rich mineral deposits in Zaire and South Africa, the oil riches of Central West Africa and Angola, plus the fact that Angola provides us more oil than Kuwait, even before the Persian Gulf war. Nigeria produces the finest grade of oil in the world.

Several times I have talked on the economic model of Botswana, as well as my favorite topic, the democratization of Namibia. Botswana has been able to have several million dollars in reserves, which is one of the few countries that is doing that today. Certainly not the U.S.A.

The State Department's latest human rights report notes that since independence, Namibia has been a functioning multiparty, multiracial democracy. In fact, their constitution is a model of gender sensitivity where references are made to she as well as he.

This last decade of the 1990's has brought forth many other African success stories. I would like to mention just a few of them. Cote D'Ivoire followed the succession process mandated by its constitution and the national assembly President Bedie became President, succeeding the late President for life, Boigny, even though the prime minister, Quartari, who was overseeing major economic reforms enjoyed strong success and support.

Because of the declining standards of living, many observers had anticipated that a political and social explosion would happen with the death of the President. As you know, he had ruled there since 1960. However, now despite continued political maneuvering, economic reforms are proceeding along very well in Cote D'Ivoire and it is moving toward elections in 1995.

Ghana has averaged about a 5 percent growth in real GDP this decade. These gains have come about because of the stringent economic reforms imposed by President Jerry Rawlings, as well as strong support from the international financial institutions. While Rawlings' authoritarian method has drawn criticism from human rights organizations, the latest State Department reports that there are improvements in the 1993 report due to strong human rights provisions in the constitution adopted by President Rawlings in 1992.

Rawlings, being one of the two leaders who took power in a coup, subjected himself to what was considered to be a reasonably fair election and won that election with 58 percent of the vote.

Malawi conducted its first democratic Presidential and legislative elections on May 20, 1994. The vote brought a peaceful departure of 96 year old President Hastings Banda who had ruled since 1964. Banda's regime had drawn mounting international criticism since the early 1980's for human rights violations and corruption.

The victor, President Maluzi, a businessman who left the ruling party in 1982 and later found an underground pro-democracy movement has now emerged as the leader. Analysts had concern that the voting pattern reflected regional divisions and rivalries, but were relieved by the conciliatory gestures made by Maluzi toward President Banda and the other opponents.

In conclusion, Mozambique is completing a United Nations supervised transition, multiparty elections for the presidency, and the 250 member National Assembly are scheduled for this October. In August, a massive military demobilization was completed despite numerous obstacles. The remaining troops of the government of RENAMO, the opposition people, emerged into a new national army. Some 7,500 U.N. peacekeepers were deployed to oversee the implementation of the Rome agreement done in 1992.

We need to hold this U.N. success story up as an example of what can happen when things are done properly since we generally hear of Somalia when we talk about U.N. missions.

I have been involved with Uganda from my first meeting with Idi Amin in 1973. The next 13 years witnessed very severe civil war. However, Uganda is now politically stable since President Museveni took over in 1986. Since 1987, the GDP has averaged a 5 percent annual growth, well ahead of its population of 2.7 percent growth per year. Uganda's deficit is declining. The shilling is appreciating on the foreign markets with the revival of foreign busi-

ness interest and investment in Uganda. In March of 1994, 7 million out of 8 million eligible voters, 87 percent, came out to vote in the election to elect the constitutional assembly. This was generally considered a very free and fair election, and as we conclude next week with Mr. Mandela coming to New York to address the United Nations in a series of events in Washington, we have seen that South Africa's transition has been extremely successful.

So we are here to say that it is unfortunate that we only hear about the problems and the failures in Africa. There are a number of successes, and I think that with conflict resolution, resolution going through the House and through the Senate hopefully soon and signed into law, with more support for these fragile new democracies, I believe that we will see more and more African nations turning from the disaster that we have heard so much about into successful nations. They have the ability, they have the resources. The people have the will and, if given the opportunity, I think that the continent will show more flourishing democracies in the near future.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Thank you, Congressman Payne.

Congressman Hastings, opening statement?

Mr. HASTINGS. Yes. Very briefly, Mr. Chairman, if you will permit me by unanimous consent to have my entire statement read into the record or put in the record.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Without objection.

Mr. HASTINGS. Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of the Hon. Alcee Hastings appears in the appendix.]

Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Chairman, as you know, as Mr. Payne just said, we come from the hearing on Haiti which is a tug on me for the reason that I have an amendment that I consider to be of some consequence, and so with your indulgence, I am going to return to that hearing, but I thought it not robbery to come here and support your organizing this particular hearing on the potential and promise of Africa and to commend you for doing so.

As development in Africa continues to unfold, I believe that it is incumbent upon us to call attention to the often overlooked issue on Africa's potential and promise. I also believe that we must continue to promote and encourage and support development for the future in Africa.

Mr. Chairman, I won't go any further, but since I am meeting Ambassador Brynn for the first time, I am going to say to him what Mr. Hicks has heard me say several times, a portion of same. I am excited about President Mandela's visit, as I am sure many of us are in this country as well as throughout the world, but I will be even more excited when Bill Clinton visits Africa.

Thank you very much.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Thank you, Congressman Hastings. I think we have extracted a promise from him. Every time Cato finished a speech in the Roman Senate, he said Carthage must be destroyed and every time Congressman Payne sees the President, he says, you have got to visit Africa.

So to all of the witnesses, we have your written statements here and so if at all possible, you can maybe condense them a little be-

cause we have found in the past we get more out of a question and answer period.

Mr. Hicks, it took 20 minutes for the Ambassador to get through his six-page statement. You have presented a 23-page statement, I request that you summarize your summary. You are on, Mr. Hicks, and we always look forward to having you. I am just kidding, but—partly kidding.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN HICKS, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR AFRICA, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. HICKS. Thank you so much, Congressman Johnston, Congressman Payne, Congressman Hastings, and members of your staffs. It is certainly a pleasure to be here today, and I think your calling this hearing just continues to reflect the very fine leadership you are providing for this subcommittee and the attention that the committee is giving to the real issues.

In preparing for this testimony today, it underscored to me the many positive changes which are occurring in Africa and these are changes that the American people need to know about, hence the importance of this hearing.

The resiliency of the African people and their relentless striving for a better life in the face of persistent tragedy provide great cause for hope and I think a strong foundation for development.

Now, while we are concerned and mourn the tragedies in Rwanda and Somalia and the Sudan and as we try to redress these situations that tend to dominate the headlines, I think that there is much positive movement. This hearing is a welcome opportunity to focus on some of Africa's political and economic successes.

Mr. Chairman, I will only note very briefly some of the success stories that are detailed in the extended written statement that I ask to be entered into the record.

It is not an easy task picking winners, given the host of severe economic, political, and social constraints which most African countries face. The recent military coup in Gambia was a sobering reminder that even the best performers can have setbacks. However, we think that there are about a dozen countries in which we are investing a substantial share of our bilateral development assistance.

We have focused on nations that are fundamentally committed to sound development policies and strategies, have or are working toward democratically elected governments, and have the potential for broad, sustainable, equitable development.

At this time, in our judgment, the countries exhibiting such potential for economic and political success, and where we want to concentrate support are Ghana, Uganda, Malawi, Tanzania, South Africa, Mali, Benin, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Mozambique, and Ethiopia.

We have significantly increased our aid to most of these countries over the past 5 years in response to positive economic and political changes. Conversely, USAID has reduced or capped aid to governments that have faltered in their efforts toward economic or political reforms. In the most severe cases, such as Togo and Cam-

eroon, USAID has closed field offices and we are providing no new bilateral assistance.

Mr. Chairman, there are encouraging stories of both economic and political progress across the continent. This is due in large part to new African leadership, expanded African participation, and the sustained assistance of the United States and other major donors.

We have used Uganda in the written statement, Mr. Chairman, and as mentioned by Congress Payne, as a country example of the broad positive political and economic changes which have occurred. We then review some of the major successes we see elsewhere in Africa in promoting democracy, stimulating economic growth, and investing in people.

Our sustained commitment to improving people's lives is also documented in our 5-year retrospective report of the Development Fund for Africa, the launching of which you chaired at a session last February.

Our support for democratization and civil society is woven throughout our programs in Africa, and it is expanding dramatically as Africans demand change and a greater voice in their political and economic decisionmaking. A sea change has occurred in Africa's political development in the past 5 years.

Most countries have undergone some fundamental democratization and transformation of their political systems. Uganda, Mozambique, Namibia, Ethiopia, and South Africa, nations which were immersed in civil war and conflict just a decade ago, today serve as encouraging examples of political transition.

However, new democratic institutions and civil society take time to mature. There is also an element of risk in promoting political change and the timetable for transition must be appropriate to the particular country setting. We have seen that democratic transition is impossible in the absence of peace. This administration is therefore firmly committed, Mr. Chairman, to supporting conflict resolution. Our sustainable development programs serve as preventive diplomacy by helping African nations redress the root causes of instability and underdevelopment.

We have several success stories in promoting broad-based economic growth through increased food production and rural income.

While headlines paint a picture of widespread drought and starvation, food security in Africa has markedly improved. New seed varieties, increased use of fertilizers, pricing and marketing reforms, and early warning systems all have made a major impact. Our investments help avert famines, such as in Southern Africa, and increased incomes and standards of living. Agriculture remains the backbone of most African economies serving as the major source of employment, income, and export earnings.

We are beginning to see a measurable impact in natural resource management which is vital to sustainable development. USAID has worked with national governments to put local communities in control of managing their own natural resources. Attitudes and practices of rural populations are changing, making the link between conservation and development a reality.

It is critical to diversify African economies and micro, small and medium enterprises are a dynamic source of income, job creation, and new goods and services. USAID funded programs to expand

credit and business advisory services are successfully expanding enterprises throughout Africa.

The lives of many Africans are improving as a consequence of advancements in family planning, basic education, child survival, and HIV/AIDS prevention programs. These investments help make development sustainable. USAID's long-term involvement in family planning is beginning to stem Africa's high population growth rate. Decreases in fertility have occurred in several countries, including Botswana, Zimbabwe and Kenya and over the last 4 years, we have seen a 20 percent reduction in fertility. Contraceptive prevalence has increased across the continent.

Education is an essential condition for progress. Human resources development, with a special emphasis on basic education, is an important investment which reaps long-term benefits. USAID can point with pride toward its role in improving education access and equity, especially for girls, and in training thousands of Africans who are at the forefront of the continent's economic and political transformation.

In the area of child survival, infant and child mortality rates across Africa have been falling consistently. We estimate that continuing increases in immunization and oral rehydration therapy coverage are saving about 800,000 African children each year.

Finally, in my written testimony, I have highlighted the impact of our regional approaches in the Sahel and in southern Africa. A new initiative for southern Africa demonstrates commitment by the United States to reinforce and support the wave of democratization and economic reform being undertaken by most countries in the South Africa region.

We are working to break the cycle of despair in the Horn of Africa through a long-term Horn initiative we are currently developing, aimed at achieving political stability and food security. This is a diplomacy and development strategy built around preventing tomorrow's crises today.

We continue to believe in the potential and promise of Africa and are honored to be a part of the continent's story of hope.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Thank you, Mr. Hicks.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hicks appears in the appendix.]

Mr. JOHNSTON. Is his testimony available to everyone? Does everybody have a copy of it? Because it is an excellent treatise, and he has gone through country by country where the successes are, and it is very, very good. I am particularly impressed on page 3 where you have taken the development fund from 1989 fiscal year to 1994, and these are really the countries that have had great success and I sincerely appreciate it, Mr. Hicks.

Mr. HICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Ambassador, on page 2 of your testimony, I will read just part of it. "We have learned, for example, that an election which observers consider less than fair and transparent, may nonetheless constitute a positive step in a country's transition to democracy."

Have you got an example of a country that you can slot in there for me?

Mr. BRYNN. Well, I will—Mr. Chairman, I will be somewhat unorthodox. I will use the country to which I was accredited, Burkina Faso, which has not been on our positive list in many respects. I was in Burkina Faso when legislative elections were held. They were—

Mr. JOHNSTON. What year was that?

Mr. BRYNN. That was in 1992. They were prejudiced by a fair amount of roughing up the opposition and the withdrawal of a number of candidates from the process because the playing field was not level.

However, I came away from the process with a conviction that the exercise of the ballot did embolden human rights groups and political activists who were not in the pocket of the government to establish organizations and networking movements inside Burkina Faso which are now in the wake of what were seriously flawed elections, leading the legislature which came into being to be considerably more independent, and—from the President, and more sensitive to the needs of the people.

And the informal networking, which resulted from the election process, the flawed election process, may well guarantee the government will not be able to march forward as it did before with such flawed elections. I think that the participatory experience and the networking experience was crucial to a step forward, even in a flawed environment as Burkina Faso offered.

Mr. JOHNSTON. When is their next elections?

Mr. BRYNN. 1997.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Five-year term?

Mr. BRYNN. That is correct, sir.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Any other country you can think of where being a little bit pregnant helped down the road? Excuse my term.

Mr. BRYNN. I think the election—I think the legislative elections in Kenya were also—followed in the same instance, and I think the elections in several other countries, in Niger and Burkina Faso which were—in Niger and Mali which were largely free and fair, but with still serious flaws, have turned out to give these two countries a broad-based participatory experience which has led to real democracy.

Mr. JOHNSTON. I guess the early on referendum in Malawi too probably was—

Mr. BRYNN. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. Hicks, have you got any examples that you can think of where at least we started out with a flawed election, but history brought us to full circle?

Mr. HICKS. Well, I would say that Malawi probably does fall in that category, but I think that the only point that I would add here, Mr. Chairman, is that in Malawi, what comes to mind is the tremendous role that donor coordination played in supporting and helping to sustain that process, and in interacting with the Malawi regime in a firm, but consistent manner.

Mr. JOHNSTON. That really brought them to the table, didn't it? Mr. Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. Yes. Could you—since we have mentioned, and I also find your report fascinating. I just had a little opportunity to browse through it since just getting it, and I think it is a very

worthwhile document, would suggest that people take it and examine it, and also your very thorough presentation.

Mr. Brynn, could you, since Mozambique and Angola were relatively similar in their conflict, Mozambique is working and Angola is not, could you, either one of you, talk about what the ingredients for success might be as we contrast those two examples?

Mr. BRYNN. I think we see in these two countries, coming from a similar Portuguese colonial heritage where there was no participatory experience at all, we see the need for a generational growth in the concept that people must play a central role in shaping the governmental institutions.

We have had a very serious problem in Angola in pushing the democratic envelope forward, partly I think because of the very wealth that exists inside Angola, the access that the government has had to the revenues from oil exports has meant that the level of conflict has been exceedingly devastating.

And on the other side, UNITA has had access to arms and ammunition in amounts that are far more generous than would be the case if UNITA did not have control over some precious metals and diamond exports.

In Mozambique, perhaps its very poverty was a ticket to better—to democratic development because the people themselves reached a point of devastation in their economic portfolio that it became a broad-based desire for peace which neither RENAMO nor the government could avoid considering, and as a result, I think that Mozambique has laid a genuine basis for reconciliation and it is moving forward on that basis.

In Angola, the ticket remains more difficult to measure as long as the access to arms remains—lethal arms remains so easy. The military option card will be a temptation for either side. We have worked extremely hard through Ambassador Hare, through Ambassador Dashanet. The United States can be proud of its very forward role in the Usaka talks. We have made tremendous progress in coordination with the United Nations and the goodwill on both sides in Angola, but we are not there yet.

Mr. HICKS. Congressman Payne, I would only add, because that is, of course, a very thorough response, that in contrasting the two situations, I think the fact that we have come so far with the demobilization process in Mozambique prior to the elections and moving that process forward is probably one of the critical lessons that the international community benefited from as it geared up to respond and support the situation in Mozambique, and I certainly agree that there is just a tremendous amount of fatigue on both—both sides and the extreme poverty really creates a situation in Mozambique where people are just tired of the fighting.

Looking ahead to Angola, I think it is going to be important for the donor community to come together as that situation begins to resolve and work closely with the U.N. organizations to provide assistance for the rehabilitation and recovery process.

Mr. PAYNE. Just quickly, how do you feel that the elections in Ethiopia went? We hear both sides making accusations. We know there are still some persons that are detained and arrested. One of the professors is one that comes to mind. By the same token,

many persons who served in prison under the Mengistu government have been released.

How do you—are they better off in your estimation, or worse off, or do you think progress is moving on? I have a lot of respect for the ability of the President there, but I would like to know what your assessment might be.

Mr. BRYNN. Yes, sir. The trauma in Ethiopia at the end of the dictatorship was something I think we can never fully comprehend, and I think we should give considerable credit to the Ethiopian people for the progress that has been made.

There are some very severe loose ends, there is no doubt about it, but the process, the essential process has been favorable to democratic institutions. We are pressing very hard on the human rights issues which remain in some cases egregious, but the—this is a case where we have to be careful not to throw the baby out with the bath water because this is a country which has gone from extraordinary trauma to a broad-based participatory experience in an extraordinarily short period of time.

Mr. PAYNE. As a matter of fact, was that—it was one of the criticisms I heard from some people that they thought it was too soon, I mean, that democracy came too quickly and was difficult to put the apparatus in and outside of that, as it got broken down, you know, we all like to see democracy come, but what do you think? Was it a little bit hasty? Probably less than a year after the war ended.

Mr. BRYNN. This will be a luxury for historians to look at. I think the part that is sufficiently good, that we should accept that the pace that was settled on was OK. A slower pace may have also allowed some of the dissident and fringe extremist elements to consolidate themselves. Maybe it was just as well that it went at this pace.

Mr. PAYNE. Just on Eritrea, you know, they are also a very peaceful country. We had the opportunity to visit there, and also a bright young Mr. Issaias, I believe, President, they have one party which, you know, we frown upon, although they claim they have spirited elections, and secondly, they, even though it is only one party, the President seems to be a sound and intelligent and progressive person.

What do you think about this one-party business and do you think that we should continually urge them to have a multiparty system?

Mr. JOHNSTON. Do you want to expand that and address Uganda, which has no parties?

Mr. BRYNN. A one-party system is never—it is never a satisfactory end of the day situation. We are pressing and will continue to press for the multiparty agenda. Eritrea has an extraordinarily industrious people, a country with limited resources, but doing extremely well with them. The democratic process needs to get equal billing and we have a good team there, and I am confident we will, along with other friends of Eritrea, not feel hesitant to push the democratic agenda toward multipartism.

Mr. PAYNE. Just the last one, since I have it here. In Zambia, we had a one party, 27-year President, Mr. Ken Kaunda, who then was defeated in the election. What—is the new government moving

better with the new multiparty elections or is there still a struggle, and has the human rights violations now been abated?

Mr. BRYNN. Human rights violations, sir, have abated. We are very concerned in Zambia about the question of governance, that is, corruption in the system. We have been pleased to see some specific, spectacular responses to our request that certain public figures be brought to the bar of justice for egregious corruption.

There is a lot of cleansing in the system which needs to take place. This was a country which was very heavily endowed with statist institutions for 25 years, and the opportunities for gross corruption in the public sector were enormous. The cleansing process will take a long time. Progress has been made. The corruption issue remains a very difficult one.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. JOHNSTON. OK. Two things, Mr. Hicks. First, I would like to—both Mr. Payne and I would like to congratulate you for putting the regional office of AID in Botswana. Both of us are going to take credit for that because the foreign minister was on our case pretty hard when we were there.

The other thing is if Mr. Payne and I are reelected on November 8, on the 11th, we intend to go to western Africa and hope that you can join us. It is a trip to Nigeria, Liberia, Ghana, Togo, Mali, Benin, and Ivory Coast. We hit three countries a day, and so—and finally, Ambassador, I agree with you on your dichotomy between Angola and Mozambique. Mr. Payne and I were there in January.

In Angola, it is diamonds versus oil, as you pointed out. We were very discouraged because we had met with everyone there, including UNITA. When we went—they came down from Lusaka to meet with us, but when we were in Harare, Zimbabwe, planes were coming in to go to Zaire to supply UNITA because they had the diamonds, and both sides were arming to the teeth. I think what brought the Mozambiquens to their knees was the drought and famine. They were totally exhausted, and we were impressed with the demobilization there and the Ambassadors in both Mozambique and Angola. They do an incredible job.

Thank you very much for coming today. We will stand in recess for 2 minutes until we will get the second panel impaneled.

We can ask the witnesses to come up and take their seats, please.

[Recess.]

Mr. JOHNSTON. We are very pleased this afternoon to have a quartet of distinguished visiting academicians. Those people who are Africans and who have come here, some from a great distance, we apologize for having to change the time. Again, the Haiti full committee time interfered there, but we would like to hear from you.

Often we get a different perspective from those in government versus those out of government. So again, we appreciate your coming and we will start with Dr. Ali Mazrui, who is Albert Schweitzer Professor of Humanities at the Institution of Global Cultural Studies, State University of New York. Doctor.

Mr. MAZRUI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Incidentally, all of your statements will be in the record in full and, without objection. We will file all of them, so—

Mr. MAZRUI. I take the hint.

Mr. JOHNSTON. I am a little embarrassed. I am not as subtle as I used to be.

STATEMENT OF DR. ALI MAZRUI, DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE OF GLOBAL CULTURAL STUDIES, AND ALBERT SCHWEITZER PROFESSOR OF THE HUMANITIES, BINGHAMTON UNIVERSITY

Mr. MAZRUI. I will summarize, sir. Thank you very much. It is true that many well-meaning American friends of Africa, as previous speakers have indicated, see the cloud over Africa, but they cannot see any silver lining, or to change the metaphor, many observers are convinced that the old dark continent is passing through a very dark tunnel, but is there any glimmer of light at the end of it, and some of them would like to believe there is, but can't see that it exists.

And, Mr. Chairman, I personally believe that the rays of hope are sometimes part and parcel of the tragic story, but it depends upon who is looking.

I arrived from Nigeria a few days ago. The head of state, General Abacha, was gracious enough to receive me. I also met others who are opposed to the military regime. Leading newspapers have been banned and draconian legislation passed by the Abacha government, and yet some of the newspapers which are still publishing continue to express very independent views in spite of the draconian threats.

I attended a conference sponsored by the former head of state, General Lacubacawan and the conference was formally opened by the present head of state, General Abacha, and yet the conference included papers which called upon the military to return to the barracks and respect the result of the elections of June 1993. So the spirit of individual independence is still alive and well in Nigeria.

For 8 weeks, Nigeria was gripped by a strike of the workers of the oil industry. The Western press either ignored the strike or presented it as part of Nigeria's instability. Had Nigeria been Poland and the union been called solidarity, the West would have recognized it as a blow for democracy.

The Nigerian strike was the most sustained utilization of labor power for a democratic purpose in post-colonial African history. I thought it would last for only 2 weeks. The strike held the nation's economy to ransom for 8 weeks. The strike has now been broken. The military has won the first round, but the pressure for democratization in Nigeria is still vibrant. That is the light at the end of Nigeria's dark tunnel.

Wole Soyinka, the noble laureate, was deprived of his passport 3 or 4 days ago as he was about to board a plane to leave for a conference in Sweden. But soon after that, I could listen to his voice on the BBC World Service. He was speaking from Nigeria in open telephone protesting to the BBC interviewer in open condemnation of the actions of the military regime. Those are the contradictions of Nigeria. This is an authoritarian regime; it is not a totalitarian regime.

All over Africa, the desire for democracy is no longer silent. In the 1990's Africans everywhere have put their rulers on notice. In some cases, the tragic choice has indeed literally been give me liberty or give me death, but while the desire for democracy is strong, the institutions to support democracy are still weak, and to put it in biblical terms, the democratic spirit is willing, but the political flesh is still weak.

We still also need to build institutions at the Pan African level, and, Mr. Chairman, I was encouraged by your opening remarks in that respect. I personally believe we should have a Pan African Security Council consisting in my opinion for the 21st century of five pivotal states: For southern Africa, South Africa; for North Africa, Egypt; for West Africa, Nigeria; for central Africa, a country not yet ready for such a role at all, Zaire; and for eastern Africa, a country also not yet ready, Ethiopia.

Now, African capacity to attempt to solve problems by African intervention has happened before. At the moment, there is the South Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana attempt to solve the Nisutu problem by many. People have already forgotten Tanzania's intervention in Idi Amin's Uganda in 1979, and even more people have forgotten that partly under President Lyndon Johnson's pressure, Tanganyika virtually annexed Zanzibar and created the United Republic of Tanzania. President Johnson was worried about an east African Cuba off the coast of East Africa.

So having five pivotal powers, encouraged by our friends outside, and especially by the United States, to play a role in helping to maintain stability in the continent would be an important part of the future.

Mr. Chairman, let me just add another thing while I am on the future before I return to the present. There is considerable discussion about permanent seats in the Security Council. The framework of reasoning the paradigm is those who are already powerful outside should be given an extra arena of power within the United Nations.

The paradigm shift that is needed is to give a vote to the most vulnerable region, not because it is powerful outside, but precisely because it is vulnerable and because the bulk of the United Nations preoccupation for the next four decades will disproportionately be concerned with Africa. And so while we are talking about who gets permanent seats on the Security Council, Germany or Japan, how about looking at the weak?

Back to the present, Mr. Chairman, on that idea of looking at clouds and silver lining. Rwanda, why didn't Africans intervene to end the genocide in Rwanda? They did. Africa took the form of the Rwanda Patriotic Front, which in the face of immense ethnic provocation somehow managed to limit its goal to conquest rather than carnage, dreaming of restoring order rather than avenging terror.

The Patriotic Front's discipline may not last. There are accusations that it is breaking down, but the Patriotic Front has shown more self-restraint than provocation in several months of stress than any other group of African or any other soldiers in similar circumstances in the second half of the 20th century, and these were Rwandans. They happened to be Anglophone Rwandans instead of Francophone Rwandans, but they displayed levels of discipline to-

tally unexpected against a background of a country gripped with such indiscipline, and therefore there is hope in that situation.

And finally, Mr. Chairman, just a word about the United States and democratization in Africa. In countries like my own, Kenya, the U.S. foreign policy has in the past been oriented toward the ambition of making democracy happen. What is perhaps more compelling is the need to make democracy endure. Americans have often been ready to spend a lot of money to undermine dictatorships in countries as far flung as Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Angola, Cuba, and now Haiti. But Americans have been less than enthusiastic about spending money to stabilize fragile democracies in places like Zambia, Malawi, or even Eastern Europe.

A shift in emphasis may be needed in American foreign policy from undermining dictatorships as an imperative, important as that is, to stabilizing democracies. Whole new strategies may need to be worked out to help democracies endure once they have happened. Economically this may mean helping new democracies be economically successful and make a democracy as a system deliver some of the basic needs of the people, so that places like Zambia, Malawi, South Africa, may also need considerable help in training human power for administrative, parliamentary, party, executive, judicial, and related roles.

And they need to buildup, when all is said and done, a civil society which, in the final analysis, is the foundation of a viable democratic order. That may require a proper balance between political liberalization and economic liberalization.

To repeat, sir, the African democratic spirit is still willing, even if the political flesh is still weak. In time, a strong desire for democracy, which already exists, that desire, may indeed crystallize into a strong will and the capacity to democratize.

Amen. Thank you, sir.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Thank you very much, doctor.

[The prepared statement of Ali A. Mazrui appears in the appendix.]

Mr. JOHNSTON. One person who did not ignore the strike was Congressman Payne, so I am sure he will come back to some questions about Nigeria when we finish the panel.

Dr. Chege, you are next.

STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL CHEGE, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT

Mr. CHEGE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. This academic year I am a visiting scholar at Harvard University. In the last 6 years, I have been working with the Ford Foundation in Harare, Zimbabwe as a program officer in charge of governance and international affairs.

In Zimbabwe, Mr. Chairman, the phones work, the roads are paved, the police, if you call them, arrive on time. The judiciary is by and large vastly independent, and if I may say so——

Mr. JOHNSTON. Are you a Zimbabwean?

Mr. CHEGE. No, sir.

Mr. JOHNSTON. When we were in Harare, I said it looked like Beverly Hills, California.

Mr. CHEGE. I was born in Namobi, Kenya. You can understand why I was impressed by Harare.

Mr. JOHNSTON. I didn't mean to interrupt. Please continue.

Mr. CHEGE. Yes. The traffic lights work, and if I may say so, the drivers are more courteous than I have seen in Cambridge, Massachusetts, where I am living now.

Against this kind of backdrop, Mr. Chairman, we often forget, looking at the press in this country, that there are institutions in Africa that work that are managed by local people and that, by and large, satisfy the needs of ordinary people. I believe that if you are going to help our continent move from its present quagmire to the future, it is going to be necessary to focus on where success is, award what brought success, and punish failure wherever it is found.

In saying so, Mr. Chairman, I do not want to make the mistake and go overboard, as some of our colleagues often do, and stress that the situation in our continent is largely originated and created from outside. I believe myself that an awful lot of the mistakes are of our own making, although it must be stressed that considerable help from our colleagues from the East and the West in the years of the cold war must be counted as culprits also.

Mr. Chairman, it has been said earlier this afternoon that there has been a wave of new democratic countries in Africa, and I wanted to add my voice to those who have gone before me and stress the fact that if you look at the list, the number of African peoples who have gained freedom as a result of elections and transitions to democracy, it is much larger than that which is caught in the cycle of violence in such countries as Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda, Angola, et cetera.

Secondly, Mr. Chairman, we should add onto the political harvest that we have had in the past. In the recent past, in such countries as Uganda, South Africa and Mozambique, governments and their opponents have tried hard to come to terms with the question of ethnic diversity and how to handle it through constitutional means and through dialogue.

Questions like these, 5 years ago, would have been considered heretical and would have earned punishment. Such discussion is a welcome and fresh wave of air into our own political discourse. Because until we learn to live with diversity, with differences, and to legislate in favor of it in the creative sense, we are going to have to live with considerable conflict which leads in some cases to violence, and that is what you want to avoid.

With that point, Mr. Chairman, I want to mention the population growth rate, which was touched on a little while ago. You have all heard, and Mr. Kaplan's article was mentioned this afternoon says it also, that Africa's population growth rate is now the fastest in the world under conditions of increasing poverty.

This of course is true, however, let us also not forget that this is not the case number of countries, such as Botswana, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Cote d'Ivoire, Lesotho and Nigeria. In all these countries, fertility rates have declined between 10 and 30 percent. Demographers say that fertility declines of 10 percent are irreversible.

Zimbabwe is an example, again, to come back to the country I have lived in in the recent past. It has made a spectacular success

of its homemade program of family planning which has been done primarily by using local people and local resources.

It is a sort of program that deserves replication. The country's population growth rate has come down tremendously in the last 3 or 4 years.

In economic development, Mr. Chairman, the February World Bank report on structural adjustment has been cited and although it is controversial, it is quite clear that on the whole there is a turnaround for countries which have consistently implemented reforms. But I would like us to look more specifically at case studies of countries and case studies of projects, because if we do that, we will realize that Africa is not uniformly losing ground.

If you looked—instead of concentrating on aggregate figures—on concentrate and specific instances, for example, the situation is not all hopeless. Mr. Chairman, in the global tea market, Kenyan farmers, largely farming on small plots of land, as well as large farms in Malawi, have increased their share of global production of tea at the expense of the Asians and they have done so by producing tea of higher quality and lower cost than their competitors.

We have very often been told that Asia is taking Africa's share in a lot of products, and this is also true. And I believe when you have a success story in areas like tea production, this is what we need to focus on to see what lessons can be learned and what lessons can be replicated elsewhere.

In Cote d'Ivoire, Mr. Chairman, the global share of cocoa has risen from very little in the beginning of the 1960's to about one-third of global production now. And preliminarily reports of the devaluation of CFA by 50 percent at the beginning of the year indicate that peasant farmers, especially in Cote d'Ivoire, are reaping benefits from higher returns from exports.

I could go on, Mr. Chairman. The wildlife program in Kenya has made tremendous progress in reversing the diminution of wildlife and particularly of endangered species. Again, efforts originated from the local leadership and management. If I may proceed a little further and go to leadership at the political level, although, again, we see a media image of African leaders as benighted and incompetent and uncaring, there are spectacular exceptions.

I believe that if one looks carefully, you will also find that we have leaders who have, under very, very difficult circumstances, done an awful lot for their own people and are trying in the difficult circumstances of today to turn the situation around.

President Nelson Mandela was already cited as an example, and the other leaders as well. I think of Bishop Desmond Tutu and of course Vice President De Klerk, the late Chris Hani in that country, as well as other leaders in various walks of life, journalists, legislators, human rights groups, leaders of religion and activists in the cause of peace and freedom, distinguished women leaders.

We have Dr. Ayittey on my left, Ms. Sirleaf, UNDP, who gave the best interpretation of the Samuel Doe government I have ever heard.

Important leaders like Wangari Mathai of the environmental group, Green Belt, in Kenya and Ms. Hawa Yakubu-Ogede, the very courageous opposition leader at present in Ghana.

So although there has been prosecution of legitimate dissent in Nigeria, as we have heard, and in countries like Ethiopia, Zaire, Kenya, Sudan, et cetera, the oppressors too are meeting their match in confident and determined opponents of oppression, in Nigeria, Kenyan journalists, John Fru Ndi in Cameroon and elsewhere. Not too far back, the correspondent of the *New York Times* in South Africa, Bill Keller, said that he was worried about what Africa was doing about critical areas like Rwanda and Lesotho, as well as Liberia.

Well, the answer really is not everything, but there is something getting done, and I think the world has to know. ECOMOG in Liberia has been cited, a mixed record, but still a record in African peacekeeping.

And I am pleased that the Clinton administration has sent Ambassador Melissa Wells to see what she could do in our part of the world. But also more encouragingly, the efforts that went into resolving the constitutional crisis in Lesotho recently and the joint leadership in cooperation of Presidents Mandela, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and Ketumile Masire of Botswana, all of them active leaders in the Southern African Development Community. And there are other examples as well. Burkina Faso is working with France to resolve the problem in Niger, for example.

If one were to object that these and other cases which were cited this afternoon, Mr. Chairman, are the ones that flew over the cuckoo's nest, I would protest that and say they represent the leading goose in the flying geese formation. They are the thin end of a growing wedge.

It all depends how we in Africa and our friends in the United States and elsewhere handle our mixed and complicated situation. In the shock of the truly horrifying images that come out of Africa today, let us not lose our sense of proportion in both time and space.

In the middle of the 18th century, Mr. Chairman, a lot of people made fun of 13 agricultural colonies on the north Atlantic seaboard. We also in more recent times tend to forget that Southeast Asia, which is now seen as a model of development, was viewed with extreme pessimism in the 1960's. Confucianism, which has been praised as an engine of the most robust economies, was seen as a drawback then and with the war in Vietnam and elsewhere. It was Africa, rather than Southeast Asia, which was seen as the wave of the future.

There are some suggestions, Mr. Chairman, that I would like to propose to your committee, brief, but I think important. The Organization of African Unity was mentioned this afternoon, and more recently as one area—as one important organization that ought to be given more muscle in resolving internal conflicts. I want to associate myself with this position.

The UNDP a few days ago allocated \$3 million to peacekeeping activities, and I believe that we should encourage—you should be encouraging more donors to look into this, particularly into providing skills of peacekeeping and the capacity toward maintaining peace on the continent.

The British Minister, John Major, not far back, I believe this last week in fact, made the comment in Cape Town that the U.N.

should become more involved in creating an early warning system for imminent disaster, and this is something that could be tied up to the OAU initiative. Prevention is better than a cure here as well. I believe that diplomatically we should be looking carefully at issues and areas which show evidence of deteriorating before they become worse or deteriorate to the proportions of Rwanda or Somalia.

More critical evaluation of money going to development aid must be done. Let us place U.S. money and the money that is coming from donors on successes. Support the projects that work. I believe Americans, and a lot of Africans increasingly, believe that American taxpayers should no longer finance the profligate habits of African dictators and their retainers. Let us use this consensus that is emerging as a basis of developmental policy.

I will stop there, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. JOHNSTON. All right. Thank you very much, doctor.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Michael Chege appears in the appendix.]

STATEMENT OF ELLEN JOHNSON SIRLEAF, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR AND DIRECTOR, REGIONAL BUREAU FOR AFRICA, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

Mr. JOHNSTON. Ms. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Assistant Administrator and Director, Regional Bureau for Africa of the UNDP.

Ms. SIRLEAF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a great honor for me to testify before this subcommittee. We are particularly pleased that despite the daily headlines which dominate the press in this country and the devastating article "The Coming Anarchy" by Robert Kaplan in the Atlantic, the committee has chosen to focus on the "Potential and Promise" of Africa. We believe that Africa has both the potential and the promise of success, even if the road to their realization may be difficult.

Despite the structural deficiencies which followed the slave trade and a century of colonialism and despite the largely undeveloped infrastructure with which Africa was faced on independence, Africa was able to make remarkable progress in its socioeconomic development in the 1960's and 1970's which compared favorably to other regions of the world. To give an example, between 1967 and 1974, Africa's GDP grew an average of 50 percent. In two decades, between 1960 and 1980, Africa's overall human development indicators rose by 50 percent.

However, Mr. Chairman, we were not able to maintain this progress largely because of the structural deficiencies to which I referred and which were masked in the early days of independence by good commodity prices and low oil prices. Where then is the promise of Africa?

Let me try to give a few responses to that. First, I believe a new day of realism has dawned in Africa. This has led the majority of countries to adopt courageous policies of economic reform, reform that has meant taking measures to deregulate prices, exchange rates and interest rates, and to effect sharp reduction in the fiscal accounts and in consumption.

These reforms have been able to restore positive rates of growth in many of our countries, Ghana, Uganda, Namibia, Burkina Faso,

Zimbabwe, Botswana to name a few. Moreover, several countries have gone beyond the adoption of economic reform measures and have sought to limit the extent the government intervention in their markets by opening up to the private sector.

Despite these efforts, Mr. Chairman, one generally hears the overall prediction on African development and it is bleak. I believe that this is largely because development requires more than just good economic policies. It requires investment in human capacities, in infrastructure, in institution building and in good governance.

The totality of these requirements mean consistency and time, consistency in policies and sufficient time for them to have the desired effect. There is simply no quick fix and no short cut. Development requires a framework based upon a long-term vision and a rolling and progressive process toward its achievement.

I have a second reason for optimism in Africa's future. It goes unheralded to a large extent and the process is still evolving, but there is a definite wind of democratic change that is sweeping across the continent. Within the last 4 years, 25 African countries resorted to the ballot box to effect changes in government. Unheard of in times past, incumbents with claims to the leadership in the preindependence freedom struggle, incumbents with the military and security might in their hands ceded power. Mali, Niger, Malawi, Benin, Lesotho, Madagascar, Namibia, Zambia and of course South Africa all come to mind.

In still a few countries, Mr. Chairman, Botswana, Mauritius, Senegal, democracy has been tested and tried in over a decade.

There is yet a third reason for optimism in Africa's future, one which you in the Congress have noted, the political transition in South Africa and the unparalleled example of reconciliation and rationality represented in President Nelson Mandela. Finally Africa has its hero, equal in stature to the great men and women of other lands. We can use this example to attempt to heal the massive social wounds that have resulted in many of our countries from years of social injustice and economic inequities.

There is also economic capital to be gained from a peaceful South Africa. Already South Africa has joined the other 10 SADC countries in a subregional economic union that is poised to become an economic growth pool for Africa. Similar action among the CFA countries in western central Africa who in January took bold action in devaluing a currency that had remained unrealistically in fixed parity for over 20 years augers well for Africa's economic future.

Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by attempting to address two issues. What will it take to achieve sustainable economic development in African countries and what can the international community do with the leadership of the United States to encourage these efforts?

Let me state first and foremost that the key to sustainable development lies in the hands of Africans themselves, particularly in their leaders and in women whose participation and recognition are not always recognized. African leadership must show the tenacity to stay the course of appropriate economic reform and improvement in governance. This will not be enough, even under the best of circumstances, thus the international community will need to give its support to these efforts.

What can you do? First on debt. It is true that many countries, including the United States, have provided significant relief to the poorest African countries, but it is simply not enough, and today the level of debt remains a major constraint on African growth. We need to do more for those that have shown the political will to reform.

Perhaps, Mr. Chairman, you might ask the administration to take the leadership working with the G-7 to tackle in the Paris Club and otherwise, not only a reduction in the flow, but we need a reduction in the stock of debt, and we hope that this action would be comprehensive and across the board, but at least for those countries which have demonstrated the political will to reform.

My second suggestion relates to the need to counter what appears to be a trend toward the reduction in development assistance to Africa. It is a known fact, Mr. Chairman, that adequacy in an international flows has been a simple key element in insuring sustainability in progress for all reforming countries, whether in Eastern Europe or in the former Soviet Union or in Africa.

In this regard, as was mentioned by my colleague, I hope that you will find the wisdom to support the UNDP's initiative for the containment of hostilities through preventive development, for we know that when a conflict breaks down, as we have seen in so many of our countries, the related costs of humanitarian assistance can imply billions of dollars. For example, in Africa, \$2 billion will be spent in 1974 on emergency assistance. Just a fraction, say, one-fifth of that amount, Mr. Chairman, could have been used to prevent those conflicts and to save enormous destruction and the death of millions of people.

Finally, we hope that the U.S. Congress will play a leadership role in promoting direct foreign investment in Africa, particularly in those countries that have promoted a conducive business environment. Special programs of assistance might be specifically targeted to the development of physical infrastructure directly related and intended to attract direct foreign investment.

May I suggest that Japan has used this form of assistance effectively to the mutual benefit of investors on both sides. There are other measures that you may consider, Mr. Chairman, in forging a stronger partnership between African governments, the U.S. private sector, and the African private sector as well.

Let me close by saying that the principles that led Secretary of State George Catlett Marshall to devise the Marshall Plan for Europe were sound and they produced the desired effect.

Similar plans of assistance, even if not of the same scale, to other regions of the world would produce the same effect, a larger world market for American products and services, a safer world environment which provides no incentive for the movement of people in illegal goods and services to American shores.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf appears in the appendix.]

Mr. JOHNSTON. Professor, I apologize but we have to recess for a second to go vote. I am sure you are familiar with this, so if we could stand in recess for approximately 10 minutes.

[Recess.]

Mr. JOHNSTON. Every time there is a recess, there is a high attrition rate in the audience. So everyone now should have a seat.

And to the members of the panel, since we are running a little late because we started an hour later, I can thoroughly understand if you have other obligations and places to go, just get up and leave and we will understand.

Professor, you are on.

STATEMENT OF GEORGE AYITTEY, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

Mr. AYITTEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Actually, one of the reasons, one of the advantages of speaking last is that you get the previous speakers to make your points for you. And let me say that—let me thank you very much for this opportunity to testify, and I understand the purpose of this hearing is to try and determine if there are any signs of hope or rays of hope out of Africa.

As we all know, this is a continent with an immense mineral wealth and natural resources, but it is wracked by civil war and with oppression, refugees, carnage, and so forth. And I think most people feel uncomfortable about talking candidly about Africa's problems because they fear it will compound or reinforce negative images of Africa.

Mr. Chairman, let me point out that there is a difference in perspective. There are many Africans who want to talk about their problems, and I think this focus on the success stories in Africa is designed more for American consumption. Americans do not want to talk about negative images of Africa. But if we go to Nigeria, and when Nigerians are being jailed, as Professor Ali Mazrui pointed out, when Wole Soyinka's passport has been seized, it would have very little meaning if you told Nigeria that Botswana is a success story when they do not feel that success story in their own countries. When you have Rwanda refugees in Zaire.

Mr. Chairman, let me point out that all societies have their problems. Even here in the United States. The United States has problems with racism, has problems with drugs, has problems with violence. Africa is no exception. We also have our problems in Africa. More importantly, we cannot solve our problems by sweeping them under a rug or by denying their existence, no matter how horrible the problems may be. The first step in solving a problem is to expose that problem and admit that such a problem exists.

I would like to go on record in commending you for holding these hearings in Africa. Why are not African Governments holding similar hearings in Africa? The continent of Africa has a huge potential. Name the mineral and we have it in Africa—titanium, rhodium, vanadium, palladium—we have it in Africa. Africa's 600 million people present a huge market opportunity.

Mr. Chairman, year after year, since 1985, we have seen one African country after another destroyed and descend into carnage and banditry: Ethiopia, Somalia, Mozambique, Angola, et cetera. We all know about this. It pains me as an African, it enrages me, and it enrages many of us, and this rage that has emboldened us to seek

our solutions for our problems. Africa is capable of feeding itself. Africa is capable of solving its problems.

True, we have some African countries which are doing well. Some countries, such as Botswana, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mauritius, Morocco, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, and perhaps Zimbabwe. They are doing well. But also we have other African countries, in fact, the vast majority of them, which are not doing well. And we should not try to apply the labels of success stories to those countries which are doing well. Because first of all, success connotes the end of the development process and a resolution of all economic problems.

Not all economic problems can be solved, like unemployment, inflation, for example. The United States has its economic problems. Japan has its economic problems. We will always have inflation. We will always have economic problems in Africa. And, second, as American journalist Robert Kaplan, who has been quoted sufficiently during this hearing, noted that the labeling of places as success stories prior to their dissolution promotes public cynicism toward a place like Africa. Kenya was once a success story, and I am quoting him now, now its capital, Nairobi, is called Nairobberry, due to the surge in violent crime in the city.

We also had the Ivory Coast, Malawi, at one time Togoland was a success story, and what happened to all of them now? Of course, those African countries which are doing well should be praised, and we would like to see—to determine what are the ingredients of success so that we can adopt them in the other African countries.

But in spite of all the problems Africa is facing, I am pleased to report that there are positive developments coming out of Africa. Sirleaf Johnson pointed out the new sense of realism in Africa. This is important. I personally believe that this ray of hope, the first positive development to come out of Africa in the past 5 years, is what you might call a new intellectual awakening. This is critical.

Call it an intellectual renaissance or revolution. Ten or 15 years ago, many of Africa's problems were attributed to external factors like colonialism, slave trade, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. External factors. Not any more. Now a new and angry generation of Africans place more emphasis on internal factors. Of course, although they are seeing that external factors did play a contributory role, but now a new generation of Africans place more emphasis on internal factors. Internal factors like misguided leadership, rampant corruption, heinous tyranny, senseless civil wars. These are internal factors and this generation of Africans insists upon internal solutions. African solutions to these problems.

And, second, Africans also have a much better idea of what works and what does not work. We know where we are heading. This is also a very, very positive development to come out of Africa.

Mr. Chairman, 10 years ago we were trying to defend African dictators and incompetent African leaders, but today very, very few Africans would do so. In fact, many Africans will readily admit that our leaders and elites made some terrible mistakes in the post-colonial period. This is refreshing. This is healthy. And it is toward admitting that we made some mistakes is the first step in economic redemption.

We might want to ask Marion Barry for this. But, anyway, the first fundamental error we made in Africa was that after independence we really never really went back to build upon our own cultural heritage. We never went back to our roots. We dismissed our own traditional system as too backward, too primitive, because we thought the traditional system was just too archaic to help transform Africa.

We needed a new ideology. We did not want Western capitalism because we associated that with colonialism. So many of us went to the East and borrowed socialist morals and then transplanted that and imposed that on Africa. It did not fit too well. Now we know the socialist moral has been a complete failure.

The second error that we made was that our leaders did not understand development well. They identified development with industrialization, with modernism. They castigated everything which was native as, again, as backward and primitive. Agriculture was shunned as an inferior form of occupation. A lot of emphasis was placed upon industry. We borrowed huge amounts of money from abroad to invest in factories and industries, but these factories turned out to be towering monuments of inefficiency, riddled with graft and corruption.

There are too many examples of these black elephants across Africa for me to give. But to take Nigeria as an example, we know of the Jakura Marble Plant, we know of the Nigeria National Paper Manufacturing Company in Nigeria.

The third error that we also made was we created a predatory state. We invested so much power into the hands of the state and this power ultimately resided in the hands of one individual. Now, we know that the huge economic powers invested in the hands of the state was abused and misused by individuals.

The argument back in the 1950's and 1960's was that only the state could marshal the resources needed to develop Africa. But now we know that all those resources ceded to the state were never really used to develop the country for the people, only the pockets of a small group of corrupt elites. We know this.

Now that I have described the mistakes that we made, what are the solutions? Three main solutions. The first—

Mr. JOHNSTON. Can I ask you one question?

Mr. AYITTEY. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Each fundamental mistake you started out with "we." Who is we?

Mr. AYITTEY. The we means the African leaders and African Governments.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Not the United States.

Mr. AYITTEY. No, not the United States. I am an African.

Mr. JOHNSTON. OK. Please continue.

Mr. AYITTEY. Now that we know the mistakes we in Africa made, what are the solutions and what works in Africa?

Now, Africans, many of us now realize that foreign solutions do not work in Africa and that Africa must find its own solutions to its problems. Somalia is one typical example.

So what do we do in Africa? Fortunately, we have something to fall back on. We have our own indigenous institutions to fall back on. Now, these indigenous institutions are not something which are

well understood in the West, because for a long, long time, for centuries, Africa was denigrated as having no viable institutions and also colonialism and slavery was good for them. Of course, this was a self-serving justification for colonialism.

But, you see, the fact of the matter is there were institutions in Africa, and there have always been institutions in Africa. We have had more than 2,000 ethnic groups in Africa. They must have done something right to have survived for centuries. They must have had some institutions. The point is not to glorify these institutions or to argue that they are superior to any other foreign institutions. That is irrelevant. The point is the fact these natives had their own institutions.

Now, I cannot summarize or give you a complete breakdown of what these institutions are. I have written a book called *Indigenous African Institutions* where I have described Africa's political institutions, legal institutions, and economic institutions. There are certain aspects of our political institutions which are important, that we understand. Many African traditional societies were governed by chiefs, for example, and the chiefs had to govern with a council of elders. The elders on the council were representatives of the various extended families in the village. Without a council, a chief was powerless.

In governance, the chief and the councillors had to come to unanimous verdict on all important matters. If they were deadlocked, they would call a village meeting and put the issue before the people. The people would debate this issue back and forth until they reached a consensus. Once a consensus was reached, everybody in the village was required to abide by it.

This was not dictatorship; this was an autocracy. The chief could not impose his will on the people. If he did that, the councillors would remove him from power. Of course, there was no ballot in the village, but that does not mean that the African people had no idea of the concept of democracy. Therefore, when our leaders told us that democracy was alien to Africa, we said this is nonsense. Because this particular argument, where it was used by African leaders to declare themselves President for life and to declare their countries to be one party socialist states, this particular type of a political system could never be justified on the basis of African tradition.

Also, we had empires. Kingdoms in Africa. Mali, the Great Zimbabwe, for example. Ghana empire. Many of these empires were organized along the basis of a confederation. Strong centralized states or rule were the exception in Africa.

And on the economic front, the means of production were never owned by tribal governments. Land was not owned by tribal governments. Our spears, our labor and everything belonged to families in Africa. There was free trade in Africa. The African peasants did not chew before their chiefs or had to ask for permission to trade. There were markets in Africa before the colonialists came. Timbuktu, Kano, Mombasa, all these markets were there. Markets in Africa had always been dominated by women. And when you go to a market in Africa, you bargain over prices. Chiefs do not fix prices.

There was free enterprise in Africa. The chief did not order the market women what sort of goods to trade, what prices they should be. People occupied—people went into occupations which they felt would advance their own economic welfare. There was very little state intervention in the traditional African economy.

The reason why I am emphasizing this was because the type of economic system instituted after independence by African leaders brought very little resemblance to what we had at the traditional level. This is very important. And now Africans are saying that we have to go back to our own roots and build upon this. It is not the World Bank, the IMF, USAID, which have come to Africa and tell African Governments to go back to their roots.

Finally, we also know that when we have problems in Africa, there are African ways by which we can resolve these problems. For example, again, Mr. Chairman, this is important, when there is a problem in a village, the African chief will call a meeting and put the issue before the people in the village meeting. And this issue will be debated back and forth until they reached a consensus. And everybody was required, including the chief, was required to abide by it. This was the African tradition.

Take this idea to the African country, build upon it, and you call this a national conference. This national conference was what to make the successful transition to democratic rule in Benin, in Mali, in South Africa, and many other African countries. It is very important. This is the African solution.

Therefore, whenever we have a problem, say, a political crisis or a political stalemate in countries that I have identified in my paper, as Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria, Angola, Mozambique, we ought to demand a political—a national conference. This national conference should be sovereign. In other words, it should have the freedom to come to grips with decisions which are facing the community. And once it comes to the decision, everybody, including the government, must abide by this decision. This is the African tradition and this is what, I believe, the United States needs to support.

Thank you very much.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Thank you very much, Doctor.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ayittey appears in the appendix.]

Mr. JOHNSTON. I have some random questions here. I guess the first one, Doctor, to you, in setting up a permanent seat on the United Nations from Africa, which has 28 percent of the members of the United Nations, let me read Page 2 of Dr. Ayittey's statement and tell me what nation you would choose.

The labeling of places as success stories prior to their dissolution promotes public cynicism toward a place like Africa. And then he lists countries that were success stories today but are failures tomorrow. If you were a benevolent dictator, what country would you choose to sit on the Security Council?

Mr. MAZRUI. I would not choose one particular country.

Mr. JOHNSTON. You would rotate it?

Mr. MAZRUI. Yes, I would have a system whereby African countries would agree by what means they would be represented on the Security Council.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Chairing the OAU or something like that?

Mr. MAZRUI. Yes, so.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Idi Amin was chairman one time. At the time it was held in Uganda.

Mr. MAZRUI. That is true, Idi Amin was chairman at the time, but part of the effort why he became chairman, and it might have been mistaken, but the idea of other African heads of state was that if you make Idi Amin responsible for a major high profile organization, it would make him much more self-conscience about his policies domestically.

And the person who told me that was the person in fact who played a big role in that venture, and that is General Gowon, who was President, or head of state of Nigeria at the time. That they were convinced that one way of ameliorating the proclivities of Idi Amin was to give him a high profile role that would make him extra sensitive to world opinion.

It might not have worked, but that was the purpose behind it.

Mr. JOHNSTON. If I could ask you a personal question, what were you doing in Nigeria recently?

Mr. MAZRUI. Yes, sir. There is a Yakubu Gowon Center which has just been established for the promotion of national unity and international cooperation. As you know, sir, Yakubu Gowon is Nigeria's Abraham Lincoln, or Abraham Lincoln was the United States' Yakubu Gowon. They both saved the union. They both saved the union.

And so this was established and the General invited me to be the keynote speaker at a major event to launch the centers. So there was General Abacha and myself as the speaker for the launching.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Not to dwell on an unsuccessful story, but does that country not have a bad case of schizophrenia right now when it comes to whether you have a free press or not?

Mr. MAZRUI. I interpret that they have a very irrepressible people, you see; that much of the press outside focuses on the activities of the government and not enough on how the people define it. So there is not enough focus on the resilience of the people and not enough discussion on how certain liberties persist in spite of decrees and dictatorships, et cetera.

And, as I say, I open the morning newspaper in Awoodia and I read articles critical of the regime, and I had just been finished reading their draconian measures against the press.

Mr. JOHNSTON. I have had the privilege of meeting Wole Soyinka, and he was very critical of Babangida openly. And he always has been sort of an icon that was untouchable. But, apparently, they have come down on him a little. Is his life in jeopardy?

Mr. MAZRUI. Sharinga's life? I would doubt it, unless it is from a lunatic soldier or something.

Mr. JOHNSTON. But not from policy?

Mr. MAZRUI. Not from policy, no. It would not be from policy.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Dr. Chege, you talked about population control. We had a conference on population, and they mentioned Rwanda having the highest population rate of growth in the world, I think. They talked about women there who would be over in Goma, who could possibly lose all of their children, and go back to Rwanda and have six more because of the nature of the culture of that area of having a lot of children. How do you address that?

Mr. CHEGE. Well, Mr. Chairman, what I was getting at in that brief presentation was the following; that the index of declining fertility rates, which is what the statistics are bringing out, is an indication that families and women in Africa can be persuaded to have smaller families and that this is best done by the kind of methods that you have seen adopted by governments like Zimbabwe, Kenya, Botswana, and even Nigeria, of an extensive rural-based family life education program, which is comprehensive. It is not simply focused on the biological aspects of family size but also educates people on the benefits of limited families and without using force.

And, secondly, it is no accident that it is countries like Botswana and Mauritius and Kenya that are doing well, and Zimbabwe, in limiting population growth rate. They are doing well because with economic growth people realize that they are better off with small families. Women realize they have more, they spend more time furthering their careers than being mothers. So pushing from inside education, inside people's minds, and pushing from outside economic development, this is the way to do it.

Mr. JOHNSTON. OK. Everybody wants economic development and everybody wants joint partnerships, but before any foreign capital will come in, including in South Africa, you have to look at the stability of the government first. It is almost a catch-22. I just wonder what would be the first thing that you would look for. And Ms. Sirleaf, you mentioned economic development, what would be the first thing you would look for if you had a degree of risk capital before you would go into a country?

Would you look at its currency, its government stability, work force, conversion of the currency, things of that nature? Doctor?

Mr. CHEGE. All of the above. To be more precise, actually, it is confidence way above all of those. Confidence that a country is determined to maintain not just political stability but a demeanor toward economic development that is essentially liberal. The investor must be reassured that they are not going to confiscate my property, and that if I go to court to defend my rights as a property owner, those rights are going to be honored and that the courts will be fair and I think not be subject to political influence and that kind of thing.

So when the World Bank and other people trace the role of governance in economic development, I think this is a bull's eye position to take. And I think it should be taken and considered seriously.

Most of the money that has left Africa has gone precisely for that reason. And money is not coming in precisely because, although we have all those resources like George has just finished telling us, people do not have confidence that governments will honor their contracts, or that when people deviate from contractual obligations in the marketplace, they will be punished for what has gone wrong.

On the other hand, when one looks at the situation, there is cause to be optimistic. In countries where stock markets have been opened and where the governments are showing clear bloody mindedness about—

Mr. JOHNSTON. Let me stop you there. Other than South Africa, where do you have a stock market on the continent?

Mr. CHEGE. Zimbabwe.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Zimbabwe.

Mr. CHEGE. Kenya. Ghana.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Ghana.

Mr. CHEGE. Nigeria. Already they are opening up and planning to open stock exchanges in Kampala and Dar-es-Salaam. In other words, it is a big program. And, actually, there are studies that have been done on African businessmen that show that medium-sized firms that are indigenously owned, when they have the right environment, have done exceedingly well in generating profits and jobs.

This is not news to us when you realize that if you give anybody a good working environment and a government that is safe and secure and a chance to make money, they will do it, and Africans are no exception. This is what we should be working toward.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Ms. Sirleaf, on debt relief we are working with Barney Frank. He chairs that committee on the Banking Committee. And the biggest problem is scoring it. OMB seems to think that every dollar that we give debt relief, it is a dollar out of our pocket when, in effect, most of these—you could not go to the bank on many of these loans.

DFA levels, you would like to increase—sometime I want you to talk to Dr. Ayittey about that because he is not too enthusiastic about increasing our aid to Africa.

Conflict resolution, though, we have addressed that very seriously. The House passed the bill last week increasing amounts to the OAU of about \$25 million over a period of time. Hopefully, the Senate will pass it this week.

Foreign investment. You mentioned Japan. I did not understand that. Are the Japanese going into Africa? I did not know that.

Ms. SIRLEAF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, on the debt issue, I think the accounting problem is something that we recognize, but there have been cases where accounting mechanisms have been found, as in the case of Poland and Egypt.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Oh, yes. Figures do not lie but liars figure, or something like that.

Ms. SIRLEAF. No, I was saying that in Japan's own development assistance they sometimes target this assistance to the building of infrastructure that will make direct foreign investment more viable.

For example, if the government is giving assistance, they may decide to use it to, say, build a road, or a port that would facilitate a particular private investment by making the cost of that investment much smaller.

So, in other words, Japan used official assistance to foster development of the private sector.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Aid with trade, yes.

Ms. SIRLEAF. Yes. But we should note that Japan is not making significant direct private investment in Africa, even though they are the highest official ODA country.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Dr. Ayittey, and I am not being cute here, but I am talking about going back to your roots. Now, if your parents and grandparents had gone back to their roots, would you be a Ph.D. teaching economics at American University today? I do not

follow the evolution of what you want in Africa today. Plus, I do not think you can unscramble this egg at this point.

Mr. AYITTEY. Yes, this is a good question. Let me explain. What I mean by going back to our roots is going back to institutions. They may be different forms of the same institution.

Let us take a market, for example. In Africa, we had a market under a tree. Here, in the United States, you have a mall. They are both different forms of the same institution. I went to university and that is at a higher level of education. In our traditional system, we also had education. My parents and grandparents, although they were not, quote-unquote, did not have formal education, they educated me. My wearing a tie or having a Ph.D. simply represents a different form of education and advanced education.

And, also, in exactly the same way, we had something like money. Money as an institution comes in various forms. In Africa, before the white man came, we were using gold dust, gold coins, cowry shells. That is one form of the institution of money. But, of course, in modern times we use paper currency, credit cards, et cetera. That is a different form of the same institution.

What I mean by us going back is to go back to that particular institution of, say, markets, and not go back under a tree but build upon what we had. Improve upon it. Not go back to the gold dust or cowry shells but improve on what we had there. Because these institutions have not died out completely in Africa. Please do not—we have people who can go to Africa to verify this. We still have markets in Africa. They are dominated by women. Destroy a market and you will be hitting very, very hard at the female population in Africa, West Africa especially.

This is what I mean by us going back to understand how our institutions operated in the free system. We have free markets and we should build upon it.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Is ethnic diversity on this continent its strength and its weakness? Rwanda. The Tutsis.

Mr. AYITTEY. Ethnic diversity is something which should be encouraged. We have more than 2,000 tribes in Africa. In many places we have lived peacefully together.

"Tribalism," has become an issue because our leaders have made it an issue. You have many corrupt and autocratic unpopular leaders who play the tribal card to divide or play one tribe against another to maintain their grip on power. So in some cases, in some cases it is our leaders who have made that a problem in Africa.

But the tribes in Africa can get along well, and they have always gotten along well unless they have had some interference.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Do you not think it has been exacerbated by the European colonial powers?

Mr. AYITTEY. Oh, by all means that has been exacerbated, and, in fact, in Rwanda and Burundi, the Belgians and the Germans played the Tutsis against the Hutus. We know this. But after independence, our own leaders have also played the tribal card. Even in Somalia, Siyad Barre played one tribe—he favored the Howee clan against the others.

Mr. JOHNSTON. There were subclans, then?

Mr. AYITTEY. There were subclans, yes. And, also, in many African countries, if you go to Kenya, for example, President Moi has

surrounded himself with members of his own Kalinjun tribe. In Togoland, Ayatamas surrounded himself with members of his loyal Kabaeer tribe. In Cameroon, the Isbitee tribe. In Nigeria, the Hausa people.

In country after country these leaders surround themselves with these members of their own ethnic group to maintain their grip on power, and I think this is why tribalism has become a problem.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Last question on this. I have a hard time, depending upon my constituents, with regard to aid to Africa, aid to anybody, for that matter.

You are critical of aid to Africa. Do you not feel that the United States has some moral responsibility, by reason of the cold war, by reason of us underwriting Savimbi and Mobutu—at least for a while, I am not saying in perpetuity? But those two men are there in large part because of our cold war policy and because we shored them up.

At least in those last two countries, particularly Zaire, which is, if you look at the map, it is surrounded by nine countries and it could be the tinderbox of all of central Africa.

Mr. AYITTEY. Oh, yes, I think the United States has a moral obligation to help Africa. No question about that.

Mr. JOHNSTON. It is the way we are doing it.

Mr. AYITTEY. Yes. That does not mean the United States should go to Africa and throw money away. All I am saying is aid will become more effective if we will put our own house in order.

We know so long as we have all these wars going on, all this money leaving Africa, all these Swiss bank accounts—many people know the aid which is given to Africa really does not reach the people at the street level. So what is the use in pumping more aid into Africa unless we put our house in order?

Mr. JOHNSTON. Dr. Mazrui, do you have any comment on that?

Mr. MAZRUI. Well, I agree about putting our house in order, but Professor Ayittey and I are not in full agreement with regard to the responsibility of the outside world toward Africa. We are in agreement that Africa has a lot to answer for itself; the African leaders especially have a lot to answer for.

But I do believe we are moving toward a world where responsibility for the vulnerable across national boundaries have to be shared globally, and that certainly we have to learn that Africa has contributed a lot to the industrialization of the Western world across the centuries, and that part of this aid is not just charity but is a kind of delayed reciprocity.

And, finally, sir, it is very important that Africa be helped to become economically viable because that will improve the economic chances for entrepreneurs in the Western world. Because an Africa that is completely economically devastated is not only useless to itself, it is also economically useless to the Western world. A prosperous Africa is a good investment for the West.

Mr. JOHNSTON. And a follow-up on that. You have recently written an article about new colonialism—

Mr. MAZRUI. Yes, sir.

Mr. JOHNSTON [continuing]. Which the African countries take responsibility for those in its geographic area. What has been the response to that?

Mr. MAZRUI. Very mixed, sir.

Mr. JOHNSTON. I have found an honest man here.

Mr. MAZRUI. Very mixed. Because, as you know, the thrust of my argument is there should be inter-African colonization, if necessary. Partly as a preemptive measure against waiting to see if the French will come to the rescue or President Clinton might decide to do another Somalia or somebody else would come. And that we should be prepared to do this mending process ourselves so that the stronger should help the weaker.

And I do cite the example of Zanzibar being annexed by Tanganyika. It was a case where Zanzibar was devastated and Tanganyika gobbled it up. They called it a union just because there was a dictator there.

Mr. JOHNSTON. It was a shotgun marriage.

Mr. MAZRUI. Pretty much so, sir.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Do you not think they will secede; Zanzibar?

Mr. MAZRUI. Well, sometimes I do not know who is seceding because sometimes it is the mainland that is——

Mr. JOHNSTON. There is a tremendous religious difference between the two, is there not? Zanzibar is all Muslim; is it not?

Mr. MAZRUI. Yes, but the mainland, Tanzania, also has a lot of Muslims. So the religious thing cuts across both sides of the United Republic. But it is true that the marriage is still rocky.

Mr. JOHNSTON. If you will indulge me on one incident about myself, since the cameras are not here; I would not have told it if the cameras were here because this shows you what little I know about Africa.

Burkina Faso was mentioned four times, once by the Ambassador. Two years ago, when the new freshmen class came in, Spy Magazine came around, and is no longer in existence, anymore. They issued to a lot of the freshmen a questionnaire, and it was a hoax. And the last question in there was, what is your opinion about the atrocities in Fredonia? Well, there is no such country as Fredonia. And about four bit, and said I think the U.N. should come in and take care of it.

So the first week I became Chair of the Subcommittee on Africa, I had only been to Africa one time, for 2 days, to Egypt. And my scheduler came in and said the Ambassador from Burkina Faso is just in town from Ouagadougou. And I said, if you think I am going to bite on that, you are crazy. Then somebody ran and said, no, that used to be Upper Volta. I said, get me a map. So if you ever come to my office you will see a huge map of Africa.

I have tried to come a long way in 24 months, but I still have a long way to go.

Let me issue one last challenge to the four of you and that is Zaire. What can be done about bringing Zaire into the community of nations?

Doctor, we will start with you and go across. With the exception of Sudan, Zaire has monopolized more of my time, I think, in trying to resolve that. Ethiopia has not helped, but——

Mr. MAZRUI. It is important, definitely. The United States played a role once in at least helping to prevent its disintegration. That commitment should continue. The danger of Zaire disintegrating has not disappeared. So that is imperative number two.

Imperative number two. We do have a person that has been in power there since 1965 and will not let go and the country is still in turmoil. And there have been suggestions to buy him out, all sorts of things, to get that accomplished. I don't know whether he has a particular price that could be paid by the International Community that would ease him out, but even getting him out would not be enough without an adequate address to what kind of infrastructure would be established to maintain the system after that.

So we would need to give hard thought not just to the disappearance of the present Mobutu regime but also to what kind of alternative political order would be needed.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Yes, life after Mobutu. Something we have to look at.

Mr. MAZRUI. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Ms. Sirleaf.

Ms. SIRLEAF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Obviously, the solution, if it were possible, would be to get Mr. Mobutu to step down. I think the reality is that is not going to happen. So one needs to find a way to co-opt him.

I think we need to support institutions at the local levels and strengthen them to bring the challenge and change to the system. I do not believe that enough was done to support Tshisekedi's government that might have enabled them to mount an effective challenge.

President Mobutu has now bought some time with his assistance on the Rwanda problem.

Mr. JOHNSTON. And some money, too, probably from the French.

Ms. SIRLEAF. In any case, most donor countries are planning to go back to Zaire. In doing so a strategy needs to be devised to help the floundering democratic institutions that are striving for peaceful change. Thank you.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Is Mobutu's Prime Minister coming next week? Yes, next week. I will meet with him, but we met with Tshisekedi when we were in Zaire.

Doctor, what is your solution?

Mr. CHEGE. Mr. Chairman, at one point I thought that the manner in which President Marcos in the Philippines was persuaded to leave his country would be the most appropriate one, particularly when Mr. Mobutu had his back to the wall in the middle of last year and a little earlier than that. The only question at that point was nobody really was willing to lead a contingent in Gbadolite and spirit him out.

I still think that is an option that should be considered. Who by, I really have no idea. But there is a rider to it which must be considered very carefully if this system is taken, and that is, that to the extent there is any order in that country, it is because of the detachments of the military, which are personally beholden to him. There would be a very serious danger of disintegration if there was nothing to replace it immediately.

So it would have to be at least, at the very least, a two-pronged intervention. I do not believe Zaire is devoid of leadership, that they could not somehow put together some leadership that could get along.

I have been encouraged myself at what good Kengo wa Dondo the Prime Minister's coming has done in the recent past to try to get some things which have been wrong in the past, like the Central Bank and the economy, back on track again. I don't know what his political agenda is. He might be asked about this when he visits here.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Doctor, I know you did not come here for this reason but it gives me an opportunity to pick four brilliant brains here and to get some information.

Mr. AYITTEY. Well, I think this is an excellent question you asked and I am glad you asked it, because it demonstrates that—you see, the crusade for democracy in Africa has to be two-pronged. Of course, we know of all these dictators we have to “educate.” But one of the things which pains me is that the opposition in Africa, too, needs to be educated. And, quite often, the opposition has made things more difficult in their struggle for democracy.

Many of the opposition leaders are themselves closet dictators and they are susceptible to bribery. Some of my own profession, the intellectuals, can also be easily bought. If you look at Nigeria, it is the typical case. Many of these examples are there. This is exactly what happened in Zaire. The opposition leaders in Zaire were also corruptible.

They held a national conference. Mobutu himself recognized, after pressure was brought to bear upon him to open up the political process, and called the national conference. That national conference was called the Sacred Gebal. Groups of people went there. Even Tshisekedi was there. But they misused this national conference to insult Mobutu, to call—Tshisekedi called Mobutu a monster on television and he demanded Mobutu's head. And Mobutu said, no chance. So he has catalyzed this program for the transition to democratic rule.

Now, to solve that problem—to solve that problem, of course, they would have to reconvene that national conference and limit it to only the transition to democratic rule, not to insult the head of state or try the head of state and ask him to bring back all the money that he had stashed away abroad. This is important, because we also have problems in the opposition in Kenya. There was a coalition which fractured and also fractured along tribal lines.

We also have the same position problems with the opposition in Togoland and in Cameroon, and even in Nigeria. Recently, the Abacha regime has been able to buy out members of the National Democratic Coalition, which is just made up of intellectuals.

So the opposition, too, can be a problem in Africa.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Well, I sincerely appreciate all the time and energy in your coming here today.

One thing, Dr. Chege, I have become very distressed over the chronology of the United States, their plane went down in April, and in May the United Nations sent up UNAMIR, and shortly after that four African countries volunteered up to 4,000 troops to go in there. All they wanted from the United States was logistics support to get from point A to point B, and we sat there and dickered with the U.N. on a lease for armored personnel carriers. They sat at Entebbe there, and all it required was a \$10 million investment from the United States. And think of the thousands of lives.

Now we are probably going to spend probably a half billion dollars, minimal, in Goma and the rest of the country, and we have the Pentagon wringing their hands, saying who is going to pay for this. It would have been so cost effective just to go in there early on, intervention purely on a humanitarian basis, not on an imperialistic or military basis.

It is past now, but the thing that is driving our foreign policy so much more than anything else is what happened on October 3 last year, and that is when 18 rangers were killed in Somalia. And the whole foreign policy is driven on that. You are seeing that in Haiti today. You saw it in Rwanda and you will probably see it for the balance of this administration.

You all were very kind and I sincerely appreciate it. The meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:41 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

Statement of Edward Brynn
Acting Assistant Secretary of State
Bureau of Africa Affairs
before the
Subcommittee on Africa
Committee on Foreign Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives
September 27, 1994

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. Assistant Secretary Moose regrets that he is unable to testify before you today. He is accompanying Secretary Christopher on meetings with African delegates to the United Nations General Assembly in New York. I am pleased to represent the Assistant Secretary at this hearing on positive developments in Africa.

The world often views Africa only through the lens of crisis or, as portrayed in Robert Kaplan's magazine article on worldwide anarchy, as proof of the planet's worsening economic, demographic, environmental and political problems. But this viewpoint is myopic. It belies this diverse continent of 500 million people -- people in 48 sub-Saharan countries who speak over 800 languages and hold Christian, Islamic, Animist, and other religious beliefs.

Africa also is a continent of stark contrasts. Its nations range from the very large, such as Zaire, Sudan and Nigeria, to small island states such as the Seychelles and Cape Verde. Africa has great deserts; yet it also has the world's largest arable land mass. There are also great contrasts in the political situations of the countries in Africa. This year, we witnessed the long-awaited transition to majority rule in South Africa through inspired leadership, elections and a people dedicated to reconciliation. At the other extreme, we saw the speedy unravelling of Rwanda and shocking internecine brutality.

Africa's contrasting scenes, whether of bodies floating down the Kagera River or of the peaceful, poignant exchange of an apartheid regime for majority-ruled democracy, may make good news copy. But these events in and of themselves do not define Africa.

Mr. Chairman, you asked me to focus on the positive events and trends in Africa. While I caution against generalization, I do believe there are a number of commendable changes occurring on the continent.

Democracy, Governance and the Rule of Law

Although armed conflict and humanitarian disaster invariably seize the world's attention, there is a dramatic trend toward open, democratic societies in sub-Saharan Africa. The election of a democratic government in South Africa is but one example of how African demands for political participation are slowly being realized across the continent. There were only four African democracies in 1989. Now, nearly two-thirds of African countries are at some stage of democratic transition, providing a tremendous opportunity to advance U.S. interests in the areas of peace, sustainable development, and trade and investment, as well as in democracy and human rights.

Each country moves at its own pace, often with setbacks along the way, and must fashion a democratic culture suitable to its own people. Change is sometimes incremental and the systems that emerge may not be completely familiar to us, demanding a more than superficial understanding before we come to judgment. We have learned, for example, that an election which observers consider less than "fair and transparent" may nonetheless constitute a positive step in a country's transition to democracy. This does not mean, however, that we will tolerate a double standard for newly emerging democracies. We will continue to hold governments accountable to the will of their own citizens and international human rights standards.

Our commitment to building democracy in Africa is carried out through policy dialogue and a strategic approach to resource allocation. Multilateral, regional and bilateral approaches are being combined to maximize the effectiveness of U.S. efforts. The United States and other donors increasingly coordinate their bilateral assistance, and are effectively pressing heads of state toward political and economic reform through international financial institutions and joint policy dialogue. For example, the former authoritarian stronghold of Malawi recently joined the ranks of Africa's democracies as a result of such coordinated pressure combined with internal demands for change.

Civil society is beginning to blossom in those countries which have initiated political reform. Human rights and other watchdog groups, an independent press, professional associations, women's groups, and non-governmental organizations providing civic education and legal assistance are proliferating and taking root. Although civic groups thrive best where democratic elections were free and fair, they have gained new footholds even in countries where democratic progress has been mixed. That is why U.S. democracy assistance, while concentrated among the most successful reformers, continues to be provided on a smaller scale where forces for positive change are active.

On the governmental side, officials, judges and parliamentarians are striving to enact legal reform, publish jurisprudence, obtain basic tools and references, develop skills, and improve the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the judicial and legislative branches. Again, such efforts enjoy the most success where the government is fully committed to change. But even in countries where change has been halting, such efforts continue on the part of reform-minded individuals or groups, often with U.S. and other donor support.

New African democracies and countries in transition face difficult challenges, including struggling economies, high levels of poverty, disease and environmental degradation, and high population growth rates. In some countries, entrenched

authoritarian leaders, recalcitrant militaries, or civil conflicts threaten the welfare of millions. However, we have seen that once a political opening has occurred and civil society has begun to flower, the ability of an authoritarian regime to maintain power indefinitely rapidly diminishes.

Conflict Resolution and Demobilization

Conflict in Africa continues to pose perhaps the most difficult challenge to democratization. Conflict resolution is the first priority where there is civil strife. The Clinton Administration has dedicated diplomatic and financial support both to resolve African conflicts and to prevent new ones. Sometimes these efforts are successful; sometimes they are not. The devastation in Rwanda, for example, came despite a two-year diplomatic effort by Rwanda's neighbors and active U.S. support to establish a framework for national reconciliation. Among other efforts to encourage reconciliation, the President sent Jesse Jackson as a high-level emissary to Nigeria to encourage the Abacha Government to take credible steps toward civilian democratic rule. The President's special envoys are deeply engaged in the peace talks on Angola and Sudan, making every effort to promote reconciliation in those countries.

Countries all over the world continue to look to the United Nations as the principal institution for resolving conflicts and keeping peace. The United Nations currently participates in four major peacekeeping operations in Africa: Somalia, Mozambique, Rwanda and Liberia. Mozambique is a budding success, well on its way to its first multiparty elections October 27-28. The United States is working closely with the international community to foster compromise and reconciliation to bring an end to all these painful struggles.

One of the most positive trends we have noted in Africa is the increasing willingness of Africans to participate in UN peacekeeping operations worldwide. Zimbabwe, Botswana, the Congo, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Gambia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Mali, Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda, Ghana, Guinea - Bissau, Chad, Zambia, and Malawi, have contributed troops for UN - led peacekeeping missions in Africa. Ghana, Senegal, Nigeria, Kenya, Cameroon, and Niger also have provided troops to UN operations in Lebanon, Yugoslavia, Iran and Cambodia.

Africans also are taking more responsibility for solving African conflicts. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) -- once best known for advocating a statist political agenda, organizing anti-western bloc votes at the United Nations, and avoiding involvement in the conflicts of its neighbors -- two years ago took an historic initiative to create its own conflict resolution mechanism. Also unprecedented was OAU condemnation of one of its own member states for the 1993 attempted coup in Burundi.

The United States strongly supports the OAU's conflict resolution effort. This year (FY94) we made a total of \$3.5 million available, either directly to the OAU to help it establish its new conflict prevention center, or to the conflict mediation and mitigation efforts in which the OAU was engaged, including those in Rwanda and Burundi. In this context, the OAU has sent 47 military observers to Burundi.

As increasing democratization reduces regional strife, we are also noting increased cooperation between states. The Economic Community of West African States' (ECOWAS) effort in Liberia involving peacekeeping from other African States has provided a new example of how sub-regional, regional and international bodies can collaborate to pursue conflict resolution and peacekeeping.

The Intergovernmental Association on Drought and Development (IGADD), originally was established to help its six members (Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia) address the Sahelian drought. Now, it has been mediating the civil conflict in Sudan under the direction of the member governments of Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea.

The Southern Africa Development Council (SADC), created by the neighboring states of then-apartheid South Africa to forge economic cooperation and lessen their dependence on South Africa, faces new opportunities. Building on existing natural alliances, lines of communication and potential ties of commerce, SADC could be the foundation of regional cooperation and collaboration for conflict resolution.

Naturally, the new leadership of South Africa is concerned with tackling tough domestic issues. Nonetheless, President Mandela wants peace in his neighborhood and, working in concert with President Mugabe of Zimbabwe and President Masire of Botswana, decisively moved to resolve the crisis in Lesotho. He also lent his prestige to help in mediating the impasse between UNITA and the Government of Angola. South Africa, with its exemplary history of transition through reconciliation, offers a model of conflict resolution in the rest of the continent.

Military downsizing has become a key issue in African conflict resolution. Several African states are in the process of demobilizing forces following the resolution of armed conflicts. They are doing so in part to reduce the economic burden of oversized military establishments.

This military downsizing directly supports efforts to promote democratization. Politicized militaries often pose the greatest threat to fragile African democracies. Downsizing and professional orientation can reduce the temptation for the military to intervene in politics, or combatants to revert to the military option once democratization is underway. When combined with a well designed program to reintegrate demobilized soldiers, it can also contribute importantly to overall economic development.

Mr. Chairman, I congratulate you and the Committee for the September 19 House passage of the African Conflict Resolution Act. We commend the proposal's emphases on an enhanced capacity of African organizations to help resolve conflicts and on the relevance of the demobilization of African militaries to the long-term peace and economic well-being of Africa.

Economic Reform/Sustainable Development

There are some improvements in the economic health of Africa. Africa has all but abandoned failed socialistic economic policies of the past. Many countries have begun reforming their economies. A World Bank study published earlier this year examined 29 African countries that had undertaken structural adjustment programs in the second half of the 1980s. The study concluded that 15 of the 29 countries studied showed at last some improvement in their economic policies. Many countries substantially reduced nontariff barriers and began to rationalize tariff structure. These better policies are beginning to pay benefits in higher growth rates in income, exports, industry and agriculture that are leading to the reduction of poverty. Tanzania, Ghana, and Uganda exemplify those countries which are reaping the benefits of their adherence to economic reform programs. The World Bank study pre-dates the January 1994 devaluation of the CFA franc on the African economies. This realignment of the exchange rate, coupled with other reforms, will help restore the competitiveness of the thirteen francophone countries whose currencies are tied to the French franc. In some countries we are already beginning to see the benefits of the devaluation both in renewed commitments to reform and indirect economic benefit to farmers.

The World Bank study, although positive on the effects of economic reform, warns of the need for sustained economic reform in Africa, especially in the public enterprises and financial sectors.

Through our own bilateral and regional assistance programs and through multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, we are helping African countries get back on the path to economic growth. We have also joined the Paris Club in offering debt reduction to the poorest nations in Africa and elsewhere.

Sustained economic development reinforces the trends towards political and economic reform in Africa. While Africans must shoulder the bulk of responsibility for economic development, the United States and the international community stand ready to assist. Congress appropriated \$802 million in fiscal year 1995 for the Development Fund for Africa to help Africa achieve broad-based economic growth. My colleague, John Hicks, will further address the successes of development assistance in Africa.

Conclusion

African peoples of all backgrounds, religions and cultures, have grown weary of autocratic rule, corruption, economic stagnation, civil strife, and human misery. Over the past few years, they have pressured for and become the participants in the movement towards more open, responsive governments. They recognize the cost of conflict to their continent; namely, the loss of life, the lack of development, and loss of trade and investment. Africans increasingly are drawing on internal resources to solve their conflicts. Unfortunately, setbacks and failures are inevitable. But these disappointments and struggle do not invalidate real progress or the promise of African efforts. These efforts remain worthy of our full support.

OPENING STATEMENT OF
CONGRESSMAN ALCEE L. HASTINGS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

AFRICA: POTENTIAL AND PROMISE

SEPTEMBER 27, 1994

THANK YOU MR. CHAIRMAN FOR ORGANIZING THIS HEARING ON AN ISSUE THAT HIGHLIGHTS AFRICA'S HIDDEN SUCCESS STORIES. MR. CHAIRMAN YOU ARE TO BE COMMENDED FOR CONVENING THIS HEARING ON AN ISSUE THAT IS OFTEN IGNORED BY EVERYONE.

I HAVE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO TRAVEL TO SEVERAL COUNTRIES IN AFRICA AND DEEPLY APPRECIATE THE DESIRE OF THE AFRICAN PEOPLE FOR DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC PROSPERITY - NOW UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED AS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF DEVELOPMENT.

MR. CHAIRMAN, SO OFTEN AFRICA IN GENERAL HAS BEEN VIEWED ONLY THROUGH THE LENS OF CRISIS, AND CERTAINLY, WE HAVE BEEN DEVASTED BY THE GENOCIDE IN SOMALIA AND RWANDA, THE CIVIL WARS IN LIBERIA AND ANGOLA AND MUCH MORE. HOWEVER, WE MUST ALSO RECOGNIZE EMERGING OPPORTUNITIES AND SUPPORT THE MOVEMENT TOWARD DEMOCRATIZATION, ECONOMIC REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA.

SEVERAL COUNTRIES IN AFRICA HAVE EXPERIENCED SUCCESSFUL FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS. RECENTLY, WE HAVE SEEN THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE DISMANTLING OF APARTHEID AND THE USHERING IN OF A NEW ERA OF DEMOCRACY. THIS ELECTION AND THE TRANSITION OF DEMOCRACY WILL PRESENT CONTINUING CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES NOT ONLY FOR SOUTH AFRICA, BUT FOR THE ENTIRE SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGION.

MR. CHAIRMAN AS DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA CONTINUE^s TO UNFOLD, I BELIEVE THAT IT IS INCUMBENT UPON US TO CALL ATTENTION TO THE OFTENTIME OVERLOOKED ISSUE ON AFRICA'S POTENTIAL AND PROMISE. I ALSO BELIEVE THAT WE MUST CONTINUE TO PROMOTE, ENCOURAGE AND SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT FOR THE FUTURE IN AFRICA.

TODAY, I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM OUR DISTINGUISHED WITNESSES WHO WILL ~~EXPLORE~~ ^{EXPLORE} WAYS TO ENCOURAGE THESE POSITIVE TRENDS IN AFRICA.

THANK YOU.

STATEMENT OF JOHN P. HICKS
 Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for Africa
 Agency for International Development
 before the
 Subcommittee on Africa
 Committee on Foreign Affairs
 U.S. House of Representatives
 Washington, D.C.
 September 27, 1994

Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to join you today to review the economic and political progress and potential in Africa.

Most of the headlines that inform the American people highlight the tragedies and struggles of Africa. Articles like the Washington Post's recent series and Robert Kaplan's "The Coming Anarchy" tend to reinforce a picture of hopeless poverty and political chaos. But this is not the Africa I know, nor is it the Africa that the people of the continent will accept for their children. After more than 20 years working in African development, I am convinced that Africa holds both the greatest challenges and the greatest opportunities for sustainable political, economic and social development in the world today. The resiliency of the African people and their relentless striving for a better life, often in the face of overwhelming tragedy, provide great reason for hope and a strong foundation for development.

Dr. Michael Chege, who is also a witness today, in a recent article in Current History, wrote about the silver lining in the dark clouds that hover over Africa. Within the silver lining, he states, "may lie the policy lessons that might realistically be applied toward improving the political and economic conditions under whose shadow a substantial proportion of Africans now live." Chege exhorts that Africa's "rays of hope should be as scrutinized as the headline stories of collapse and national setback."

While we must mourn the tragedies of Rwanda, Somalia and Sudan, and try to redress these situations that grab the headlines, there are many rays of hope to celebrate which remain largely under-reported:

-- Africa's political landscape has changed dramatically with the winds of democracy. More than twenty countries have held multi-party elections.

-- There is a new generation of enlightened leaders that have the interests of their people as the first priority. Over thirty countries are pursuing policy reform programs to stimulate broad-based, economic growth and social development.

-- Health care and education are more accessible than ever before. Children are living longer. Parents are choosing to have fewer children. Farmers are growing more food and small entrepreneurs are flourishing in response to new opportunities created through economic policy reforms.

I am proud, Mr. Chairman, of the role that the United States has played in promoting positive political and economic developments across the continent. I would like to address in my statement:

- how the United States seeks to encourage positive economic and political change in Africa;
- some of the successes we have had through assistance provided under the Development Fund for Africa; and
- the role of regional approaches to development.

I. ENCOURAGING POSITIVE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHANGE

The Clinton Administration's policy priorities for Africa are:

- helping Africans build stable, honest and democratic governments, including stimulating popular participation and full respect for basic human rights;
- promoting sustainable development, through broad-based, equitable economic growth, protection of the environment, and slowing population growth;
- supporting conflict prevention and resolution; and
- providing humanitarian assistance to alleviate suffering and hunger.

It is not an easy task "picking winners", given the host of severe economic, political and social constraints which most African countries face. The recent military coup in The Gambia was a sobering reminder that even the best of performers can have setbacks. Nonetheless, to enhance the effectiveness and impact of our development assistance, we concentrate resources in those countries which we believe are undertaking the economic and political reforms necessary for sustainable development, and we both leverage and reward such changes.

Currently, USAID has sustainable development programs in about twenty countries in Africa. Within this broad grouping, we allocate assistance based on host country economic and social policy, democratic governance practices, need, and our aid program's effectiveness. The vast majority of our bilateral development assistance is concentrated in a dozen of these countries. Although these countries are at various stages of economic development and political transition, we have concluded that: their governments are fundamentally committed to sound development policies and strategies; they have or are working towards democratically-elected governments; and they have the potential for broad, sustainable development. Countries which are

undertaking economic reform are those which are showing stronger growth; for example, Ghana, Uganda and Tanzania have had real GDP per capita increases of at least 2% annually the last three years. And the benefits of development are more likely to be broadly shared in those countries pursuing democratic systems of government.

At this point in time, in our judgement, the countries exhibiting the greatest potential for combined economic and political success, which we want to support, are: Ghana, Uganda, Malawi, Tanzania, South Africa, Mali, Benin, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Mozambique and Ethiopia.

Bilateral aid levels to most of these countries (as shown in the table below) have been increased significantly over the last five years in response to economic and political changes which create a more positive environment for sustainable development.

TABLE
DFA levels, in millions of dollars

<u>Country</u>	<u>FY 89</u>	<u>FY 94</u>	<u>% Increase</u>
Ghana	\$ 9.2	\$32.2	250%
Uganda	13.6	34.1	151%
Malawi	19.9	33.4	68%
Tanzania	5.4	24.2	348%
South Africa	19.2	130.3	579%
Mali	22.1	37.9	72%
Benin	0.0	20.3	-
Zambia	6.1	19.4	218%
Zimbabwe	5.0	19.3	286%
Madagascar	14.5	28.6	97%
Mozambique	18.6	35.1	89%
Ethiopia	0.0	32.5	-

Not only is aid increased to "reward" positive change, but USAID also reduces or caps aid levels when a government is faltering on economic or political reforms. Reductions taken in the context of Consultative Groups on Malawi and Zambia leveraged positive change. On the other hand, our aid to Kenya was reduced in FY 92 because of concerns about retrenchment on democratization and it has been straight-lined since because of lack of substantial forward progress. In the most severe cases, such as Togo and Cameroon, USAID has closed field offices and we are providing no new bilateral assistance because the host country was deemed a poor development partner.

USAID collaborates closely with other donors in the programming of our aid. The Special Program of Assistance for Africa (SPA) is an unusually effective network for harmonizing programs and policies to direct quick disbursing aid to those countries undertaking

economic reforms. USAID provides non-project assistance (NPA) within the SPA framework to leverage and reward policy and institutional reforms in the productive and social sectors.

Before turning to some concrete success stories, let me make one final comment about the interplay between political and economic change. As reform proceeds simultaneously, our work becomes more challenging and complex. We believe strongly that African participation in and ownership of reforms is critical to their sustainability. On the other hand, we must accept that democratic systems and popular participation make the economic reform process more unpredictable. In some cases, such as Zambia, with political transition can come a mandate for economic reform which strengthens a government's ability to undertake difficult reforms. These are most likely to occur in a democratic system. In other situations, however, economic reforms can be slowed or performance targets missed if an important constituency in the political reform arena objects, such as was the case in Mali and Benin.

II. SUCCESSES UNDER THE DFA

There are encouraging stories of both economic and political progress across the continent. New African leadership which is seriously committed to development and the sustained assistance of the United States and other major donors are having a measurable impact on the lives of Africans. It is important to remember that the United States is the fifth largest donor to Africa, providing about 5 percent of official development assistance (ODA). Consequently, it is imperative that we collaborate closely with other major donors in providing aid, and our success and contribution to African development is a product of partnership -- with other donors, with private voluntary organizations and non-governmental organizations, and with African leaders and communities.

I would like to use Uganda, Mr. Chairman, as a country example of the broad, positive political and economic changes which have occurred, and then I will also briefly review some of the major successes we see elsewhere in Africa in promoting democracy, stimulating economic growth, and investing in people.

Our sustained commitment to improving people's lives is also documented in USAID's five year retrospective report on performance of the Development Fund for Africa, entitled Growth Renewed, Hope Rekindled. You co-hosted the official launching of that report, Mr. Chairman, last February. I would ask that it be included for the record as part of this hearing.

A. UGANDA COUNTRY STORY

Under effective national leadership, Uganda has made great strides in recovering from years of protracted violence, despotism and human rights abuses. Concerted government efforts to rehabilitate the economy, combined with Western political and economic support, have resulted in restoring order where there was chaos. Most importantly, a sense of optimism for the Ugandan people has been restored for a secure, prosperous and democratic future.

1. Background

Uganda is a nation rich in natural resources, has significant development potential and could be a substantial trading partner. However, years of civil unrest, resulting from power struggles between Uganda's different ethnic groups and despotic leadership, have hindered economic development. The conflict in the 1970s and early 1980s resulted in substantial loss of life, terrible human rights abuses and economic and social disintegration. Many of Uganda's most talented citizens either fled or were forced into exile. Real GDP declined approximately 20 percent during the 1970s.

When the present government of President Yoweri Museveni took over in 1986, the economy was in shambles, with much of the infrastructure destroyed or in disrepair. Uganda relied on coffee exports to generate the little foreign exchange it had and thus, had virtually no reserves and no ability to import necessary goods. Compounding Uganda's problems has been the rapid rise of HIV/AIDS transmission among its population.

To its credit, the Museveni government has undertaken economic reform focused on privatization, export diversification, investment promotion, revenue generation, and responsible debt management. Politically, the country is pursuing a course of national reconciliation, constitutional democracy, and elections. There have been other positive developments as well: Uganda has made progress in the demobilization of its military (33,000 soldiers were discharged in the last two years), implementation of a new investment code, and the return of about 2000 properties expropriated during the years of civil conflict.

The goal of USAID's program is to establish the basis for sustainable improvements in the standard of living by promoting sustainable, equitable economic growth on a competitive diversified basis.

2. Movement Towards Constitutional Democracy

Uganda has made impressive progress during its transition to a constitutional democracy, laying the foundation for political stability and economic growth. The smooth execution of the

Constituent Assembly elections in March 1994, which involved participation by 87 percent of registered voters, bodes well for success of the upcoming phases -- debate and ratification of the Constitution, and elections for a national legislature and the President.

While democracy and governance is not a formal sector of activity in USAID's Uganda portfolio, we have nonetheless been heavily involved in assisting the government in the election process. Through the Africa Regional Electoral Assistance Fund (AREAF), assistance was provided in voter education, training of monitors and candidates, and technical assistance to the Election Commission. The United States has successfully encouraged other donors (EU, Canada, Norway, Australia and UNDP) to lend support to a process that will hopefully lead to the first free and fair parliamentary and presidential election in that country in over 25 years.

Improvement in the status of women is a priority for the Ugandan government. Currently there are four women Ministers and fifteen other women who hold the rank of Under Secretary or higher. USAID supports numerous activities to develop women's leadership skills and expand understanding of gender issues.

3. Marked Progress on Macroeconomic Reform

Uganda is making marked progress on economic reforms. Trade policies have been liberalized, inflation has been reduced to three percent, and a market-based foreign exchange system was established in 1993. The government also took a strong initial step in civil service reform. In FY 93, 14,000 civil servants were laid off, permitting an increase in teacher's salaries, which is a key element of USAID's primary education objective.

However, policy changes in the agricultural sector, in which USAID focuses its assistance, have by far been the most dramatic. Agriculture is responsible for 80% of Uganda's employment, 66% of GDP, and 99% of export earnings. It is USAID's sector of concentration, with a strategic objective to increase rural men's and women's income from agricultural exports.

USAID's five-year \$38 million Agricultural Non-Traditional Export Promotion Program has helped the country diversify its source of foreign exchange earnings from a high dependence on coffee. Our support for policy and regulatory changes helped liberalize the foreign exchange and agricultural marketing systems. We also provided technical assistance to agribusiness firms and associations. This assistance helped increase the real value of agricultural non-traditional exports from a level of just \$8.1 million in 1987 to an estimated \$61.4 million in 1992. As exports have risen, farmer incomes have grown. Silk is one of the new exports, and it is a commodity of which Uganda has the potential to

become a major international producer. Silk growers receive an annual revenue of \$456 dollars per year, compared to Uganda's annual per capita income of \$165.

Vanilla farming, which was started with USAID assistance, continues to do well. Participating vanilla producers -- 75 percent of whom are women -- saw their incomes rise 25 percent over the last several years. The new foreign exchange regime encouraged by USAID opened the way for a private Ugandan firm to secure a contract with McCormick, the U.S. spice company. The firm paid farmers about six times the price they had received for vanilla in 1989 and tripled the number of producers they work with.

In a decisive change of the marketing mechanism, exporters are no longer required to use the government marketing boards. It is too early for there to be statistical evidence of the benefits of competition, but farmers state that they are getting better prices for their crops, and most importantly, getting paid on time. For the first time in two decades, coffee farmers were paid a cash dividend for coffee exported through the cooperatives. This change has been a major benefit to the cooperative movement, which USAID is assisting to gain better access to the export market.

USAID has also been the lead donor in another important area, that of rehabilitating Uganda's agriculture research network. Results linked to USAID's Manpower for Agricultural Development project have been impressive. Potato yields have increased 30% during the past three years; land planted in potatoes has also increased from 4,000 hectares to 52,000 hectares. Potato farmer income has improved 20% over the same period. Other crops such as corn, cassava, sorghum and sunflowers show similar improvement.

4. P.L 480 Makes an Important Contribution

Another program that has been of major, if indirect, help to the agriculture sector, is USAID's P.L. 480 program. After years of civil strife, important commodities such as wheat, vegetable oil and tallow (used for soap) were in short supply and too expensive for most Ugandans. The Title II vegetable oil monetization program supplied Uganda during a critical period while domestic production came on stream. Substantial increases in production were made in 1992, with local currency assistance from the program. Self-sufficiency should be reached in 3 to 4 years.

The Title III program, which brought in tallow, has made a similar contribution. The sale of tallow at world market prices generated revenues that have been used to support a rural roads renovation program. Approximately 2,000 kilometers of feeder roads have been renovated to date, which has been of major assistance to farmers in marketing their crops. Equally importantly, five Ugandan private manufacturers are satisfying the nation's needs for soap and are beginning to export regionally. It is also important to underscore

the positive impact of the series of policy reform measures associated with the Title III program that have liberalized the private sector to encourage agricultural exports.

5. Natural Resources - A Potential Source of Major Economic Growth

Uganda has long been noted for its natural beauty. The country's natural resources are a major source of potential economic growth, but effective management is essential for the potential to be realized. Like many African countries, Uganda's fragile environment is threatened by increasing population pressures for fuelwood, food and water.

USAID's Action Plan for the Environment project is helping local communities and the Government to develop and implement a natural resources management program that provides for sustainable use of Uganda's unique resources. Already three new national parks have been created as a result of the project, and tourism has been expanded. These protected areas play a pivotal role in revitalizing Uganda's tourist industry, which 30 years ago provided more foreign exchange than Kenya's.

An example of how natural resource management projects can benefit the community can be found in the Rwenzori Mountains National Park. USAID has assisted a local PVO to improve the economy of the area through guided tours. Tourism increased dramatically, but that was only a part of the story. The PVO (Rwenzori Mountaineering Service) has built elementary and secondary schools and a dispensary and upgraded a key local road since 1985. As a result, a bus ride into town has decreased from \$1.50 to \$.60. Farmers have gotten better prices for their crops because the roadwork has resulted in more traders, and competition between traders increased farm gate prices. Incomes from guiding tourists have improved an estimated 30 percent. Of the 850 families in the area, about 800 have at least one family member who works in the program sometime during the year. For many this is their only or main source of cash income. By combining conservation and development, with a strong emphasis on management techniques, everyone benefits.

6. A Focus on Uganda's Future

Civil unrest in Uganda ruined the quality of Uganda's education system. Since 1986, the Government of Uganda has refocused Ugandan education goals and policies. As a result, educational objectives for Uganda now emphasize achieving universal primary education, introducing practical curricula in primary schools, improving the quality of teaching, and decentralizing management of education.

In support of the Government's efforts, USAID designed the Support to Ugandan Primary Education Reform program focused on overcoming constraints to quality and equity in education. Through support of this program, the government achieved a large increase in teachers'

salaries in 1993. This is a major breakthrough that will positively affect 90,000 primary school teachers, most of whom are women. A policy on procurement of textbooks which emphasizes competition among private publishers has also been adopted in conjunction with the program. Enhanced community participation in education is being promoted through grants to schools to reduce drop-outs among girls and other vulnerable groups of children.

7. Health Concerns Pose A Major Challenge

Uganda's health sector deteriorated when qualified personnel fled the civil unrest and economic decline. The majority of Ugandans still lack access to good quality and affordable health services, although the sector has experienced major donor-financed rehabilitation since 1986. A high HIV/AIDS prevalence has given Uganda an unwelcome notoriety. The causes of mortality and morbidity among children extend beyond HIV/AIDS to malaria, diarrheal disease and malnutrition.

USAID's health programs to assist in family planning, AIDS prevention and control and maternal/child health have been consolidated into one project to increase their effectiveness.

Existing programs, however, have shown significant success. USAID has been the primary donor in support of Uganda's pioneering efforts to counter the spread of HIV/AIDS, and it is the largest USAID program of this type in the world. Working through the private sector and NGOs, as well as the government, innovative approaches to testing, counseling are attracting the attention of AIDS program representatives throughout Africa. Recent data indicate that Ugandans who have received HIV/AIDS education are changing their sexual behavior to avoid HIV transmission. One USAID-funded NGO has provided voluntary and anonymous HIV testing and counselling to 97,000 Ugandans.

Other USAID health programs focus on assisting the widows and orphans of those who have died of AIDS.

B. PROMOTING DEMOCRACY

1. Overview

One of USAID's new strategic objectives in Africa is the peaceful transition to and consolidation of democratic states and societies -- both as an end in itself and because it is critical to achieving and sustaining broad-based development. Our support for democratization and civil society is woven throughout our programs in Africa, and it is expanding dramatically as Africans demand change and a voice in political and economic decision-making.

Clearly a sea change has occurred in Africa's political development in the past five years. Before 1989, the continent was dominated by authoritarian rule under highly centralized political systems, underpinned by state-managed economies. Five years later, most African countries are moving along the path toward democratically-elected national governments. Nearly two-thirds of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa are consolidating their democracies, having successfully conducted free and fair elections, or are in transition to a democratically-elected government. Even among some of the failed states or those hamstrung by prolonged political impasse, there is evidence that political change is inevitable; a transition, albeit haltingly and potentially volatile, is occurring. Uganda, Mozambique, Namibia, Ethiopia, and South Africa -- nations which were immersed in civil war or domestic conflict a decade ago -- today serve as encouraging examples of political transition.

Among both the consolidating and transition countries, major progress has occurred in terms of freedom of association. The initial impact was a burgeoning of new political parties across Africa. As democratic transitions have opened up the public arena and decreased the control of the state, the number and role of non-governmental organizations have multiplied exponentially. Although many of these nascent organizations are weak and depend heavily on outside assistance, their impact on the transition process has been substantial, even pivotal. In many countries, they were major sources of voter civic education, and they played a significant role in monitoring elections. Following the elections, NGOs have become increasingly important in demanding that both national and local governments be more transparent, accountable and responsive to local communities, particularly in such areas as provision of basic education, primary health care, product marketing, credit, and civic education.

Dramatic progress has also been made in Africa with respect to freedom of expression and freedom of the press. The number of privately-owned daily and weekly newspapers has increased dramatically in both transition and consolidating countries. Moreover, publicly owned newspapers have become more objective in their coverage, particularly in those countries that have successfully completed transition elections. Although ownership and control of radio and television broadcasting facilities are still heavily dominated by the state, pressure is growing, particularly in the post transition countries, to make publicly owned facilities more independent of the party in power and to allow private ownership and control of such facilities.

Finally, as public accountability has increased in response to expanded freedom for the media and associations, significant improvements in human and civil rights have been achieved. The number of political prisoners in Africa has dropped dramatically over the past five years.

From an historical perspective, there has been significant political change in Africa in a relatively short period of time. However, there is considerable variation in the level of progress among countries. I would like to highlight several countries which have made remarkable progress in democratization and the role the United States has played in supporting their peaceful political transitions.

2. Zambia

As one of the early transitions, the October 1991 multi-party elections in Zambia provided a model against which many subsequent transition elections across Africa were planned, implemented and evaluated by the host country public, private groups, and the international community. USAID's support for those elections proved pivotal to the peaceful democratic transition which unseated Kenneth Kaunda after 18 years of uncontested single-party rule. Moreover, USAID's support in the early post-election period contributed significantly to maintaining a stable political environment during the fragile transition period. We have funded a crucial, multi-faceted program for supporting the consolidation of Zambia's democratic gains.

Zambia's democratically-elected government has advanced the basic institutions and tenets of democracy (rule of law, respect for human rights, freedom of the press, open political debate, public accountability competitive elections) in spite of continued social pressure brought on by economic difficulty. These efforts have resulted in: the proliferation of NGO's; an increase in the number of privately owned newspapers and the licensing of private owners of electronic media; the establishment of a Human Rights Commission; the institution of public service reforms; and various measures to combat corruption, including passage of a new government ethics bill and establishment of an anti-corruption commission. Moreover, a new electoral law was recently passed, local elections were judged to be free and fair, and the national legislature is operating more independently.

3. Mali

The political and civil changes in Mali during the past three years are profound. Following a coup by military reformists in 1991, some 2000 Malians from all sectors and strata of society, representing most linguistic and ethnic groups, participated in a National Conference to draw up a new constitution and define rules for a free, open, multi-party electoral process. The new constitution was approved by a national referendum in 1992, and new leadership was installed through free and fair elections. USAID has helped strengthen civil society through support to NGOs, which have expanded exponentially. There has been a major increase in

freedom of the press; some 75 privately-owned newspapers are publishing, at least sporadically, and there are 14 independent radio stations operating. The government recently passed a decentralization law under which 540 rural and urban communes will be established, and commune leaders will be democratically elected in Mali's first-ever local elections.

4. South Africa

In preparation for the history-making elections in April 1994, USAID provided just over \$35 million in support of the electoral process in South Africa.

Voter education was a major part of this effort. USAID devoted \$10 million in FY 94 alone to supporting 90 separate voter education and documentation activities. The quality of the USAID-funded voter education programs through NGOs such as the Martin Luther King Center were recognized, accredited and utilized by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). As the election drew closer, USAID/South Africa focused efforts towards voters most likely to be victimized by intimidation, coercion and fraud such as the illiterate voter, farm workers, women, disaffected youth, and voters in especially conservative and/or violence-prone areas. It is estimated that USAID-funded NGOs reached 3.6 million eligible voters by the time of the election.

Through a grant to a consortium of U.S. PVOs, USAID assisted political parties which had not participated in previous elections in South Africa. This assistance was geared to developing their capacity to identify and address constituent needs, to develop effective campaign organizations, and to campaign effectively.

USAID supported the development of training materials for elections monitors and the development of standards of conduct and criteria by which to judge free and fair elections. Local NGOs were strengthened in developing systems for gathering independent information on the conduct of the elections, and in organizing local elections monitors and coordinating local monitors with international observers. A USAID-financed grant to a U.S. PVO provided basic orientation and coordination of the several hundred election observers fielded by around 40 U.S. organizations.

USAID also provided a wide range of support to the IEC to strengthen its election and polling processes. When the IEC decision to use a two-ballot system invalidated much of the voter education material which had already been produced, USAID funded a major effort to ensure that voters understood how the new mechanism would work. Ten million new sample ballots and 10 million pamphlets were printed, explaining the two-ballot system.

But, elections would not have been possible without equally profound changes in civil society. Since the mid-1980s, USAID had supported local community and non-governmental organizations. Since 1992, USAID has supported South African organizations engaged in promoting a culture of tolerance, with efforts ranging from training in negotiation and conflict resolution to helping communities cope with the losses they have suffered as a result of violence. USAID also assisted the National Peace Accord Structures, including the Goldstone Commission. USAID resources just before the elections were used to address problems of violence in hostels, township communities, and sub-regions throughout South Africa.

5. Conclusions on Promoting Democracy

While there has been significant democratization and political development in Africa the past three years, new democratic institutions and civil society take time to mature. There is also an element of risk in promoting political change, and the timetable for transition must be appropriate to the particular country setting. Thus, more mature democratic states -- both African and western countries -- are faced with a challenge and an opportunity to support a full and peaceful political transition in those African countries still undergoing democratization and civil society-building.

We have also clearly seen that democratic transition is impossible in the absence of peace. This Administration is, therefore, firmly committed, Mr. Chairman, to supporting conflict resolution; this is both a foreign policy priority and a sustainable development objective. We are keenly aware, as the tragic cases of Rwanda and Somalia so visibly demonstrate, that violent civil disorder tears at the very fabric of a society and unravels development progress; moreover, it is potentially destabilizing to a whole region. While we tackle current political problems through diplomacy and mediation, our sustainable development program serves as preventive diplomacy; we are helping African nations redress the root causes of instability and underdevelopment and constructively deal with problems before they threaten the region or the globe.

C. STIMULATING ECONOMIC GROWTH

1. Overview

Promoting broad-based economic growth is fundamental to our sustainable development strategy for Africa. We must stimulate broad economic growth to move beyond dependency of individuals on the state and beyond dependency of African governments on donors. And, in Africa, this means that we need to continue our support to the twin pillars of African economies: smallholder agriculture and

small enterprises. We have innumerable success stories of increased food production and rural income, as well as expanded and improved family planning and basic education services.

2. Agriculture and Food Security

While headlines paint a picture of widespread drought and starvation, food security in Africa has been markedly improved through a combination of new seed varieties, increased use of fertilizers, pricing and marketing reforms, and early warning systems. Let me cite a few examples:

Mali: In Mali, an extensive multi-donor Cereals Market Restructuring Program, initiated with USAID leadership in the early 1980s, has had a dramatic impact on national and household food security and income. The production of staple grains has steadily increased, so that locally-produced food available per capita is almost double that of a decade ago. The purchasing power of rural Malians, who are predominantly farmers and 80% of the population, has increased substantially, while GDP per capita has been growing 2.6% annually since 1985. On average, Malians are better able to meet their food needs, and the fact that more income is going to non-food consumption would suggest that their overall standard of living appears to be increasing.

With this increased grain production and the institutionalization of a USAID-funded Famine Early Warning System (FEWS), Mali has not suffered from drought or serious food shortages in over ten years.

Malawi: In Malawi, USAID's multiple investments in agriculture research, liberalization of fertilizer prices, privatization of high yielding seed development and marketing, and opening of high value cash crop production to smallholders, have had a direct impact on improving food security and rural income.

Under a policy reform program which broke the estate monopoly on burley tobacco production, average smallholder annual farm incomes have increased to nearly \$700 (from only \$200) for each of the 20,000 participating farm families. The increased incomes enabled them to buy new, improved maize seeds. Maize seed purchases are up nearly five-fold and fertilizer use more than doubled since 1985, increasing national productivity to 1.5 tons per hectare. Higher incomes have enabled the repayment of credit, the payment of school fees, and the purchase of medicines and bicycles for transport.

USAID/Malawi research indicates that rural populations not directly participating in the burley tobacco-growing also share in the benefits of the program. There are seasonal farm employment opportunities, and the increased demand for goods and services spurred by the tobacco earnings has created jobs in bicycle and radio repair, clothing, tailoring and other small and micro

enterprises.

Economic empowerment has stimulated demands for transparency and more open participation in national politics, which has helped move the country from a dictatorship to multiparty democracy over the last two years.

Zambia and Zimbabwe: In Zambia and Zimbabwe, the availability of drought resistant varieties of millet and sorghum and high yielding varieties of maize, combined with the decontrol of pricing and marketing, has stimulated production and increased productivity of basic food grains, and helped avert a famine during the recent drought which struck the Southern Africa region. Moreover, reforms have permitted the emergence of small-scale millers, which has created employment, as well as lowered the cost of maize meal and made this staple food more accessible to the poor.

Kenya: In Kenya, USAID has supported the development and extension of new, high yielding varieties of Kenya's key staple, maize. This single crop accounts for about 20% of total agricultural output, 35% of agricultural employment, and 55% of per capita calories. Initially, only 2% of acreage under maize production was hybrid seed; today, it is well over 80%. Moreover, we have leveraged market liberalization so that farmers get better prices for their produce.

Other segments of Kenya's agricultural sector are also booming. Smallholders are garnering excellent income from coffee and tea because of current high world prices. Horticultural products are now the country's leading foreign exchange earner and are in high demand on European markets.

3. Natural Resource Management

Because most African economies are so tied to agriculture, good stewardship of the natural resource base is vital to sustainable development. Consequently, this is a major focus of many USAID programs, and it is an area where we are beginning to see measurable impact.

Botswana: The Government of Botswana took a significant step in preserving the country's environment by passing legislation allowing communities to apply for the right to manage their natural resources. USAID's Natural Resource Management Project (NRMP) supports this effort.

This project is proving that local communities can manage resources of global importance and demonstrates that benefits from conservation can accrue to rural populations most directly affected by these resources. The NRMP and Botswana's new wildlife policies represent a bold approach to conservation. By placing direct

control over valuable natural resources in the hands of the communities, economic incentives are created for sustainable use of the land rather than perpetuating exploitative, short-term gain practices. As a result, community-based natural resource management is empowering rural populations and encouraging private enterprise.

The NRMP has helped to establish the proper policy environment, build institutional capacity, carry out planning processes, and establish demonstration projects that show the viability of sustainable community-based natural resource management. Policies have been established which promote more effective use of the wildlife resources in the country, including the establishment of community-controlled hunting areas. Plans to manage buffer zones and national parks have been completed for nearly two thirds of the wildlife management areas.

Economic gains are producing a change in attitude and practice among rural populations and linking conservation with development. In 1993, through contracting with a safari company to hunt 20 per cent of the wildlife hunting quota for the area, villages in one area earned \$12,000. Bids were again let the following year and the successful bidder paid over \$25,000. Most of the revenue is used for income-generating efforts including furniture making, a gift shop and guest houses for tourists. The realization that increased animal populations bring future revenue has led to local decisions not to hunt the full quota.

Mali: Mali has made great strides in introducing policy and institutional changes in natural resources management. These changes are resulting in a growing number of communities having greater authority to manage forestland, increasing the skills of Malians to deal with market choice and credit, and increasing access to technical assistance.

Three USAID projects are supporting these changes and are helping to transform the way that rural communities make their livelihoods. In the project area, 8,000 out of 10,000 farmers have adopted farming practices that are both more productive and environmentally sound. These include improvements to soil fertility, soil conservation, alleviation of constraints to labor, crop-livestock integration, and resolution of women producers' concerns. The result of these improvements has been increased yields and diversified economies.

Madagascar: Madagascar's natural resource base is seriously threatened by deforestation, soil erosion and associated declines in soil fertility. USAID, with other donors, is supporting Madagascar's Environmental Action Plan, one of the first in Africa. The goal is to save 3.6 million hectares, an area around the size of Maryland, by conserving biodiversity, improving the sustainable management of forests and national parks, and increasing income and employment opportunities for those living around the parks.

Impacts from this program are already being observed. Malagasy farmers are being educated in constructive research practices, thereby conserving biodiversity. Revenue-sharing activities with the local population have resulted in job and income opportunities. One-half of park entrance fees go to the community, as do revenues from souvenir and handicraft sales. By defining national park boundaries with the community and hiring local field staff, villagers are encouraged to modify destructive practices in and around the parks. Village-level environmental/forest committees have increased local environmental awareness and reduced illegal wood cutting. Finally, the capacity of Malagasy NGOs has been strengthened in order for them to play a significant role in conservation activities and advocate on behalf of local constituents.

4. Private Sector Development

It is critical to diversify African economies, and small and medium enterprises are a dynamic source of income, job creation, and new goods and services. There are several examples which demonstrate the impact of our assistance to private sector development.

Niger: U.S. assistance for microenterprise development is succeeding in Niger, one of the poorest countries in the world. Rural private sector cooperatives engaged in productive economic activities have expanded: more than 100,000 families in 150 new cooperatives have been organized, as well as 70 women's groups; over 9,000 people have received literacy and/or numeracy training; a loan guarantee fund has allowed cooperatives to receive loans to market their members' produce; and small village stores and pharmacies have been established. Since 1989, \$4.5 million has been disbursed as loans to cooperatives, with 95% repayment rates.

Savings and credit unions have also expanded. In less than three years, membership has risen from around 50,000 to over 450,000, mostly in rural areas. In the last quarter alone, the number of credit unions increased 33% and member savings deposits grew 70%.

A rural bank has also been established to provide loans to small enterprises and entrepreneurs for working capital and equipment purchases. Technical training is also provided to strengthen small businesses. Over 21,000 new businesses have been assisted and approximately 20,000 new jobs created. \$3 million has been disbursed in loans and 900 people have received technical training.

Others: Similar programs of lending and business advisory assistance are successfully expanding micro, small and medium enterprises in Senegal, Guinea, Swaziland, and Ghana. USAID-assisted private sector firms in Kenya are estimated to have generated some 470,000 jobs in the past seven years.

Finally, policy reform programs in Ghana and Uganda, focussed on expanding non-traditional exports, are helping diversify those economies and stimulate income for small producers.

D. INVESTING IN PEOPLE

The lives of many Africans are improving as a consequence of advancements in family planning, basic education, child survival and HIV/AIDS. These investments reinforce sustainable development.

1. Family Planning

Stemming Africa's high population growth rate is typically a major component in USAID's country programs. This is an area in which the U.S. has a comparative advantage, and our long-term involvement and multiple investments are now making a difference.

Kenya: Recent demographic data has shown that Kenya is experiencing one of the most dramatic declines in total fertility that has ever been recorded. Kenya is clearly beginning to experience a demographic transition.

Total fertility rates--the number of children a woman could be expected to bear in her lifetime--dropped from 8.1 in 1977 to 5.4 in 1993. Also the mean ideal family size has declined from 5.8 (1984) to 3.7 (1993).

This historic drop in fertility is due mainly to increased use of modern methods of contraception. Kenya, along with Botswana and Zimbabwe, now ranks near the top in terms of modern contraceptive use in sub-Saharan Africa.

Current use of contraception among married women of reproductive age has increased from 17% in 1984 to 33% in 1993. Contraceptive use in some districts is comparable to some developed countries (i.e., 64% in Nyeri).

USAID is the leading single donor to Kenya's national family planning program. After 20 years of support for family planning in Kenya, we can feel justifiable pride in this accomplishment.

The USAID strategy in Kenya has focused on increasing access to and use of modern methods of contraception. Successful elements of strategy implementation have included a strong in-country technical staff, building host country capacity for family planning program management, support to a mix of public and private sector providers for a mix of methods, and emphasis on monitoring and evaluation.

Ghana: At independence in 1957, Ghana had a population of about 5 million and one of the highest levels of social and economic

infrastructure and income in sub-Saharan Africa. However, by the early 1980's, the relatively high standard of living of Ghanaians had been eroded by inappropriate development policies and high population growth. Although the economic situation has improved, Ghana's population growth rate has remained high.

USAID's bilateral assistance to family planning in Ghana began in 1968. Between 1968 and 1981, approximately \$15 million was provided to initiate population programs, contributing to an increase in modern contraceptive prevalence (CPR) from zero to 5.4 percent among women 15 to 49. Between 1981 and 1985, USAID and other donors suspended assistance, resulting in a decline in contraceptive prevalence to virtually zero. Between 1986 and 1992, USAID assistance totalling \$18 million was provided to rebuild Ghana's population program; this contributed to an increase in the CFR from zero to 5 percent in 1988 and to 9 percent in 1992.

USAID's current \$35 million project was initiated in 1990. A 1993 survey indicates that the contraceptive prevalence rate has now increased to 10.1 percent and that fertility among women aged 15-49 has fallen substantially. This is evidenced by a decline in the total fertility rate (TFR), from 6.4 children per woman in 1988 to 5.5 in 1993.

The significant reduction of fertility over a five year period in Ghana is a remarkable achievement compared to family planning experiences world-wide, and it is an outstanding accomplishment for sub-Saharan Africa. USAID is contributing to this success by concentrating on the provision of short-term and initiation of long-term contraceptive methods.

USAID has also made effective use of the Non-Project Assistance mechanism to encourage policy reforms. Evidence of Ghana's progress in this regard are frequent public statements by top government officials, especially the President and First Lady. The most notable policy reforms are: establishment of the National Population Council; revision of the National Population Policy; removal of restrictions on the sale and distribution of contraceptives; and liberalizing advertising of contraceptives to increase knowledge and awareness.

Senegal: Family planning has been accepted at the highest levels of Senegalese national leadership as an essential component of development policy.

USAID has had a long involvement in family planning in Senegal, and has been the lead donor in this sector since 1981. This support has shown results. The total fertility rate in Senegal has declined from 6.6 in 1986 to 6.0 in 1993. The contraceptive prevalence rate in urban areas rose from 7 percent to 12.1 percent from 1986 to 1993. Couple-years of protection increased by 74 percent from 1986 to 1993. A decline in the desired family size

over the past seven years, from a mean of 5.0 children reported in urban areas in 1986 to 3.7 in 1993, suggests increased knowledge and use of modern contraceptive methods.

The Government of Senegal's national director for family planning believes that the publicity generated by USAID-financed projects, and the clear manifestation of demand for family planning services, have helped make discussions of the need for safe and effective contraception "respectable". Until recently, family planning issues were completely ignored in the Senegalese press. Today, radio, television, newspapers and magazines often present feature stories on family planning. Activities supported by USAID are largely responsible for these changes.

2. Human Resources Development/Basic Education

Education is an essential condition for progress. Human resource development, with a special emphasis on basic education, is an important investment which reaps long-term benefits.

Malawi: Progress has been made in Malawi towards increasing girls' attainment in basic education. USAID has been successful in helping place gender equity on the sector reform agenda. A gender unit has been established in the Malawi Institute of Education which is responsible for overseeing the reduction of gender bias in the new curriculum materials being produced as well as conducting training focused on gender awareness.

These efforts have resulted in the elimination of all fees for girls in standards 2-8, curriculum revision, new policies regarding pregnant girls, creation of a task force on girls education, and inclusion of girls in all academic requirements.

Motivated by USAID conditionalities, improvements in education are benefiting all students. The government has restructured budgets to increase support for education. The allocation to education for 1993-94 was 16% of the national budget. The share of resources allocated to primary education from the overall education budget increased from 43% in 1990 to 57% in 1992.

Additional efficiency gains are being pursued through the promotion of private sector contracting for the procurement of materials and privatizing the materials distribution system. Teacher training programs have been revamped and recruitment procedures improved in order to address a predicted shortfall in trained teachers. In addition, the government has increased teachers' salaries making the profession more attractive.

Mali: The Government of Mali has implemented significant reforms supported by the USAID Basic Education Expansion Program. Accomplishments include: improved budget management; development of annual regional action plans and budgets; and a matching grant mechanism to promote participatory management in budgeting and monitoring of expenses for school infrastructure and equipment.

Policy and institutional reforms have led to improved efficiency of administration and management. The Ministry of Education conducted a census and developed a personnel redeployment plan. Systems were put into place for management of school inventories. Seminars have been held with parents and communities to determine roles in the management of schools. Parent organizations have received training in finance and inventory management.

Improvements in access and equity have resulted from USAID support to basic education in Mali. The statistics are impressive -- enrollment in primary school increased by 41% from 1989 to 1993. The female primary gross enrollment rate increased from 16.6% in 1989 to 22% in 1993 (still leaving a large gap, however, between girls and boys enrollment).

Training new leadership: In addition to strengthening African technical and managerial capacity through long and short-term training in the U.S., USAID's extensive participant training program has been instrumental in training a cadre of leadership who have been at the forefront of Africa's economic and political transformation. The African Graduate Fellowship Program (AFGRAD), managed by the African American Institute, has provided degree training in American universities for nearly 3,000 Africans. USAID's Human Resources Development Assistance Project (HRDA) is providing training for over 28,000 participants; 93% of the training is conducted in Africa, over half the trainees are from the private sector, and 35% of the participants are women.

3. Child Survival and HIV/AIDS

While infant and child mortality rates across Africa are still among the highest in the world, they have been falling consistently. We estimate that continuing increases in immunization and oral rehydration therapy coverage are saving about 800,000 African children each year.

HIV/AIDS will remain a major problem in Africa for the foreseeable future. However, most African governments are now actively campaigning against the disease, and there has been a marked increase in public awareness of the causes of HIV/AIDS and of the behavioral changes needed to prevent transmission. While little behavioral change has been reported to date, research in Uganda and Kenya have demonstrated some encouraging impact which we hope will eventually stem the spread of this deadly and devastating disease.

III. THE ROLE OF REGIONAL APPROACHES TO DEVELOPMENT

Finally, I would like to highlight the impact of our regional approaches in the Sahel and Southern Africa, and outline our plans for two new regional initiatives for Southern Africa and the Horn.

A. CILSS/CLUB DU SAHEL NETWORK

The CILSS/Club du Sahel network has evolved from its initial focus on coordinating disaster assistance. It now has a broader concern for sustainable development, and it has been particularly effective in focussing the attention of African policy-makers and donors on the nexus between population and the fragile Sahelian environment. A companion institution, AGRHYMET, has developed the capability to provide sophisticated early warning information to member states which has helped avoid famine in this drought-prone region.

B. SOUTHERN AFRICA DEVELOPMENT COORDINATION CONFERENCE (SADCC)/ SOUTHERN AFRICA DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC)

Originally created in 1980 to reduce economic dependence of Southern African nations on an apartheid South Africa, SADCC successfully forged a regional identity and a sense of common destiny among member states, and it mobilized over \$3.5 billion from donors for regional priorities, particularly for infrastructure. As the political situation within the region has evolved, a new organization, the Southern Africa Development Community, was formed to increase cooperation within the region by encouraging free movement of capital, labor, goods and services.

C. USAID'S INITIATIVE FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA

USAID is developing a special Initiative for Southern Africa to forge greater regional cooperation and to reinforce the wave of democratization and economic reform being undertaken by most countries of the region. The initiative will have four components:

- a fund for democracy and governance, which will support civic education, conflict resolution, building civil society, and strengthening separation of powers, and will also promote networking among Africans to share lessons learned;
- a \$100 million enterprise fund to stimulate creation and expansion of indigenous businesses;
- transportation and telecommunications investments; and
- expanded support for agriculture and natural resources management to accelerate sustainable economic growth.

D. A NEW INITIATIVE FOR THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA

Finally, USAID Administrator Brian Atwood led a President. Mission to the Horn of Africa in late May. The United States firmly committed to meeting the short-term emergency requirement of the people of this region; this year, USAID has committed almost \$400 million of food aid and emergency relief. However, we also need to address the underlying economic and political problems of the Horn. Consequently, we are currently developing a long-term initiative intended to achieve political stability and food security, in order to break the "cycle of despair." The focus will be on:

- increased capacity in the region for conflict resolution, crisis prevention and response;
- strengthened regional support for effective national food security safety nets;
- greater regional collaboration in promoting economic growth; and
- expanded efforts to address population and migration issues as a root cause of insecurity.

CLOSING

I hope that my statement captures and conveys our conviction that there are encouraging political and economic success stories across the continent. Our long-term commitment to African development, to the political and economic empowerment of the African people, are reaping results. Significant challenges remain, but we have the opportunity to be part of Africa's story of hope. As Vice President Gore exhorted in closing remarks at the recent White House Conference on Africa: "Decades from now, when we look back on what we accomplished, let it be said that this was the generation that helped Africa achieve the peace and prosperity that has eluded it for so long."

AFRICA: THE DEMOCRATIC BALANCE SHEET

by

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Good news from Africa is often lost because reporters focus on the wrongs which governments perpetrate rather than the precise nature of the people's reactions and response. In September 1994 the world press rightly reported on the banning in Nigeria of such newspapers as The Guardian and the Concorde family of publications. The international press also reported on the new decrees about detention without trial and the effort to put military decisions beyond judicial challenge and review.

All this reporting of the bad news from Nigeria was quite justified. What was not reported was the continuing defiance by much of what remained of the Nigerian Press. In spite of the threat of detention without trial, many reporters and feature-writers continued to stick their necks out on important political issues, often critical of the Government of General Sani Abacha.

In September 1994 I attended a conference of the youth of Nigeria on the theme of "Nigeria in the 21st century". The conference was sponsored by the Yakubu Gowon Center (named after a former military head of state) and the conference was opened by the current Head of State, President Sani Abacha. Nevertheless, the conference included papers strongly critical of both the excesses of military regimes and the corruption and anti-democratic cynicism of many Nigerian civilian politicians. Clearly debate and independent expression were alive and well in Nigeria, in spite of Draconian military decrees.

Between Ethnicity and Labour

In places like Rwanda we have witnessed not just the decline of the nation-state but its complete collapse. But we have also seen Western hegemony at work. Here the West had the power to decide whether to save only Western nationals in the mayhem and let the Hutu and the Tutsi go to hell in a collective suicide pact.

The West also had the power to get the Security Council to play the pendulum game - one day calling upon the United Nations forces to withdraw from Rwanda and let the violence take its natural course, and the next week calling upon the United Nations to increase its presence.

There was also the power of Elysee Palace in France to play God - ranging from being the main supplier of Hutu military destructiveness to being the main protector of Tutsi on the run. The French presidential palace played goddess of death on one day; angel of life the next.

Why did not Africans intervene to end the genocide in Rwanda? They did. "Africa" took the form of the Rwanda Patriotic Front which, in face of immense ethnic provocation, somehow managed to limit its goal to conquest rather than carnage, dreaming of

restoring order rather than avenging terror. The Patriotic Front's discipline may not last. It may collapse anytime. But the Patriotic Front had shown more self-restraint under provocation in several months of stress than any other band of African or any other soldiers in similar circumstances in the post-colonial era.

Western hegemony is not infallible. In 1961 John F. Kennedy launched an invasion of Cuba by Cuban exiles on the Bay of Pigs. The invasion, intended mainly to serve U.S. interests, was a complete fiasco. In 1994 President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda helped Rwandan exiles launch their own "Bay of Pigs". For the time being this African "Bay of Pigs" invasion by Rwandan exiles has been substantially successful. For once an African initiative has been more triumphant than its Western-sponsored predecessor.

When Moshood Abiola won the Nigerian presidential election in June 1993, he was the first Southerner to be elected Executive Head of State in the country's post-colonial history. In previous elections Nigerians brought into power Northern Muslims. In June 1993 they still brought back a Muslim victor - but this time he was a Southerner. Did the military government of Ibrahim Babangida nullify the elections for those ethnic and regional reasons? Was Moshood Abiola denied the Presidency because he was Yoruba rather than Hausa?

On being denied the presidency, Abiola's biggest mistake of 1993 was in exaggerating the scale of Western hegemony in the world. Instead of staying at home to fight it out, he travelled to the capitals of the Western world to seek international help in the fight against the military government in Nigeria. Washington and London made small gestures. Abiola damaged himself seriously at home.

In 1994, a few weeks before he resumed his struggle for the presidency, Abiola was in Washington again. But this time he knew that the main battlefield had to be Nigeria. He telephoned my home and missed me. With the help of my wife, he tracked me down at a hotel at Lincoln University, Pennsylvania. He told me "I am going to Nigeria to become President. I will see you at the Inauguration!" I was startled. In a sense I am still startled. But that phone call was also a lesson to me in political courage.

A few weeks later Abiola declared himself President of Nigeria at a rally in Lagos attended by thousands of people. It is true that he should have done that a year earlier. He had gambled in 1993 on Western hegemony and lost. But on matters of principle, "better late than never"!

Abiola's electoral support had been multi-ethnic. But his support in the fight against the military regime became heavily Yoruba and in the Western region. The fight produced one remarkable phenomenon - the phenomenal strike of the oil workers

and their supporters in defence of Abiola. The strike became the most impressive utilization of labour power for democratic ends in the history of post-colonial Africa - regardless of whether or not the strike ultimately succeeded. Its capacity to sustain itself for many weeks and hold the nation's economy to ransom on an issue of national democratic principle had already earned the strike a place in post-colonial history. The strike was finally broken after its eighth week.

In Poland under communism in the 1980s the defiance of Solidarity as a trade union movement had been widely acclaimed in the Western world. The petro-labour strike in Nigeria in the 1990s in defence of democracy fired few imaginations in the Western world, inspite of the fact that Nigeria was several times the size of Poland in population, and was Africa's most populous country.

Lech Walesa became a household name in the West, and he won the Nobel prize for Peace in 1983. Who knew the names of Nigeria's trade union leaders outside Nigeria? Was any of them likely to win the Nobel Prize for Peace?

The double standards of the World had persisted, distorted by Western hegemony. What passed for heroism in Europe (i.e. Solidarity in Poland) passed for instability in Africa (i.e. the strike of Nigeria's oil workers). What passed for martyrdom in Eastern Europe (harassment of Lech Walesa) became another example of African tyranny when African democrats were victimized. The Western focus was disproportionately on who was killing democracy in Africa, and inadequately focussed on who was fighting for democracy on the continent. African villains got more coverage than African heroes.

U.S. Policy and Africa's Democratization

In countries like Kenya, the United States' foreign policy has in the past been oriented towards the ambition of making democracy happen. What is perhaps more compelling is the need to make democracy endure.

Americans have often been ready to spend a lot of money to undermine dictatorships in countries as far-flung as Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Angola, Cuba and now Haiti. But Americans have been less enthusiastic about spending money to stabilize fragile democracies in places like Zambia, Malawi or even Eastern Europe.

A shift in emphasis may be needed in American foreign policy from undermining dictatorships to stabilizing democracies. Whole new strategies may need to be worked out to help democracies endure once they have happened.

Economically, this may mean helping new democracies be

economically successful - and make a democracy as a system deliver some of the basic needs of the people.

Places like Malawi, Zambia and South Africa may also need considerable help in training human power for administrative, parliamentary, party, executive, judicial and related roles.

In Africa there is clear evidence that the people are tired of dictators. In one African country after another there have been riots and protests against dictators. There is genuine desire for democracy, but the capacity to democratize needs to be strengthened. The democratic spirit may be willing, but the political flesh is weak.

The United States can help democracy endure in Africa only in certain ways. But both Africa and the United States must first recognize this paradox of a strong African desire for democracy combined with a fragile African capability for it. We need to understand the malaise before we can help treat it.

In the course of the 1990s much of Africa has continued to demonstrate this solid desire for democracy. What has yet to be tested fully is Africa's capacity to democratize. The desire for democracy has manifested itself in a variety of ways - from pro-democracy street demonstrations in Togo to the Muslim riots at the Kenya Coast, from the political tug-of-war between soldiers and civilians in Nigeria to the electoral fall of Hastings Banda's tyranny in Malawi.

But are Africa's will and capacity to democratize strong enough? This capacity requires not only the urge to throw out one particular unpopular regime, but the determination to institutionalize legitimate political succession indefinitely. The will to democracy also requires readiness to permit an unpopular but legitimate government to govern without hindrance and complete its electoral term of office without being overthrown.

Ghana elected Kofi Busia in 1969, and the Ghanaian army overthrew him in 1972 before he completed his first electoral term. In 1979 Ghana elected Hilla Limann, and again the Ghanaian army overthrew him in 1981 before he completed his first term. What was even more astonishing, popular opinion in Ghana cheered both military coups. The Ghanaian will to democracy was not strong enough yet.

In 1992 a new situation arose, Flt. Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings, formerly a military dictator, resigned his military commission and stood for election as a civilian. According to international observers, Jerry Rawlings won the 1992 election. Had he won it because the register of voters was unfairly incomplete? Or did he win because of actual vote-rigging during the election? Or were the opposition parties simply bad losers? Whichever of the above

suppositions was the truth, it constituted evidence that Ghana's democracy was not fully consolidated. Will we see Jerry Rawlings, the civilian, allowed to complete his electoral term as president? The answer is in the womb of history. We need to help Ghana consolidate a democratic tradition.

The evidence that Jonas Savimbi and UNITA are bad losers in Angola is probably clearer. Former United States' protege Jonas Savimbi was prepared to plunge the country into renewed civil war rather than accept even the first round of the presidential elections, which had gone against him. That Angola's will to democracy was weak was not surprising. The country had been ruled by one of the least democratic of all European colonial powers in Africa, Portugal. In the last decade of colonial rule, Angola was more accustomed to multi-army politics than to multi-party politics. The democratic tradition in Portuguese-speaking Africa had either been destroyed by the whole Portuguese domineering style or never arrived because Portugal ceased to be part of the European main-stream, and its colonies were ignored or brutalized as a result.

Mozambique suffered a comparable fate - more a multi-army experience than a multi-party tradition. The year 1992 saw the armies of FRELIMO and RENAMO (MNR) edging their way towards each other for a reconciliation. Did they stand a better chance of success than Angola did? Let us hope so. The will to democracy is particularly weak in Lusophone Africa.

When I was at the Summit Meeting of the Organization of African Unity in Dakar, Senegal, in June 1972, I was privileged to be introduced to the new President of Zambia, President Frederick Chiluba. Within a year he had learnt a lot. One lesson for democracy was not only to be a good loser, but also to be a gracious winner. At first Chiluba's party was unable to grasp that point. The party seemed determined to humiliate former President Kenneth Kaunda. This seemed to be the surest way of sending a message to all presidential incumbents in the rest of Africa not to make, "the same mistake as that made by Kenneth Kaunda" - i.e., give in to democratic pressures!

It would be a disaster to send a message to all African presidential incumbents that humiliation awaits them if they cease to be heads of state. Chiluba had a special responsibility to Africa as a whole to avoid sending such a message. But thanks partly to Chiluba's own good sense, and partly to the advice of General Olusegun Obasanjo and other African elder statesmen, moves towards reconciliation between Chiluba and Kaunda were made. President Chiluba's highly publicized birthday greeting to former President Kaunda were particularly symbolic.

More needs to be done not only in Zambia, but also in the rest of Africa, to make former presidents feel honoured and respected

even when they are defeated. Nigeria is already on its way there. Both General Obasanjo and General Yakubu Gowon are greatly respected - though there is more controversy with regard to former President Shehu Shagari (civilian) and former President Ibrahim Babangida (military). In the United States all former presidents are politely addressed as "Mr. President".

The will to democratize is sometimes compromised by an unwillingness to accept the triumphant ideology in a contest. This was most dramatically illustrated in Algeria. The pluralistic experiment was not, in reality, ready to accept the triumph of the ideology of the Islamic Salvation Front. Elections were held - and then aborted when the winner was not acceptable to those who were able to command military support to frustrate the democratic process. Algeria is now plunged in a "no-win" situation - as the democratic secularists seek to neutralize the majoritarian Islamists.

One of the major dilemmas confronting the new African democracies is whether economic liberalization should have preceded political liberalization. Should Africa have reduced the role of the state in the economy before Africa increased the role of the people in the political process? Would that have strengthened Africa's will to democratize?

Experience in Asia seems to lend support to that strategy. South Korea embarked on vigorous capitalism before attempting liberal democratization. On the whole, this approach has also been true of Taiwan, and of most members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Successful Asian capitalist countries have pursued the legacy of Adam Smith before they have paid any attention to the legacy of either Thomas Jefferson or the Jacobins.

An even more dramatic case is that of the People's Republic of China since Mao Tse Tung's death. The giant of Asia has definitely been moving towards greater economic liberalization, while remaining impeccably opposed to political liberalization. The Tienanmen Square suppression of 1989 was a measure of opposition to political liberalization, but China's commitment to economic liberalization has remained unabated. The Chinese people have a desire for democracy, but not yet the will to force the aging elite to provide it.

On the other hand, Mikhail Gorbachev attempted political liberalization (glasnost) before any systematic economic liberalization (perestroika). The result in the former Soviet Union was rapid political disintegration without meaningful economic transformation. It was not only the Soviet empire of Eastern Europe which disintegrated in the wake of glasnost. It was also the bicontinental body politic of the Soviet Union itself. The Chinese are justified in seeing Gorbachev as the man who destroyed the country which had made him leader - the USSR.

In Africa Ghana has from time to time explicitly faced the dilemma as to which should have priority first - political recovery or economic recovery. Ghana's founder-president, Kwame Nkrumah, opted for the primacy of politics. He declared in the 1950s: "Seek ye first the political kingdom and all else will be added unto it".

Did Nkrumah mean that political independence for an African country would bring "all else added unto it"? Or did he mean the liberation of the whole of Africa (including the Republic of South Africa) was a precondition for Africa's "political kingdom"? Or was his concept of "political kingdom" a combination of both Africa's liberation and Africa's unification into a united country on a continental scale?

Clearly political independence for individual African countries has never, "added all else unto it". For individual African nations Nkrumah's emphasis on the state as the primary actor in Africa's development has been invalidated.

Thirty years after Nkrumah's dictum of "seek ye first the political kingdom" another Ghanaian leader seemed to have drastically revised the dictum. Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings' politics from the mid-1980s until 1992 seemed to be based on the dictum: "Seek ye first the economic kingdom and all else will be added unto it". Jerry Rawlings - in spite of left wing rhetoric - submitted his Ghanaian government to the rigours of structural adjustment and related discipline of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

It was not until 1992 that Jerry Rawlings' government - under both domestic and international pressures - at last conceded political democratization. A timetable was more firmly announced for multi-party elections. Political liberalization was at last catching up with economic liberalization in the new Ghana. Was "the economic kingdom" about to demonstrate that it would have "all else added unto it"? At least for Ghana, the question is still wide open. Will the new Jerry Rawlings elected into in power still continue to put economic recovery first as a precondition for successful political reform? If he did, will he be as vindicated as had been South Korea, Taiwan, South-East Asia, and possibly the People's Republic of China? Will he be negating Nkrumah's premiss of the primacy of African politics? Or is there a third dictum which demands to be explored: "Seek ye first the cultural kingdom and all else will be added unto it"?

The fate of both political and economic liberalization hinges on cultural variables which have too often been underestimated. We may need to grasp the cultural dimension before we can fully gauge the scale and durability of social change in Africa. Every constitution needs to be culturally viable. Every development project needs a cultural feasibility study.

But history does not wait for historians. History has its own momentum. In many African countries political liberalization has been taking place without either a cultural feasibility study or an economic stock-taking. Liberal democratic activism has been under way from Madagascar to Mali, from Marrakesh to Maputo, from ~~Dar-es-Salaam~~ to Dakar. The scale of activism has varied from country to country - but a liberal, pluralistic contagion has been spreading across the continent. Yet the question persists: Is it only a desire for democracy or is there a real will and capacity to democratize?

We posed a wider scenario - "Seek ye first the cultural kingdom and all else will be added unto it". This third scenario requires understanding the cultural pre-conditions of both political will and economic competence. Africa needs planned democracy - preceded by a feasibility study to ascertain the cultural viability of any proposed economic or political system. Slogans like "privatization" and "democratization" need to be accompanied by a cultural manual specific to the society or to the region. Africa's desire for democracy has reached significant proportions. Devising a culturally inspirational agenda for the future may transform that democratic desire into a powerful democratic will.

CONCLUSION

Most of the democratizing work has to be done by Africans themselves. The United States can try to save new democracies from becoming economic failures. The United States can also help transmit technical skills of election-monitoring, party compromises, parliamentary effectiveness, administrative capacity-building, and the training of journalists and reporters for a free press. The United States may also need to be more sensitive to the speed and sequence of economic liberalization in relation to political liberalization. The African democratic spirit is still willing even if the political flesh is still weak. In time a strong desire for democracy may indeed crystallize into a strong will and a capacity to democratise. Amen.

WHERE IS THE PROMISE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA?**Michael Chege****A Statement to the Congress of the United States, House Subcommittee on Africa
Committee on Foreign Affairs****September 27, 1994**

Against the backdrop of so many disasters in Africa, so prominently portrayed by the media, it is easy to forget that there is much that is going right in that continent, that deserves to be nurtured and expanded for the good of our people. Congressman Harry Johnston had asked me this afternoon to address your committee on these, more positive but less publicized aspects of internal developments in Africa. In doing so, I do not want in the least to pretend--as some do--that the political and humanitarian catastrophes now so sadly evident in such places as Rwanda, Angola, Liberia, Sudan and Somalia are a fabrication of the media or creations of baleful external conspirators. Much of it regrettably is of our own making, with--it must be stressed--considerable help from our Western and Eastern friends in the heydays of the Cold War.

Let me begin with the difficult but steady increase of democratic governments in Africa. In the last three years some 12 countries have made peaceful transitions from authoritarian governments to democratically elected ones. These now include South Africa, Malawi, Benin, Cape Verde, Zambia, Central African Republic, Niger, Mali, Madagascar, Lesotho, Sao Tome. The population now enjoying freedom through that process is much larger than that unfortunately caught in the violence and carnage cited above. To this new crop of democracies, add older ones--Botswana, Namibia, Senegal, Mauritius. The issue then is to ensure that the majority of states--those lying between freedom and disaster--follow the peaceful road to democracy and avoid civil war.

Second, through open debate, countries like Ethiopia, Uganda, South Africa and Mozambique have tried to come to terms with the problem of ethnic diversity through constitutional reform; ethnic conflict having been a constant source of internal warfare. Peaceful resolution of ethnic differences was also discussed in the 1990-92 national conferences of French-speaking states. Such discussion might have been taboo five years back. And though no one can guarantee a solution, it is clear that informed debate, reform and compromise on the basis of fairness are the better way forward than enforced cultural uniformity of the past.

Population. You have heard that Africa's population growth rate is now the fastest in the world under conditions of increasing poverty, and it is true. However, a number of countries--Botswana, Cape Verde, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Cote d'Ivoire, Lesotho and Nigeria--fertility rates have declined by between 10 and 30 per cent in the last two decades. 10 percent declines in fertility are considered irreversible by demographers. In particular,

Zimbabwe's spectacularly successful home-made program in reducing population growth deserves to be better known and replicated.

Economic Development. Despite the pitiful overall growth record, the World Bank's March 1994 report on adjustment in Africa had evidence of improved performance in six countries. More to the point, if one looks at specific countries and projects, Africa has not lost ground everywhere. In the global tea market for instance, Kenyan farmers using small family plots (and large farms in Malawi) have increased their share of total world production at the expense of Asian producers. We have often witnessed the reverse. As with population policy and democracy there are precious lessons here that deserve to be studied and duplicated. Also, Cote d'Ivoire has increased its global share of cocoa to about a third. Preliminary reports of January's devaluation of the CFA currency by 50 percent indicate gains for peasant farmers in Francophone West Africa and especially in Cote d'Ivoire.

Leadership. As we can see in Africa's war-ravaged states but also sadly in such countries as Nigeria, Zaire, Kenya, Cameroon, Burundi, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Conakry, the capacity of local leadership to stubbornly push their own people into disaster is greater than we ever imagined. The same applies to warlords in Angola, Somalia etc. Yet there is also evidence of exemplary statesmanship best personified by President Nelson Mandela. How many leaders elsewhere in the world can claim to have ridden the tiger of deep internal hatreds with as much skill and at such a great personal cost? And he is not alone in this. Think of Bishop Desmond Tutu, Vice president De Klerk, the late Chris Hani, and many community leaders of all races. Elsewhere principled journalists, legislators, human rights groups, and religious leaders defend peace and freedom. Among them distinguished women activists like environmentalist Wangari Mathai of Kenya, and banker Eileen Johnson-Sirleaf with us here today. Persecution of legitimate dissent continues in Nigeria, Ethiopia, Zaire, Sudan, but this hardy breed of freedom advocates will not cave in. Many have paid dearly for their stand. Like opposition leader John Fru Ndi in Cameroon, Campaign for Democracy in Nigeria, Wole Soyinka, Beko Ransome-Kuti and many, many others whose names never make to the headlines. This may be where to look for the germinating seeds of hope.

Regional peacemaking and security. Not too far back a correspondent for the New York Times wondered what if anything African states were doing about Rwanda and other African flashpoints. Well, not everything but there is something. Despite all its problems, ECOMOG--the multinational force of the Economic Community of West African States--in Liberia represents an important initiative in African collaborative efforts in peacemaking. It is part of an emerging pattern. Under Kenya's leadership, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) in Eastern Africa has sought to mediate the Sudanese civil war and it is helpful that Ambassador Melisa Wells on behalf of the Clinton administration has been in that region. More encouragingly, we recently witnessed the successful resolution the constitutional crisis in Lesotho, bringing back the democratically-elected government, that was undertaken by Presidents Mandela,

Robert Mugabe and Ketumile Masire of the Southern African Development Community. In partnership with France, Burkina Faso is mediating the Tuareg problem in Niger.

If one were to object that instances of African successes in various fields cited above represent the one that flew over the cockoo's nest. I would protest that we do not know yet. They may well be the leading goose in a flying geese formation, the thin end of a growing wedge. It all depend how we in Africa, and our friends in the US and elsewhere handle this complicated and mixed situation. In the shock of the truly horrifying images now coming out of Africa, let us not loose our sense of proportion in both time and space. Let's not forget there were commentators who could not give a chance to a rebellious thirteen agricultural colonies on the Atlantic seaboard of North America in the eighteenth century. We easily forget the pessimism about South East Asia in the 1950s and 1960s. The way forward is rewarding success, amplifying it and minimizing disaster.

Here are some suggestions.

*Without domestic peace and security it will not be possible to expand the scope of the many programs and policies I have cited. The Organization of African Unity is slowly upgrading its peacekeeping capability more recently with a \$3m grant from UNDP. Others ought to chip in. For the ravaged states without a formal government to speak of, someone must keep the peace while political settlements are worked out. More significantly Prime Minister John Major last week announced in Cape Town an UN-based initiative that would create an early warning system for imminent domestic instability like that of Rwanda and Somalia. This initiative deserves wider support.

*Prevention is better than cure. And this principle also applies here. The Clinton administration worried about a \$5 million levy that would have gone into transport for an UN peace-keeping force that might have stopped the genocide last Spring, but will now be asking Congress for \$300million for the badly-needed humanitarian work for Rwandan refugees. Preventive monitoring and diplomacy ought to focus on potential flashpoints: ethnic cleansing in Zaire's Shaba Province, in Kenya's Rift Valley Province, and the free-fall politics engineered by General Sani Abacha in Nigeria. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have published reports describing the principal culprits responsible. They ought to be the subject of a campaign for diplomatic and economic isolation led by the industrial democracies where these people have substantial personal interests. And in the case of Rwanda, the UN Human Rights Commission and the proposed tribunal ought to be funded as rapidly as possible before the trail of the killers gets cold. Let us set an example to deter future organizers of genocide in Africa.

*More rigorous criteria in the management of development assistance ought to be instituted. Africa's tragedy is also that far too often good money has been thrown after bad. Funding ought to be conditional on honest accountability of public funds and on good governance. Support the projects that work for they are there. American taxpayers should no longer finance the profligate habits of African dictators and their retainers.

*Greater coordination between the US and its G-7 allies, and especially Britain and France which have important historical interests in the region. Unless this is done, there will be conflicting signals and African mischief-makers will play one G-7 nation against the other. Against the backdrop of hopelessness and a declining interest in Africa, this issue ought to be raised at the next G-7 summit.

*More support for African democratic activists, journalists, writers, scholars and political leaders in distress. This need not always be financial. Diplomatic pressure and blunt public statements against repression, pogroms and other violations of civil rights do have an impact. Closer consultation with African human rights and their US-based counterparts would be advisable.

I thank you for listening to me and I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

Testimony of Ms. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf
before the House Subcommittee on Africa of
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Congress of
the United States - 27 September 1994
* * * * *

Mr. Chairman, Honorable Members, my name is Ellen Johnson Sirleaf. I am currently Assistant Administrator and Director of the Regional Bureau for Africa of the United Nations Development Programme. Previously I was Vice President and Director of the Equator Holdings Company, a member of the Hong Kong Bank Group. Before that I held several positions including Minister of Finance of Liberia, President of the Liberian Bank for Development and Investment, Vice President of Citibank, Regional Office for Africa and Senior Loan Officer at the World Bank.

It is a great honor for me to be invited to testify before the House Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. I am particularly pleased that despite the disconcerting news about Africa which dominate the press in this country and the devastating article "The Coming Anarchy" by Robert Kaplan in the Atlantic, the Committee has chosen to focus on the "Potential and Promise" of Africa. I believe that Africa has both the potential and the promise of success even if the road to their realization are difficult.

History has not been kind to Africa. Like all other parts of the World, Africa started off with evolving civilizations centered around large empires throughout the continent. But the evolution into modern nation states was preempted by the slave trade which robbed Africa of some 12 million of its able bodied men and women. This destabilizing and dehumanizing experience was followed by a century of colonialism which introduced a system of exploitation and, in 1884/1885 in the Colonial Conference of Berlin, balkanized and divided Africa without respect for ethnic or cultural groupings. Direct interventions by Europe and the super-powers in the era of cold war geopolitics continued thereafter.

But history is not enough to explain the crises that characterize much of Africa today. Failed vanguards of political liberation and military despots have stunted the growth of a visionary and developmental leadership resulting in dysfunctional macro-economic policies, underdeveloped national capacities and widespread violations of human rights.

These widespread historical and structural deficiencies were masked in the early post independence period by good commodity prices, low oil costs and relatively good flow of overseas development assistance. Thus Africa was able to make remarkable progress in socio-economic development in the sixties and seventies which compared favorably to other regions of the world.

For example, between 1967 and 1974 GDP of the region grew by an average of 6 per cent per annum. In two decades (1960-1980) Africa's overall human development indicators reflecting improvements in literacy rates, life expectancy, and incomes per head, rose by 50 per cent. On independence, after the long period of colonialism, several countries had no more than, say, one physician, or only a few engineers, no scientists, no paved roads. Except for the amenities introduced into what were essentially urban trading posts, goods and services for the majority of a subsistence population consisted of what nature could provide. Two decades later, modern transport and communication systems, move goods and services hourly between Africa and the rest of the world. Today, thousands of Africans man your hospitals and your schools, your labs and your factories and, for lack of an alternative, they predominate in driving your taxicabs.

The early post-independence progress only postponed the crises, however, as too many countries proved unable to respond to the global economic change introduced in the 1970s by the oil boom. For some, like Rwanda, Somalia and my own native country, Liberia, the crisis has become a national disaster.

Where then is the Africa of promise? Let me suggest that it is there, open and ready to be seen and discovered, if we but look beyond the daily media coverage of disaster, starvation, violence, death and destruction.

Let me try to talk about this other unnoticed Africa, and the reasons why there is cause for hope and optimism.

First, a new day of realism has dawned in Africa, urged on since independence by the students and the political activists and made even more urgent by the overall deteriorated conditions which followed the 1980 decade of economic decline. By the late 1980s African countries and their leaders had finally waken up to the fact that there was no partner out there willing to carry their burdens, that development was primarily their own responsibility and that this could be achieved only with drastic change in their way of doing business.

This led the majority of countries to adopt courageous policies of economic reform, reform that has meant taking measures to deregulate prices, exchange and interest rates and to effect sharp reduction in the fiscal accounts and in consumption. These reforms have helped to restore positive rates of growth of GDP per capita in some countries, albeit in still too small a number due to reversals in policy in certain countries and inadequate reform measures in others.

Moreover, Several countries have gone beyond the adoption of economic reform measures and have sought to limit the extent of government intervention in their markets by opening up to the private sector.

Despite these efforts, one generally hears that the overall prediction on African development is bleak. This is largely because development requires more than just good economic policies. It requires investment in human capacities, in infrastructure, in institution building and in good governance. The totality of these requirements means consistency and time -- consistency in policies and sufficient time for them to have the desired effect.

There is simply no quick fix and no short cut. Development requires a framework based upon a long-term vision and a rolling and progressive process towards its achievement.

I have a second reason for optimism in Africa's future.

It goes unheard and the process is still evolving, but there is a definite wind of democratic change that is sweeping across the continent. Within the last four years about 25 African countries have resorted to the ballot box to effect changes in government. Unheard of in times past, incumbents with claims to the leadership in the pre-independence freedom struggle, incumbents with the military and security might in their hands have all ceded power. In several countries there are functioning opposition groups, many of whom are well on the way to becoming constructive loyal opposition, as those which characterise the democratic processes in more developed countries.

In still a few countries - Botswana, Mauritius, Senegal, to name a few - democracy has been tested and tried in over two decades, and this has often resulted in stability which has fostered major economic advancement.

There is yet a third reason for optimism in Africa's future, one which you in this Congress have nurtured -- the political transition in South Africa and the unparalleled example of reconciliation and rationality represented in President Nelson Mandela. Finally, Africa has its hero, equal in stature to the to the great men and women of other lands. We can now use this example in attempts to heal the massive social wounds that have resulted in many of our countries from years of social injustice and economic inequities.

There is also economic capital to be gained from a peaceful South Africa. Already South Africa has joined the other 10 SADC countries in a sub-regional economic union that is poised to become an economic growth pole for Africa.

Similar action among the CFA countries in West and Central Africa, who in January took bold action in devaluing a currency that had remained unrealistically in fixed parity for over twenty years, augurs well for Africa's economic future.

Mr. Chairman, let me conclude my testimony by attempting to address two issues -- What it will take to achieve sustainable economic development in African countries, and what can the international community, with the leadership of the United States, do to encourage these efforts.

Let me state, first and foremost, that the key to sustainable development lies in the hands of African themselves. The African leadership must show the tenacity to stay the course of appropriate economic reforms and improvement in governance. This will not be enough, however, even with the best effort and under the best of circumstances. The record worldwide, including for those African countries that have been reforming, will show that an adequate level of international support and capital flows is a major factor in ensuring the sustainability of reform.

For the international community this boils down to action on three fronts.

First, on debt. It is true that many countries, including the United States, have provided significant relief to the poorest African countries. But it is simply not enough and it fails to provide the level of support for those whose reform measures have begun to show results.

What is perhaps required additionally is for the United States to lead the effort for a major G-7 initiative to tackle, in the Paris Club or otherwise, a reduction not only in the flow but the stock of African debt -- we hope comprehensively and across the board but, at the least, for those countries which have demonstrated the political will to reform.

I also believe that we will need to seek innovative approaches to relief from Africa's multilateral debt (e.g. that owed to the IMF, the World Bank and the African Development Bank), debt which currently represents for many countries the biggest constraint on growth.

My second suggested course of action relates to the need to counter what appears to be a trend toward the reduction in development assistance to Africa.

As I indicated earlier, adequacy in international flows has been the simple key element in ensuring sustainability in progress for all reforming countries -- whether in Eastern Europe, or the former Soviet Union, or in Africa.

In this regard, Honorable Chairman and Members, I hope that you will see the wisdom in responding to the appeal of UNDP's Administrator who in a speech on Africa in May 1994, pointed to the need for a special facility to support conflict prevention and

containment of hostilities through preventive development. As we all know when a conflict breaks and deepens as we have seen in the case of Somalia or Angola or Liberia, the related costs of humanitarian assistance can imply billions of dollars. Already in 1994 the international community is committed to spending about two billion dollars in Africa. We believe that if directed through the right programmes, it would have taken less than one-fifth of this amount to help Africa maintain a stable environment for development to proceed.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, the United States Congress could play a leadership role in promoting direct foreign investment in Africa, particularly in those countries that have promoted a conducive business environment.

For example, special programs of assistance might be specifically targeted to the development of physical infrastructure directly related and intended to attract direct foreign investments. Japan has used this form of assistance effectively to the mutual benefit of investors on both sides. The Congress might also consider specific tax incentive measures designed to provide clearly defined benefits for potential investors. These or other such measures would assist in forging stronger partnership between African Governments and the United States private sector.

Mr. Chairman, Honorable Members, the principles that led Secretary of State, George Catlett Marshall, to devise the Marshall Plan for Europe were sound and they produced the desired effect.

Similar plans of assistance to the other regions of the world would produce the same effect -- a larger world market for American products and services; a safer world environment which provides little incentive for the movement of people and illegal goods and services to American shores.

The leadership of the United States in assisting other regions and other countries to harness their own resources remains a noble and rewarding cause. The leadership of the United States in promoting development in Africa is equally so.

I thank you.

Ellen Johnson Sirleaf is Assistant Administrator and Director of the Regional Bureau for Africa, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), New York. Prior to this, she was vice President and Director of Equator Holdings Company, a member of the Hong Kong Bank Group. She has served as Minister of Finance of Liberia; President of the Liberian Bank for Development and Investment; Vice President of Citibank, Regional Office for Africa; and Senior Loan Officer at the World Bank. Ms. Sirleaf serves on the boards of directors of numerous African and international development institutions and was a member of the World Bank's Council of African Advisers from 1988 to 1990. She was a founding member of the International Institute for Women in Political Leadership, and has served on the boards of several women organizations in her home country, Liberia and the United States. She is a founding member of the Liberia Action Party which challenged the military regime of Samuel Doe in the 1985 general elections. As a result of this, she was jailed two times for a total of nine months. The petition of twenty thousand Liberian women and international outcry led to her release. In 1988 she was honored with the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt International Freedom Award. Her most recent publication is "The Outlook for Commercial Bank Lending to Sub-Saharan Africa" with Francis Nyirjesy (1991). She holds a Master's Degree in Public Administration from Harvard University.

RESUME

ELLEN JOHNSON SIRLEAF

PROFESSIONAL HISTORY

7/92 - Present

UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME
 Assistant Administrator and Regional
 Director, Regional Bureau for Africa
 New York, NY

Responsible for overall management of
 country programs in forty-three
 sub-Saharan African countries

8/86 - 7/92

EQUATOR BANK/EQUATOR HOLDINGS
 Vice President and Member of Executive
 Board
 Washington, DC

Representative in DC with responsibility
 for business in Eastern Africa

7/85 - 8/86

Sabbatical (Liberia)

Participation in general elections
 process

12/81 - 7/85

CITIBANK/CITICORP, Africa Regional Office
 Vice President
 Nairobi, Kenya

Coordinator African country risk
 assessment and responsibility for
 business in eleven (Eastern/Southern
 African non presence countries)

12/80 - 12/81

WORLD BANK
 Senior Loan Officer
 Washington, DC

Responsible for lending programs in
 Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda. Managed
 Division during Division Chief's absence.

4/80 - 12/80

LIBERIAN BANK FOR DEVELOPMENT AND
INVESTMENT
President
Monrovia, Liberia

Responsible for overall management of
development finance institution

5/77 - 4/80
64-69

MINISTRY OF FINANCE
Minister - Deputy Minister - Assistant
Minister
Monrovia, Liberia

Responsible for overall economic and
financial management. Representation of
country at World Bank, African
Development Bank, ECOWAS, etc.

9/72 - 5/77

WORLD BANK
Loan Officer
Washington, DC

Responsible for certain lending programs
in Barbados and Brazil

EDUCATION

1971 MPA (Economics)

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Cambridge, MA

1970 Diploma

ECONOMICS INSTITUTE
University of Colorado
Boulder, CO

1964 BBA (Accounting)

MADISON BUSINESS COLLEGE
Madison, WI

PUBLICATIONS

1992

THE OUTLOOK FOR COMMERCIAL BANK LENDING
TO SUBSAHARAN AFRICA
(With Francis Nyirjesy)
(Ishrat Hussain Edt.)

1991

FROM DISASTER TO DEVELOPMENT
(K. Cahill Edt.)SPECIAL HONORS

1988

Franklin D. Roosevelt
Freedom Award (USA)

1979

Grand Commander Star of African
Redemption (Liberia)

1978

Knight Commander Star of African
Redemption (Liberia) .BOARD MEMBERSHIP

1993 - Present

INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH
San Francisco, CA

1993 - Present

WOMEN WORLD BANKING CORPORATION
New York, NY

1989 - Present

SYNERGOS INSTITUTE
New York, NY

1989 - present

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL
Washington, DC

1987 - Present

EQUATOR HOLDINGS
Washington, DC

1990 - 1993

AFRICAN CENTER FOR DEVELOPMENT AND
STRATEGIC STUDIES (ACDESS)
Nigeria

1989 - 1992

LIBERIAN COMMITTEE FOR RELIEF,
REHABILITATION AND DEVELOPMENT
Washington, DC

1988 - 1990	WORLD BANK COUNCIL OF AFRICAN ADVISERS Washington, DC
1987 - 1992	INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR WOMEN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP Washington, DC
1986 - 1992	AFRICAN NEWS (Chair) Durham, NC

PERSONAL

Born in 1938 in Liberia

"AFRICA: POTENTIAL AND PROMISE"

George B.N. Ayittey, Ph.D.¹

Testimony before House Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
The US Congress, Washington, DC
Sept 27, 1994.

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen. Thank you for this opportunity to testify before this Subcommittee. As I understand it, the purpose of this hearing is to determine whether there is any reason to be hopeful about Africa. This is a continent with immense mineral wealth and natural resources but wracked by political instability, chaos, carnage, famine, refugees, oppression and wanton destruction. Most people feel uncomfortable about talking candidly about Africa's problems because they fear it would reinforce "negative images" about Africa. These fears, though justified, serve no useful purpose at all. In fact, they compound our problems in Africa.

All societies have their own problems. The U.S. has its own problems with racism, violent crime, drug abuse and disintegration of the family unit. Africa is no exception and has its problems too. More importantly, problems cannot be solved by denying their existence or sweeping them under a rug. The first important step in solving a problem is to expose it or admit of its existence. The next step is to perform a diagnosis of its causes and prescribe a solution. The final step is to monitor the solution periodically to determine if it is working. If not, a new remedy may be necessary.

I would like to go on record as commending this Subcommittee for holding these hearings. Why aren't African governments holding similar hearings in their own countries? All of us in this room would like to see African progress. It has a huge potential. It is the source of important and strategic minerals, vital aerospace, metallurgical and abrasive industries in the West: titanium, rhodium, vanadium, palladium, cobalt, diamonds, etc. With its 600 million population, Africa presents a huge market opportunity to U.S. businesses. However,

¹ The author, a native of Ghana, is an Associate Professor of Economics at The American University and president of The Free Africa Foundation, both in Washington. His book, Africa Betrayed (St. Martin's Press) won the 1993 Mencken Award for Best Book.

we need to be objective and pragmatic. Some African countries are making it but many are not.

Year after year since 1985, grisly pictures of emaciated bodies of famine victims have been paraded on television to appeal for humanitarian assistance: Ethiopia (1985), Angola (1986), Mozambique (1987), Sudan (1991), Liberia (1992), Somalia (1993), Rwanda (1994). Many Africans, including myself, are enraged by television images that deprecate their pride and dignity. Africa, it seems, is synonymous with famine, death and destruction. The horrific pictures also convey the mischievous notion that Africans are incapable of feeding themselves or solving their own problems. With a bowl in an outstretched hand, they are always begging foreigners for food.

Africa is capable feeding itself and solving its own problems. Some African countries are doing well economically: Botswana, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mauritius, Morocco, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda and arguably Zimbabwe. But we should avoid using labels as "success stories." First, "success" connotes an end to the development process and resolution of all economic problems. Certain economic problems, such as unemployment, inflation and poverty can never be eradicated. Unemployment, for example, will always be with us. It can never be zero; only minimized.

Second, as American journalist, Robert Kaplan, recently noted: "The labelling of places as 'success stories' prior to their dissolution promotes public cynicism toward a place like Africa. Kenya was once a 'success story,' remember? Now its capital, Nairobi, is known as 'Nairobbery,' due to surging violent crime [and ethnic strife]" (The Washington Post, April 17, 1994; p.C2). It may be recalled that other African countries, such as Ivory Coast and Malawi, were touted as "role models" for Africa in the 1980s. What happened to them?

Of course, those African countries doing well should be praised as we would like to see more such countries. Unfortunately, they are in the minority – a fact we cannot run away from. Consequently, we have a choice to make: We can focus on the relatively few countries that are doing well, and ignore the majority, letting them self-destruct. That would not be smart. Or we may seek to identify the "secrets to success" and try and transplant these in the other African countries and halt their slide. Of course, we also be worrying about the sustainability of development in the few countries that are doing well. Do their progress rest on

shifting sands? These issues may be explored at some future date.

Despite the innumerable problems facing Africa, I am pleased to report that there is a new ray of hope and optimism, which may be attributed to two positive developments. The first occurred in the last five years and is what I would call the new intellectual awakening, renaissance or revolution. Ten or fifteen years ago, Africa's woes were attributed largely to external factors: the ravages of the slave trade, legacies of colonialism, American imperialism, an unjust international economic system, inadequate foreign aid, exploitation by multi-national corporations, drought and so on. Not anymore.

Today, a new and angry generation of Africans, while accepting the contributory role played by external factors, place more emphasis on internal factors: misguided leadership, rampant corruption, heinous tyranny, senseless civil wars, capital flight, naked looting, and military vandalism. This new generation seeks internal solutions to Africa's problems – solutions from within. This, I believe, is the most positive development to have occurred in Africa recently.

Second, Africans have a much better idea of what works and what doesn't in Africa. We know where we should be heading. Ten years ago, we may be described as lost, groping under all sorts of "revolutionary slogans." We have learned quite a bit. Most Africans would readily admit that our leaders and the elites made some terrible mistakes in the post-colonial period. What are these mistakes?

First Fundamental Error: The Imposition Of Alien Systems On Africa

Many of African leaders and elites never returned to their own cultural roots after independence. They dismissed the Africa's own traditional system as "too backward" or "too primitive" to be used for the rapid transformation of Africa. Having rejected the traditional system, they needed a new system. The adoption of the Western system was out of the question, as they symbolized a submission to Western notions of "superiority," colonial exploitation and oppression. The inevitable choice was socialism, the anti-thesis of capitalism. It was to be the guiding ideology. Only socialism could check the evil machinations of neo-colonialism, imperialism and capitalist exploitation, it was argued.

Accordingly, the first generation of post-colonial leaders declared their countries "one-party socialist states" and themselves "presidents-for-life." Democracy was decried as alien – a Western institution.

Opposition parties were outlawed. Those who objected to this insidious march toward tyranny saw themselves hauled into jail or their lives abruptly terminated.

Now, we know that rue socialism was never practiced by African leaders. Those African leaders and ministers chanting "socialism, socialism!" were invariably the same ones who were riding about in Mercedes Benzes and accumulating huge personal fortunes in Swiss bank accounts. Furthermore, the socialist state, with its coercive powers, became an instrument of oppression and exploitation.

The ideological debate over socialism versus capitalism in Africa was a monumental waste of time -- totally unnecessary. Africa had its own indigenous ideology and system. The leadership should have built upon this after independence but failed to do so. Only Botswana did so.

Most of these "socialist" leaders were booted out of office in the 1970s in a spate of military coups that swept across Africa. But then the soldiers who took over were egregiously worse, squandering resources and turning their guns on the people they were supposed to defend. By 1990, almost all the African countries designated as "economic basket-cases" were all laboring under brutal military dictatorships: Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Zaire. Most Africans are now simply fed up with military barbarians. On September 20, 1994, when "General" Julue of Liberia announced that he has overthrown the interim government of Liberia and seized power, the people had had it. He was seized, beaten up well and handed over to the ECOMOG forces.

Second Fundamental Error: Misconstruction Of The Notion Of Development

African leaders and elites misunderstood the term "development." They equated it with modernism and industrialization. All things native were castigated as "backward and inferior." Agriculture was held in contempt as an inferior form of occupation and shunned. The natives were urged to abandon their backward ways and adopt "modern methods." Development became synonymous with "change." Perhaps ashamed of the label of "backwardness," African leaders and elites embarked upon a program of development that placed obtrusive emphasis on industry. No longer should Africa be relegated to the "inferior" status of "drawers of water and hewers of wood."

Consequently, the development that occurred in post-colonial Africa, can therefore be described as "development by imitation." Grandiose projects and schemes were copied abroad and transplanted into Africa. Huge foreign loans were contracted to establish state-owned factories and enterprises. In many cases, the industries were acquired recklessly with little planning or feasibility studies. Many of Africa's state-owned enterprises came to be towering monuments of inefficiency, riddled with graft and corruption. They scarcely achieved their capacity rate of utilization. Nigeria, for example, is littered with such "black elephants": Ajaokuta Steel Mills, Jakura Marble Plant, the Nigeria National Paper Manufacturing Company.

Third Fundamental Error: The Creation Of The Predatory State

After independence, the state assumed primary role in economic development. The degree of state interventionism of course varied from the superficial (in Botswana, Cameroon, and Mauritius) to the massive (in Algeria, Angola, Benin, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Zambia). The rationale for dirigisme emanated from two sources.

The first was ideological, a product of the misconceptions that emerged out of the liberation struggle against Western colonialism. Colonial rule was adjudged "evil and exploitative." This abhorrence of colonialism transformed itself into an ideological aversion to capitalism on the premise that, because the colonialists were capitalists, capitalism too was "evil and exploitative."

The second was a product of prevailing orthodoxy in much of the Third World at that time. It maintained the necessity of centralized planning and control for pragmatic reasons. Markets were assumed to be either non-existent or underdeveloped and could not possibly serve as a guide to investment decisions. Even where they existed, prices were often distorted by structural rigidities and supply inelasticities, providing unreliable signals to economic actors. In Africa, for example, organized capital markets have long been absent while commodity markets could be cornered by powerful commercial interests. Only the state could marshal the resources required to undertake large-scale development projects.

Accordingly, wide-ranging powers were conferred upon the state for this purpose – powers which eventually came to be concentrated in the hands of one individual (the head of state) and against which little or no countervailing checks or safeguards were attached. Development plans of various terms to maturity

proliferated across Africa in the 1960s. To help these plans achieve their objectives, a plethora of legislative controls were imposed on imports, exports, prices, rent, interests and flows of money, credit and foreign exchange. Import and exports controls, for example, were deemed necessary to conserve scarce foreign exchange. State enterprises were established and given exclusive franchises to shield the country from the avaricious propensities of foreign multinational corporations. Detailed controls over prices, the flow of money and credit ensured large-scale transfer of resources to the state. Ostensibly, the resources ceded to the state were to be employed efficiently and for purposes of development for all. But today, we know better.

In many African countries, the natives were squeezed out of industry, trade and commerce where the state emerged as the only, if not the domineering, player. Indigenous operators were not tolerated. Even trading, a centuries-old economic activity, was banned unless authorized by the state. The prices African peasants received for their produce were dictated by governments, not determined by market forces in accordance with African traditions. Prices of agricultural produce were fixed to render food cheap for the urban elites – the basis of political support for African governments. Under this oppressive system of price controls administered by African leaders and elites, Africa's peasants came to pay the world's most confiscatory taxes.

In Ethiopia, Guinea, Tanzania, and many other African countries, peasant farmers were forced to sell their produce or quotas only to state produce-buying agencies. When Zambian traders refused to sell their produce at government-dictated prices in 1988, authorities raided the markets. They arrested hundreds of people, took their money, tore down market stalls, and seized sugar, detergents, salt, maize meal, soft drinks, candles, flour, and clothing.

Resources, extracted from the rural areas through various legislative devices and controls, were never used for development for the peasants. The elites used them to develop only the urban areas, built statues and monuments for themselves. State structures in Africa quickly became unwieldy, rigid, inefficient, and overstaffed. The myriad of controls established by the state bred corruption, by creating rich opportunities to extract bribes and "commissions." By 1980, the state had become the problem.

The Solutions: What Works

1: Return To Africa's Roots

Africans now realize that foreign solutions or interventions do not always work in Africa and that Africa must find its own solutions to its problems. Fortunately, there is something for Africa to fall on: its own indigenous institutions, traditions and practices. Unfortunately, these are not well understood and myths abound. For centuries, Africa was denigrated as "backward" and "primitive," lacking any viable institutions of its own. Therefore, colonialism and slavery saved African natives from their own short, brutish existence. Of course, much of this was a self-serving justification for colonialism. The various "tribes" of Africa must have done "something" right or had some institutions for them to have survived for centuries.

The issue here is not how perfect or superior these institutions were. They had their strengths and weaknesses. Nor is the object here to glorify them. More important is a recognition of their existence and the fact that they still drive the actions of millions of African peasants – the majority in every African nation. An extensive discussion of indigenous African institutions cannot be attempted here but for further reading, see Ayittey (1991). Only brief summaries of the indigenous political and economic systems are presented below.

A Summary Of The Features Of The Indigenous Political System

African political systems and languages may be diverse and multitudinous. However, there were many basic beliefs, practices and institutions which were common to them. These may now be summarized.

BELIEFS

- A strong sense of family values was pervasive. Kinship was the article of social organization. The community's interests anteceded those of the individual for purposes of survival. However within the community, the individual was free-born politically, economically and socially. He was free to do what he chose with his life. Life was what he made of it in the community.
- The African philosophical tenet of "I am because we are" did not preclude individual achievement, prosperity or accumulation of wealth. The philosophical tenet, social mores and obligations merely set the parameters within which the individual could freely operate.
- There were differences in wealth, social status and power. The wealthy were revered. Their success was attributed to a blessing by ancestors, luck or sheer hard work. Industriousness was admired and valued but laziness was abjured.

NATIVE COURTS

- Virtually all the indigenous African states had courts to settle disputes and uphold individual and property rights within the community. Court hearings were open and any adult could attend them. Those present at court could air their opinions freely. The chief, who served as the judge, would weigh all viewpoints and reach a verdict.
- The judge was not infallible. His decision could be appealed or overruled by popular opinion. There was no written law and precedents were not important. Each case was adjudged upon the prevailing circumstances. Thus, native law was not rigid but adaptive to new situations.
- Decisions could be appealed from the family court to the village court and ultimately to the royal court.
- There was a detectable bias in favor of parents and the elderly as in disputes between a son and his mother or grandfather. However, native law came down more heavily on erring elders, for they were supposed to know better and set a good example for the youth.
- In the stateless societies, disputes were settled by moots. Although there were no sanctioning bodies, settlement was enforced by the rule of public opinion.

POLITICAL SYSTEM

- Tribal governments began at the village level. The founding lineage chose the chief. Chieftaincy was hereditary but not automatic. The choice of an heir was subject to the approval of the "royal" lineage or the Council of Elders," and, in some tribes, by the "Village Assembly." Even so, there were always rival claimants and competition for kingship, which generated the search for supporters. The chief was a leader, not a ruler. He was chosen to execute the will of the people and could not usurp such a will.
- The chief had an inner or privy council of advisers to assist him in administration. The duty of the advisers was to gauge public opinion and reprimand the chief, if need be, when he erred.
- The second unit of government was the "Council of Elders," who were the heads of the various lineages and thus representatives of the commoners, the majority. Council meetings were open and any adult could sit on them, participate and air their opinions freely. Dissidents were not jailed or massacred. Unanimity was the rule and when an issue proved contentious, a village meeting was called to put the issue before the people.
- The third unit was the "Village Assembly" - public assembly of all citizens. At the village meetings, individuals exercised their freedom of expression without fear of harassment. It was up to individuals to make sensible suggestions or fools of themselves. But their right to freedom of expression was respected and upheld. At such meetings, however, every effort was made to reach a consensus.
- Despotism was a theoretical possibility but not a practical fact. There were four checks against autocratic tendencies: the "royal" lineage, the inner council of advisers, the council of elders (headmen) and the village assembly. Without the councils, chiefs were powerless. Further, new laws had to be promulgated and ratified at the village assemblies for full debate by the people. Thus, in many states, there were checks and balances to curb despotism and the chief's power.
- The people always retained an inalienable power to exit. When all the checks against despotism failed, an unpopular or autocratic chief was abandoned through emigration beyond the boundaries of the chieftdom or state.

- The traditional role of the chief was not autocracy but to ensure the survival of his tribe, serve as an arbiter of disputes, act as caretaker of ancestral land and govern by consensus. He had to be impartial and be willing to listen to and encourage alternative viewpoints. The oppression and slaughter of his own people did not make sense. Nor did brutal despotism fit into this traditional role and the social system where there was intense competition for supporters and retainers.
- In the empires and kingdoms over subjugated tribes, the imperial rule was one of confederation. Strong centralized government was rare, and where it came into existence, did not last long because of the African's cultural passion for independence.
- There were two types of imperial rule: indirect rule with extensive local autonomy, and rule by assimilation. Assimilation, in turn, was of two types: religious and cultural. Religious assimilation, as in the Islamic empires, was not forced but gradual in the initial phases and spread over long periods of time. But cultural assimilation, as in the Zulu and French colonial policy, achieved little success.
- Under either type of imperial rule, there was a marked hierarchical political structure, radiating from the state council through provincial heads down to the village government. As in chiefdoms, the kings and emperors were also surrounded with councils without which they were powerless. In normal daily administration of kingdoms and empires, the kings played little political role. Much of their authority was delegated to provincial heads and subsequently to village chiefs. The kings occupied themselves mostly with spiritual and religious duties of the office of kingship. They were rarely seen in public and spoke through linguists.
- The village government in the empire was not radically altered. The tribes retained a large measure of autonomy and governed themselves as before and chiefs continued to be chosen by traditional methods. That is, the chiefs ruled through the inner council, the council of elders, and the village assembly.
- The military played little or no role in day-to-day government administration. In fact, most African states did not even have standing armies. The people were the army. Only in a few African kingdoms, such as the Asante, Dahomey and Zulu, were the military given a prominent role in governance. In the Islamic empires, military officers were appointed as nominal provincial heads. But other than that, the role of the military was to defend the tribe or empire against external threats, not to rule. Historical evidence does not show Africans being ruled by soldiers under the native system of government. Military rule, therefore, is without question as alien and un-African as colonial rule.

Summary Of The Features Of The Indigenous Economic System

LAND TENURE

- Land in the village did not belong to everybody as implied by 'communal ownership.' Land was lineage-controlled. The true owners of land were those who first settled on it - the ancestors. Although dead, their spirits were believed to be ever-present and guide the living.
- The chief or the lineage head was a mere custodian of the land. His role was to hold the land in trust. He could not deny a tribesman access to the land. Even strangers could obtain use rights upon the provision of a token gift. Use rights were virtually perpetual so long as a small tribute was paid, voluntary in some cases, and the land was not abused.
- Crops raised on the land belonged to individual farmers, not to the village chief or headman. What types of crops to cultivate was an individual choice.

- If a family abandoned their farmland and moved out of the tribal area, as was often the case, such unoccupied land fell into the custody of the chief for allocation. The chief would not claim ownership of this land even though the people might refer to it as belonging to the chief.

Economic Enterprise

- All the means of production were privately owned, not held by the state. Even land was not owned by the state or the chiefs. Lineage heads exercised control over land in most villages.
- The natives were free enterprisers, going about their economic activities on their own initiative, not at the command of chiefs. Profits made by them were theirs to keep, not for the chiefs to expropriate.
- There was no African law which prohibited the natives from making a profit or accumulating wealth in the course of their economic activities. Prosperity and wealth could be pursued but within the limits set by either Islam or social norms or both. Group loyalty or solidarity was generally held to be important and to the extent that there was no conflict the pursuit of wealth and prosperity was not debarred.
- The wealth of the rich was not sequestered by the chief or king for equal distribution to all the people. All the wealthy were required to do was to assist their poor kinsmen.
- There were few direct taxes. Only tribute was paid to the chief voluntarily. The size of the tribute was determined by how well the chief governed. The kings derived much of their revenue from their own royal estates and gardens. In essence, the kings looked after themselves.
- After the abolition of the slave trade and with the restoration of peace, trade expanded and market tolls and duties increasingly provided the bulk of state revenue. But all taxes, gifts and other forms of donations to the chief or king still belonged to the people to be used in times of need or emergency to assist them.
- In general, there were no state or tribal government enterprises, except in very few cases such as Kingdom of Dahomey. A king or chief could operate a farm, a mine or some commercial enterprise. But it was for his own benefit, not purposedly for the welfare of the people. It was not his traditional function to use his farm, if he chose to have one, to feed his people. The people fed themselves and provided for their needs.
- In many indigenous systems, there was generally no direct interference with production or distribution of commodities. Agricultural production and trading were activities dominated by women. What these women cultivated and traded were their own decisions to make.
- Markets and trade were free and open. Though trade in some few commodities, such as slaves or ivory, was reserved for the king, in general no king or chief monopolized trade or markets to the total exclusion of his subjects. It would have been an un-African thing to do. Rather the chiefs encouraged their people to engage in trade and it was the traditional function of the chief to create a peaceful atmosphere for his people to engage in free trade.
- Prices on native markets were not fixed or controlled by the chiefs. They were, in general, determined by market forces - supply and demand. These principles were understood by the natives and they bargained over prices. Markets were well structured and organized in West Africa under 'Market Queens.' At most markets, systems were in place to settle trade disputes.

- Though some powerful merchants tried to control markets and fix prices, open competition was the rule. Nor could such competition be eliminated. There were numerous suppliers, middlemen, brokers, trade routes as well as substitutes. Trade in indigenous products could not be controlled, but the possibilities existed for that over 'imported' items. However, even in these cases, control could not be complete, since alternative trade routes existed.

In Africa's indigenous system of government, the African chief was chosen or appointed by a Queenmother with the full approval of the Council of Elders. He did not appoint himself. If the chief did not govern according to the will of the people, he was destooled (or removed) or abandoned by his people. The people voted with their feet and moved elsewhere. The history of Africa is full of migration of people.

In governance, the chief and the councillors had to reach unanimity on all important matters. Any adult could participate in the council meetings called ndaba by the Zulu or kgotlas by the Botswana. In Senegal, even slaves, djam, sent their representatives to the king's court. In Angola, King Alfonso allowed the Portuguese merchants to send their representative, Don Rodrigo, to his court.

Traditional African political decision-making is noted for its protracted debates. If the chief and the elders were deadlocked on an issue, a village meeting would be called and the issue put before the people. It would be debated back and forth until a consensus was reached. These village meetings, usually held under a big tree at the village market square, are variously called pitso by the Xhosa and asetena_kese by the Ashanti.

The indigenous African system of government was open. No one was locked out of the decision-making process. One did not have to belong to one political party or family to participate in the process. The chief did not declare the village to be a one-party state. Nor imposed an alien ideology on his people. The political tradition of sitting under a big tree to debate issues to reach a consensus was there before the Europeans set foot on the continent.

In the economic sphere, the means of production were owned by Africans, not by their chiefs or tribal governments. Even land was not owned by the chief. Land belonged to the ancient ancestors and the chief acted as a mere custodian. What was grown on the land was private property, belonging to the farmers, not to the chief. Peasants were free to choose what occupation they wished. They did not queue in front of the chief's hut for permission to engage in trade.

Pre-colonial Africa was characterized by great freedom of movement of people and of trade. A dense web of trade routes (for example, the Trans-Saharan) criss-crossed the continent, along which the natives moved freely and engaged in trade. Africans have long had an ingrained cultural propensity to trade. Throughout their history, they have been known to travel great distances to purchase goods from "strangers" at cheaper prices to sell at higher prices to make a profit. Much of this activity was free from state controls and regulations. State intervention in trade, commerce and markets by Africa's traditional rulers was the exception rather than the rule. There was no native African law which forbade Africans from entering into businesses if they wished. By nature and tradition, Africans have always been free enterprisers. Markets were the nerve-centers of traditional African societies and market activity was dominated by women and still is.

These are the economic roots Africa must return to. It is a shame that US AID, World Bank and IMF must bribe various African governments, under programs known as "Structural Adjustment," to make this move.

2. Crisis, Conflict Resolution

Africans are under no illusion that democracy alone would solve all their problems. It will only help establish the stable environment needed for development. It is obvious that development cannot occur under a brutal, corrupt dictatorship that savagely suppresses human rights. Nor can development occur in an environment wracked by civil war and strife. All of Africa's civil wars involve a government on one side and a rebel group or coalition of opposition groups on the other. As such, they are underpinned by political factors: competition for political power or to secede from an oppressive state. We now know that had Angola, Ethiopia, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, been democratic, these countries would have been saved. What type of democracy would be most suitable for Africa is for the African people themselves to determine.

Traditionally, Africans have made this determination by convening a "Village Meeting" under a big tree, where the issue was hammered out until a consensus was reached. Once secured, all, including the chief and councillors, were required to abide by it. To build upon this tradition, a national conference must be convened either to chart the political future of an African country, defuse a crisis or resolve a political stalemate. Currently, a stalemate or crisis exist in following African countries: Burundi, Ghana, Kenya,

Nigeria, Uganda, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tanzania and Zaire. We should not wait for these countries to blow up before sending emergency relief aid.

A national conference must be made up of representatives from all identifiable groups – political, religious, military, professional, peasant, etc. The "national conference" must be "sovereign"; that is, its decisions binding upon all parties, including military government and cannot be abrogated. This mechanism was successfully used to make peaceful political transitions in Benin, Cape Verde Islands, Congo and South Africa. The Convention For a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) was in essence a national conference, whose decisions were binding upon the de Klerk Government. But in Togo and Zaire, the national conference failed when delegates misused the forum to pursue their own personal vendetta. In Zaire, for example, national conference delegates openly insulted President Mobutu and demanded his head. Similarly, in Togo.

Further, national conferences in Africa should avoid these mistakes. Its agenda must be restricted to a few key issues, such as the transition to democratic rule and the setting up of an interim administration. A national conference is not the place to solve all the country's economic problems, try the head of state, or write the constitution.

The national conference, like the village meeting, is the forum where Africans resolved their disputes. It is the African tradition and it is this tradition which the U.S. should try and support in Africa.

Thank you.

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ISBN 0-16-046617-2



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